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This book is unlike any other project i have ever undertaken and, admittedly, it 
is the happy coincidence of fly-fishing and history. in fact, the book ought to be 
subtitled “a river ran through it,” but norman Maclean beat me to it. My interest 
in this comparison started in 2006 while fly-fishing in yellowstone national Park. 
i came across a road sign in the park by nez Perce creek that briefly described 
the flight of the nez Perce and their incredible escape through the park. i was 
curious. i picked up a few books and started learning about the tragic fate of 
chief Joseph and his people, but more importantly, i began to notice similarities 
between nineteenth-century american attitudes toward indians in general and 
Russian attitudes toward the empire’s minorities living in central asia and the 
caucasus. These similarities sparked a comparative curiosity. i noticed similar 
attitudes, imageries, stereotypes, and consequences. I am not a disciple of Marc 
Bloch, considered by many to be the father of comparative history, but came 
to this comparative study only after reading literature outside of my studies in 
Russian and central asian history. i am, essentially, an accidental comparativist.
having spent years in central asia—chiefly in almaty, Kazakhstan, study-
ing the region—i had already noticed the geographic similarities between the 
Kazakh steppe and the northern plains. But until 2006 i had not made the 
connection between the american process of expansion and colonization and 
Russian expansion—in particular, the colonizers’ attitudes, perceptions, imag-
ery, and typologies of colonized minorities. donald W. Treadgold’s books and 
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articles—required reading for anyone interested in imperial Russian expansion—
should have alerted me to the possible similarities, as he encouraged scholars to 
test frederick Jackson Turner’s frontier thesis in the Russian historical context. it 
did not register with me, in part because Turner and Treadgold tended to neglect 
american and Russian indigenous populations; they focused instead on expan-
sion and resettlement of pioneers and peasants but gave minimal attention to 
the policies implemented by the united states and Russia to delimitate spaces 
between settler and native.
as a student, i was keen to understand Russia and its historical relationship 
with the Kazakhs and never considered a comparative possibility, certainly not 
with the united states. What comparative works i read dealt with china and 
its relationships with minority nationalities—especially those living in Xinjiang, 
such as the Kazakhs and uighurs. in fact, i only read Turner’s famous article 
once before, as an undergraduate, so i was somewhat blissfully unaware of the 
century-long debate about his thesis. having trained in graduate school as a 
Russian and central asian historian, i had a foundation for one side of this com-
parison, but not the other.
after thinking about the similarities and, perhaps more importantly, the 
differences between american expansion and colonization of the sioux and 
Russian expansion and colonization of Kazakhs, i approached my american his-
tory colleagues to discuss the idea. Their enthusiastic response to this project 
frankly surprised me—or perhaps i was simply pleased they did not greet it 
with derisive laughter. The next test for this comparative study came at the 2009 
Western historical association annual conference in denver, where i presented 
a rough essay of this project. once again, i was somewhat taken aback by the 
thoroughly positive response. The Western Historical Quarterly published a sig-
nificantly revised version of that paper in 2012, which reinforced considerably 
my belief that this project had merit.1 This work is an attempt to elaborate more 
fully on the various themes and interpretations addressed in that article.
it was not possible to complete this project without the invaluable assistance, 
advice, encouragement, and good humor from so many friends and colleagues. 
This project expanded and improved, i hope, due to their support. first, my 
colleagues in the history department at the university of north carolina at 
charlotte were amazing, patient, and sincerely interested as this book evolved. 
Most notably, John david smith and carol higham read numerous drafts, lis-
tened to my complaints and travails, gave advice, asked questions, and con-
sistently offered inspiration during its several years’ incubation. several other 
colleagues offered advice and support along the way, including but certainly 
not limited to Jürgen Buchenau, dan dupre, Peter Thorsheim, and Benny 
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andres. in addition, the dean of the college of liberal arts and sciences at 
unc charlotte, dr. nancy Gutierrez, made available financial research support 
and time to write. i also benefited tremendously from my university’s faculty 
Research Grants Program, which provided further financial means to travel 
to archives in Kazakhstan and the united states. in addition, grants from the 
charles Redd center at Brigham young university made it possible for me to 
conduct research in regional archives and libraries.
in Kazakhstan, my dear friend and colleague sakhinur dautova was always 
ready to help, and i am forever grateful. Many friends and colleagues provided 
welcome respites from the archives and libraries, especially the Between the 
Pillars fishing club. Thank you, Paul Roberts, John strafford, shahbaz Minallah, 
and others too numerous to mention, who seemed always ready with a smile, a 
beer, and good conversation.
other colleagues offered incredible advice and support as well, and i would 
be negligent if i failed to express my gratitude to clyde ellis, sheila McManus, 
Will Katerburg, Paula Michaels, and especially david Wrobel, who read the 
manuscript for the university Press of colorado. Professor Wrobel identified 
numerous areas in the manuscript that needed reconstruction and reconfigu-
ration. i am indebted to him for his meticulous reading and commentary. Two 
other anonymous readers also provided pointed and valuable comments. any 
failings in this project remain, as always, with the author.
i must also thank darrin Pratt and Jessica d’arbonne of the university Press 
of colorado. Their early interest in this project was critical to move it forward, 
and their steadfast patience as i worked through the various stages of research 
and writing was instrumental to its completion. always they exhibited an enthu-
siasm and confidence in this book that just as frequently waned for me as I 
struggled to put the pieces of the puzzle together. To each, i offer my heartfelt 
thanks, though it hardly seems sufficient.
finally, without the love and support of my family—anita, conor, and sean—
this project would have undoubtedly remained a work in progress. now that it 
is finished, i am reminded of a seemingly innocuous conversation i had several 
years ago, one that makes sense to me in retrospect.
in 1996 i was in almaty, conducting dissertation research. during a din-
ner conversation with leading Kazakh historian Mambet Koigeldiev, the topic 
turned to Russian imperialism and colonization and its consequences for 
Kazakh nomads. I was generally quite critical of the Russians, but not so my host. 
he surprised me when he commented that the Kazakh people suffered might-
ily under Russian rule, but he also said, “What we took from the Russians only 
made us stronger as a nation. We survived. Kazakhs have their own country now. 
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Where are your indians?” i felt completely foolish; i mumbled something about 
reservations and that native americans too have survived, fully realizing how 
ignorant i was about the topic. another friend joined the conversation, and she 
mentioned that the “Russians were not bad colonizers, better than the chinese.” 
The conversation turned to china; i was grateful for the comparative reprieve. 
looking back all these years later, that conversation planted the seed for this 
comparative study, and the rivers in yellowstone gave it the chance to bloom.
noTe
 1. steven sabol, “comparing american and Russian internal colonization: The ‘Touch of 
civilisation’ on the sioux and Kazakhs,” Western Historical Quarterly 43 (spring 2012): 29–51.





This work compares the process and practice of nineteenth-century american 
and Russian internal colonization—a form of contiguous, continental expansion, 
imperialism, and colonialism that incorporated indigenous lands and peoples. 
Both the republican united states and tsarist Russia exercised internal coloniza-
tion, yet they remain neglected in many studies devoted to nineteenth-century 
imperialism and colonialism. scholars generally ignore the united states in 
studies that compare empires and colonization because, as amy Kaplan argued, 
“united states expansion is often treated as an entirely separate phenomenon 
from european colonialism of the nineteenth century.”1 similarly, scholars often 
neglect Russian colonial expansion because, as Taras hunczak noted, it was “a 
continental state, its expansion has been viewed largely as a process of unification 
and consolidation.”2 The contiguous nature of both the united states and Russia, 
and the proximity of colonized regions, seems to exclude each from discussions 
of nineteenth-century empires, colonialism, and internal colonization. historian 
James Belich reiterated a slightly different element of this concept, positing that, 
even now, “american westward migration is seldom seen in the context of other 
great migrations—pan-anglo, pan-european, or global. This is partly because it 
happened to be overland and ‘internal,’ yet in this it was no different from the 
Russian migration to siberia or chinese migration to Manchuria.”3
The united states and Russia blurred the distinctions between their met-
ropolitan origins and their newly incorporated territories by amalgamating 
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them into a single polity.4 The seamlessness to american and Russian move-
ments reinforced perceptions of expansion rather than empire or colonization. 
american and Russian expansions appeared more natural—almost as organic 
extensions of physical and geographical boundaries. nonetheless, american 
and Russian contiguous expansion echoed european overseas expansion, where 
every “settler frontier required the active political, military, and fiscal engage-
ment and support of an aggrandizing state.”5 in both cases, expansion started 
slowly, often clumsily, but accelerated during the nineteenth century without 
any clear understanding of the people and their number, societies, histories, and 
traditions and the problems american and Russian troops, settlers, or officials 
might encounter. The united states and Russia were not accidental empires; 
instead, they were opportunistic, deliberate, and aggressive empires.
few scholars dispute that france, Great Britain, holland, Belgium, and, to 
some extent, Germany, were imperial powers. up to and during the nineteenth 
century, these european empires colonized most of africa and much of asia, 
and spain and Great Britain remained the united states’ most serious impe-
rial rivals in north and south america. Russia was clearly an imperial power 
in siberia, the caucasus, and central asia. in comparison, however, scholars 
frequently neglect the United States in conversations about nineteenth-century 
empires. nonetheless, the united states colonized the louisiana Territory, Texas, 
california, and all the land between the oceans. The united states incorpo-
rated these territories largely through imperial negotiations with france, Great 
Britain, and Spain, but it also won this territory through conquest against Mexico, 
Great Britain, and indigenous peoples, such as the Sioux, Comanche, Iroquois, 
Kiowa, navajo, and dozens of other tribes. Thus, it suggests that the nineteenth-
century united states colonized, but it had no colonies. The united states was 
an empire but not imperial.6 in Russia, a comparable argument emerged, in this 
sense at least: the Russian empire colonized, but it had no colonies. Russia was, 
however, imperial.
Russia’s expansion began in the fifteenth century, and, ultimately, it colonized 
ukraine, Poland, finland, the Baltics, siberia, alaska, the caucasus, and cen-
tral Asia. It acquired much of this territory through conquest over the Turks, 
Tatars, Poles, chinese, Kazakhs, Bashkirs, Turkmen, ossetians, and dozens of 
other peoples. up until the nineteenth century, Russia’s principal imperial 
rivals lay in asia: the ottoman Turks and the Qing dynasty in china.7 in the 
nineteenth century, Great Britain sporadically challenged Russia, but it had few 
serious imperial adversaries as it expanded across the continent. The ostensible 
absence of colonies during the nineteenth century should not hide the fact that 
both the united states and Russia colonized territories and organized internal 
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colonization, which was the process and mechanism of american and Russian 
expansion and imperial rule over indigenous populations.
This work provides a critical, comparative examination of internal colonization 
exercised by the united states and Russia and experienced by two indigenous 
populations—the sioux and the Kazakhs—to negate the “tendency to isolate the 
study of American history, to overemphasize the uniqueness of the American 
development and to exalt national pride.”8 it seeks to incorporate the united 
states into the wider nineteenth-century colonial and imperial “international con-
text” typically accepted for european imperialism and colonialism.9 This compari-
son is broad in scope, temporarily and geographically.
at the heart of this study is, of course, the issue of empire and internal colo-
nization. Was the united states an empire? did it colonize land and people? 
did it exploit and hold dominion over alien peoples? Was it territorial or eco-
nomic imperialism or both? Was it internal colonization? These are processes 
typically associated with nineteenth-century european imperialism and colo-
nization. On the surface, the answer to all these questions appears to be yes. 
Certainly, Alexis de Tocqueville thought so when he wrote that their “starting-
point is different, and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems 
marked out by the will of heaven to sway destinies of half the globe.”10 yet, as 
ann laura stoler and carole McGranahan noted, in their introduction to the 
edited essay collection Imperial Formations, “What scholars have sometimes 
taken to be aberrant empires—the american, Russian, or chinese empires—
may indeed be quintessential ones, consummate producers of excepted pop-
ulations, excepted spaces, and their own exception from international and 
domestic laws.”11 Scholars do not question that Russia was an empire, that it 
colonized land and peoples, that it exercised dominion over non-Russians, that 
it exploited its own population, or that it exerted control over the economy and 
exercised internal colonization. scholars do not often compare Russia to other 
nineteenth-century empires.12
in the united states, however, it appears to be an unsettled interpretation of 
the american experience, although as sandra M. Gustafson argued, the idea of 
an american empire “waxed and waned, but it has never been entirely absent” in 
american historiography.13 in 1988 lloyd c. Gardner explained the discrepancy 
in his presidential address to the society for historians of american foreign 
Relations. he reminded his audience that the “american empire was still ‘the 
empire that dare not speak its name’ ” because, he observed, “we are still very 
far from agreed about the circumstances of its creation, and its purpose.”14 
american geographer Jedidiah Morse understood its purpose, however, when 
he wrote in 1792, “it is well known that empire has been travelling from east 
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to west. Probably her last and broadest feat will be america.” he exuberantly 
prophesized that “we cannot but anticipate the period, as not far distant, when 
the american empire will comprehend millions of souls, west of the Mississippi. 
Judging upon probable grounds, the Mississippi was never designed as the west-
ern boundary of the american empire.”15 Thus, by comparing the united states 
and its expansion with tsarist Russia, this study will demonstrate more clearly 
Stoler and McGranahan’s theory that the United States and Russia were “quint-
essential” empires that mirrored one another in theory and practice, but neither 
was an exception or exceptional.
In order to answer these questions, this work examines the process of internal 
colonization using the conquest and internal colonization of the Sioux and the 
Kazakhs as key case studies. These two nomadic, militarily powerful societies 
represented distinct challenges and obstacles to american and Russian expan-
sion. That should not suggest that the apache, navajo, or cheyenne easily suc-
cumbed to american power or that the uzbeks, chechens, or Turkmen posed 
any less of an obstacle to Russian expansion. This comparative study examines 
the process of american and Russian internal colonization to construct very 
different empires, which bear no relation to each other, and the subsequent 
comparable consequences for the Sioux and the Kazakhs during American and 
Russian imperial expansion.
specifically, this study examines american and Russian internal colonization 
practiced against the sioux and the Kazakhs. in particular, it examines how and 
why perceptions of the sioux and Kazakhs as ostensibly uncivilized peoples, and 
similarly held american and Russian perceptions of the northern plains and 
the Kazakh steppe as “uninhabited” regions that ought to be settled, reinforced 
american and Russian government sedentarization policies and land allotment 
programs among the sioux and Kazakhs. in addition, it compares the processes 
practiced by the two empires and the various forms of sioux and Kazakh mar-
tial, political, social, and cultural resistance evident throughout the nineteenth 
century.
As different as American and Russian expansion and conquest of continen-
tal interiors might initially appear, the consequences for the Sioux and the 
Kazakhs are remarkably similar; and the solutions devised by the united states 
and Russia to deal with intractable nomadic peoples share many parallels and 
results. in both cases, the colonizing power expressed absolute confidence in 
its civilizing mission and realized its own greatness through territorial expan-
sion and the introduction of progress, prosperity, and stability and social, eco-
nomic, and political order. Martial, cultural, and intellectual resistance by the 
sioux and Kazakhs to the superior power and, by extension, its general civilizing 
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tendencies, produced in the minds of americans and Russians only two possible 
outcomes for the sioux and the Kazakhs: assimilation or extermination. The 
process of internal colonization of the sioux and the Kazakhs and its compari-
son deepens our understanding of and redirects attention to the united states 
and Russia as active participants in the nineteenth-century imperial conquests 
undertaken by other european powers in asia and africa. it reveals a univer-
sal struggle between civilization and savagism—between internal and external 
colonialism—and negates the tendency to study the united states and Russia in 
isolation or as singular national histories. When viewed through a comparative 
prism, american expansion no longer seems exceptional or a rejection of “old 
Europe” for something uniquely “American” but rather as part of a global pro-
cess; and Russian expansion and conquest, and its subsequent treatment of its 
indigenous populations, no longer appears more brutal, more autocratic, more 
Russo-centric.
comparing american and Russian colonization of the northern plains and 
the Kazakh steppe—particularly the relationship between the expanding power 
and the indigenous Sioux and Kazakhs—serves to connect the conquests to the 
nineteenth-century global colonizing experience.16 Trade, land, and security 
motivated both the united states and Russia to expand, and the greater wealth, 
superior technology, power, and population eventually eclipsed both sioux 
and Kazakh abilities to resist colonization. Throughout the nineteenth cen-
tury, intensified migration and the occupation of land by american settlers and 
Russian peasants on land previously, but historically, claimed by the sioux and 
the Kazakhs resulted in sporadic contact and conflict in proportion to american 
and Russian formalized control. contested claims to the land between colonizer 
and colonized critically undermined their relations.
after 1850 americans and Russians assumed more formal control of sioux and 
Kazakh indigenous sovereignty as the machineries of internal colonization sub-
ordinated sioux and Kazakh political decision-making to the colonizers’ socio-
political and economic structures.17 sioux and Kazakh political, economic, social, 
and cultural dependence and collaboration intensified as american and Russian 
policies altered and eventually vitiated sioux and Kazakh sovereignty. Motivated 
by stereotypes and misperceptions of the sioux and Kazakhs, americans and 
Russians created an environment that made expansion and internal coloniza-
tion—and, ultimately, civilizing the nomads—part of the national mission. as 
helen carr noted, colonizing powers reformulated policies derived in part from 
misperceptions of the indigenous peoples and the urgency to occupy the land 
and settle the nomads into agriculturalists that justified “removal of land as the 
granting of civilization.”18
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americans and Russians embraced numerous preconceived images of the 
sioux and Kazakhs as they ventured into the plains and steppe—particularly 
notions of their own superior culture, society, and civilization when compared 
to the savage nomads.19 in the nineteenth century, the Jeffersonian belief in 
agrarian social theory intensified, the “agricultural paradise” that anticipated 
the “imaginary figure of the wild horseman of the plains . . . replaced by that of 
the stout yeoman.”20 The Russian government similarly perceived Russian peas-
ants as carriers of the agrarian ideal, the purveyors of modernity and equal to 
american pioneers.21 This portrait of american pioneers appeared in an unvar-
nished stereotype, and Robert l. Mason’s distilled imagery resonated for many 
readers. in 1927 he wrote,
The frontier cabin in america should be emblazoned upon her coat of arms. 
The historical movement of this cabin across the whole of the american con-
tinent from the first built by the english at Jamestown in 1607 to the last built 
on the final frontier of alaska has always heralded the vanguard of civilization. 
When we think of the frontiersman, wherever he may be, we see the cabin 
with its fort-like aspect and its primitive rifleman protected behind its heavy 
walls; of its peaceful smoke filling the valley showing a home under durance—
but a home nevertheless—making a way in the wilderness for the mighty 
tread of civilization. . . . it suggests clean-mindedness and good citizenship. it 
implies the loss of sordidness which often goes hand in hand with the wealth 
of a country—and ours is wealthy.22
This elegant vision of the past reveals the mythology spawned by the ameri-
can expansion westward. The frontier cabin was a home, it was protection, and 
it represented civilization in the wilderness. The cabin helped to conquer the 
frontier. scholars, however, understand that the american expansion across the 
continent was more than a cabin, more than a simple expansion of civilization 
that defeated the wilderness. american expansion and internal colonization was 
complex, but often lost in the conversation was that the united states differed 
little from other contemporary empires.
as scholars take note of indigenous populations’ reactions to colonialism and 
colonization, a tendency developed to neglect the ideology or motivation of the 
colonizing power. yet there are complimentary narratives that make understand-
ing both sides critical to understanding the whole. One of the consequences 
of colonialism and colonization was that indigenous sociopolitical or economic 
institutional norms that functioned in a pre-colonized era decayed and became 
inoperative or dysfunctional, which isolated the community from its constitu-
ent parts.23 expansion resulted in conflict that ultimately forced the sioux and 
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Kazakhs to settle onto land deemed by the colonizer as sufficient for occupation 
and agriculture.24
american and Russian expansion and internal colonization in some cases 
destroyed native sovereignty and institutions, but sioux and Kazakh social, cul-
tural, and spiritual vestiges adapted and survived in various ways. Both the colo-
nizer and colonized reacted and adapted to the relationship as it evolved. for 
example, the americans and the Russians adopted administrative tactics that 
suited their colonizer sensibilities. according to Jeffrey ostler, american power 
“manifested itself through reservation agencies administered by the indian 
office.”25 The government expected sioux leaders, identified by reservation 
agents, to maintain order within this alien political environment. Restrictions 
placed on the sioux and Kazakhs obstructed mobility and forced settlement 
and impoverishment, not assimilation. Russia did not establish reservations but 
instead confined Kazakhs to volosty (administrative units) and uezdy (districts) 
to raise livestock or farm—an environment just as restrictive as the american 
reservation system. it was two different solutions, but one similar result.
in response to american and Russian internal colonization, the imperial 
expansion produced diverse forms of resistance among the sioux and Kazakhs; 
however, internal colonization also shaped their adaptive strategies. adoption 
and adaptation meant survival. The internal colonization practices established 
by the united states and tsarist Russia did not exterminate the sioux or the 
Kazakhs, as sundry nineteenth-century observers predicted. sioux and Kazakh 
society weakened, their cultures radically altered, and individuals were economi-
cally dislocated and impoverished; yet they survived despite dispossession and 
the intensive cultural, social, political, and economic consequences of internal 
colonization. The concerns that the sioux and the Kazakhs must perish or assim-
ilate did not, and likely could not, predict the powerful forces that ultimately 
aligned to sustain greatly weakened sioux and Kazakh communities and preserve 
cultural attachments and symbols, language, and religious beliefs. and yet some 
scholars regard american expansion as somehow worse—an unparalleled “colo-
nial occupation” and “one of the greatest known land thefts in human history.”26 
This inherently comparative statement assumes that no other colonial occupation 
was continental in scope and that american expansion was an exceptional “theft.”
This comparison, at its core, is a macro rather than a micro examination. it is 
designed to compare how and why two nineteenth-century expanding powers 
colonized two different peoples, yet one is clearly understood and accepted to 
be an empire (Russia) and the other is not (united states). it compares two dif-
ferent nineteenth-century colonizing states that exercised dominion over two 
different peoples on two separate continents. it traces the policies to colonize 
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different lands and peoples in order to illuminate that the united states and 
tsarist Russia were quintessential nineteenth-century empires, no different 
from Great Britain, france, Belgium, or any other imperial, colonizing power at 
that time. The comparative prism that examines the internal colonization by the 
united states and Russia changes the historical narrative, however slightly, to 
incorporate the two contiguous empires into nineteenth-century imperial and 
colonial history.
This work does not fully compare the sioux and Kazakh peoples, although 
they figure prominently throughout this work. it does examine the indigenous 
peoples’ response to american and Russian imperialism, which influenced the 
dynamics of nineteenth-century internal colonization. To the extent possible, 
this study contextualizes the sioux and Kazakhs in their world, as they endured 
the loss of sovereignty and territory to the united states and Russia.
This work does not assume that the sioux or Kazakhs were passive recipi-
ents or victims of american and Russian civilization, mere nonparticipants in 
the process of internal colonization. in fact, the sioux and the Kazakhs resisted 
American and Russian expansion and conquest with martial vigor, and at other 
times, they deployed more subtle means. Both the sioux and the Kazakhs 
influenced the course of events; they managed the variegated social, political, 
economic, and cultural changes wrought by internal colonization. Most impor-
tantly, the sioux and the Kazakhs survived—a fate few believed possible in the 
nineteenth century. They lost sovereignty over various aspects of their lives but 
retained a small degree of autonomy and managed to sustain their society, lan-
guage, culture, and, to some extent—certainly in the Kazakh case—a meager 
economy.
The sioux and the Kazakhs adapted to and adopted the changes occurring 
all around them. The americans and Russians incorporated the sioux and the 
Kazakhs into their empires and compelled the nomads to adapt and adopt alien 
cultural, social, economic, and political structures. in so doing, the sioux and 
Kazakhs adjusted to the new environment and survived. To paraphrase frederick 
Jackson Turner, the plains and the steppe were not a land without people, but a 
people without land.27 People were there, and they resisted internal colonization. 
The sioux and the Kazakhs were not static societies but changed before, during, 
and after colonization. The typology and imagery of nomadism reinforced per-
ceptions that extinction was the only possible outcome rather than recognition 
that the sioux and the Kazakhs could adapt and survive.28
in the nineteenth century, travelers and visitors to the united states and tsar-
ist Russia typically had two very different impressions of both places. america 
was lively and energetic, and its government was democratic, forward-looking, 
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and progressive. The american people expressed optimism, faith in the future, 
and a belief in their own destiny. Russia, on the other hand, was dark and forbid-
ding, the people quite gloomy and fatalistic. Writers often depicted the Russian 
peasant as backward, ignorant, dirty, and as superstitious as the land and people 
the empire colonized in siberia, the caucasus, and central asia.29 foreigners 
often described Russia and its government as backward in the extreme: auto-
cratic, ruthless, brutal, and despotic.30 indeed, these seemingly entrenched ste-
reotypes, often expressed by americans and Russians themselves and just as 
frequently contradictory, prevailed in the literature of the day.
These two opposite characterizations extend the gap for this comparison, or 
so it seems. how can two countries and two peoples, depicted in such contrary 
ways, end up in the same place: expanding empires that internally colonized 
indigenous peoples? What philosophies and ideologies were at work? What 
typologies and images pervaded american and Russian perceptions and atti-
tudes about the sioux and the Kazakhs? What were the principal motivations for 
expansion and internal colonization? What were the consequences for the Sioux 
and the Kazakhs? america had its “indian Problem,” Russia its “nationality 
Question,” and each pursued policies designed to resolve the problem or answer 
the question. There were clearly diverse opinions about the Sioux held by differ-
ent segments of american society, and, periodically, prominent individuals and 
groups disagreed with the common typologies, perceptions, attitudes, and imag-
ery used to characterize not just the sioux but all indians. and not all Russians—
high official or lowly peasant—thought, much less cared, about the Kazakhs or 
the steppe. But are the united states and tsarist Russia comparable? This study 
seeks to demonstrate that internal colonization by the united states and tsarist 
Russia are indeed comparable, but not in every facet; and there were notable 
differences.
This work takes a broader focus than many other comparative histories, cover-
ing a wide temporal space, from the earliest contacts between the americans and 
the sioux and the Russians and the Kazakhs up to the first decade of the twen-
tieth century. although the starting points for american and Russian expansion 
occurred at different times, by the later part of the nineteenth century, the pro-
cesses and mechanisms of internal colonization and resettlement reveal more 
similarities than differences. chapter 1 of this study examines sioux and Kazakh 
societies, at least to the extent possible, in their social, cultural, and economic 
milieu. chapter 2 examines the early phases of contact between europeans 
and the sioux and Russians and the Kazakhs, up to the nineteenth century. 
chapter 3 examines the American and Russian conquest, as well as Sioux and 
Kazakh resistance, and the early evolution of american and Russian internal 
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colonization policies. chapter 4 examines american and Russian perceptions 
and attitudes—particularly the typologies and imagery that influenced colonial 
policies in the steppe and plains. chapter 5 and chapter 6 examine those policies 
and the consequences for the Sioux and the Kazakhs—most particularly those 
related to land, civilization, sedentarization, and assimilation—from the latter 
half of the nineteenth century to roughly the start of World War i.
The year 1914 was a global and historical turning point—unquestionably so 
for the United States and tsarist Russia. The consequences of the First World 
War changed the course of global european imperialism and colonialism. The 
war dramatically changed relations between the colonizer and the colonized 
in india, africa, asia, the united states, and Russia. Russian society agonized 
tremendously during the war and experienced untold suffering during the 1917 
revolutions and civil War. Moreover, the 1917 Russian Revolution, with the sub-
sequent Bolshevik victory, ushered in a dramatically different relationship in the 
Kazakh steppe in the 1920s and early 1930s. The sioux, however, resided in a 
strong, confident united states that fully emerged economically and militarily 
on the world stage. By the 1930s, the sioux and the Kazakhs existed in a different 
world—one that transformed the social, political, economic, and cultural land-
scape that existed just a decade before. The united states experienced a some-
what different revolution in the 1930s, in the midst of the Great depression; 
and the federal government attempted to reform, once again, the relationship 
between indians and the government with the introduction of the 1934 indian 
Reorganization act, also known as the Wheeler-howard act. The united states 
and the soviet union took interesting, but considerably different, approaches in 
the 1930s to deal with the legacies of internal colonization.
souRces
This work relies principally on published primary and secondary sources to 
interpret american and Russian typologies and imagery of the colonized lands 
and peoples.31 an extensive amount of american government-related materials is 
available to scholars, such as indian agent and us army reports published by the 
Government Printing office (GPo). The Russian government also produced a 
significant amount of material for scholars to examine, though not as broad as in 
the united states. other valuable published materials include memoirs, travel-
ogues, and the personal papers of leading officials.
in the nineteenth century, american, Russian, and foreign writers were char-
acteristically comparative, frequently fixated on the innate weaknesses and 
backwardness of the indigenous populations they encountered and observed in 
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comparison to their own. in most cases, the context for these works was com-
parative empire, expansion, and national pride. nineteenth-century americans 
moving westward were a more literate people than Russian peasants—a fact that 
is reflected in the types of sources used in this comparison. americans wrote 
decidedly about the land and the people they encountered. The sioux in the 
1860s and 1870s were a particularly popular topic. americans migrating west-
ward, crossing the Great Plains, wrote extensively and frequently about their 
journeys, adventures, hardships, and encounters with indians. Many travelers 
published memoirs, diaries, and histories, and others deposited their accounts 
with state historical societies’ libraries or in university libraries. These unofficial 
sources and literary works remain an extensive, invaluable resource not repli-
cated in Russian imperial history.
The meager amount of unofficial sources might frustrate a student of Russian 
expansion and colonization of the Kazakhs and the steppe, when compared to 
the richness of american materials, particularly if he or she is trying to examine 
and evaluate perceptions and attitudes among peasants. Russian intellectuals 
and writers certainly produced a copious amount of material about the Russian 
empire—most notably, about the caucasus and the far east—but the Russian 
peasants who migrated eastward into siberia and settled on the Kazakh steppe 
in the nineteenth century simply did not record their journey with the same 
tenacity that americans did. Russian government officials, military men, sci-
entists, and others did produce a valuable written record of time spent among 
the Kazakhs—their way of life, religion, economy, etc.—but it is a profile in 
which the historian must tease out typologies, imagery, perceptions, and atti-
tudes. By the 1890s, Russian officials frequently asked Russian peasants ques-
tions that usually dealt with points of origin or destination. They rarely posed an 
official question—“What do you think of Kazakhs?”—to Russians moving east. 
Moreover, Russian peasants tended to be an illiterate lot, and those sources are 
scant at best to understand Russian peasant perceptions and attitudes about 
the Kazakhs. Thus, this comparative study necessarily uses—cautiously—for-
eign visitors’ sources (books and articles) more in the Russian case than in the 
american.
When foreign travelers met with Russian officials and peasants, they typically 
recorded those conversations and reproduced them for a european or american 
reading public that demonstrated a curiosity about the forbidding tsarist empire. 
Many of these works tend to describe Russia in decidedly harsh terms—des-
potic, oppressive, secretive, and suspicious of foreigners—the quintessential 
autocratic police state.32 americans too perceived the Russians in contradic-
tory images. The publisher of the 1814 edition of The Life of Field Marshal 
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Souvarof noted, “The national character of the Russians is the subject of much 
animated discussion. They are represented . . . as a compound of ferocious bar-
barism and vicious profligacy [or] they are pictured with all the virtues as well as 
the strength of an infant and growing people.”33 Many of these authors viewed 
the Russian empire with skepticism, and they held preconceived notions of 
what they expected to see and experience. nonetheless, by sifting through the 
authors’ biases and judgments, scholars can detect themes and tropes that reveal 
much about imperial and popular perceptions and attitudes about the Kazakhs. 
But these writers also understood that their readers had preconceived notions 
about the Russian Empire and the lands and people it conquered and colo-
nized; writers used similar typologies and imageries to describe the Kazakhs 
that they thought readers could easily comprehend. The descriptions almost 
mirror each other, whether describing a sioux or a Kazakh, a simple reference 
to nomadism dehumanized the individual and locked him into a specific form: 
backward, uncivilized, wandering, primitive, etc.
in both cases, official records are a valuable source, but as will become clear, 
the language used in these reports and documents requires scholars to extrapo-
late perceptions and attitudes and tease out the comparable meanings. Russian 
official documents tended to report information such as bureaucratic informa-
tion and statistics; rarely are personal perceptions or attitudes overtly expressed. 
official american sources, such as reservation agents’ reports are, fortunately, 
not quite so reserved. The popular press is another source, even in Russia, from 
which to glean perceptions and attitudes. scholarly works, literature, and even 
artistic impressions reveal a lot about american and Russian sensibilities dur-
ing the nineteenth century; they reflect society and influence it. There is little 
debate that James fenimore cooper’s The Leatherstocking Tales “established the 
indian as a significant literary type” in the united states. The works of cooper, 
Mayne Reid, and others were translated in french and available to Russian writ-
ers and social elites.34 These works, as well as comparable Russian literature 
about colonized regions and people, unquestionably influenced Russian writers 
and the public. This literature helped shape perceptions and attitudes about 
the empire and the colonization of the caucasus, siberia, the Kazakh steppe, 
Turkestan, and the Russian far east.35
despite the discrepancy of sources, scholars can reap sufficient information 
from primary and secondary sources to understand american and Russian per-
ceptions, attitudes, typologies, and imagery about the sioux and the Kazakhs in 
order to understand how and why policies were developed and implemented. 
central to the perceptions and attitudes expressed by american and Russian 
commentators, scholars, writers, pioneers and peasants, government officials, 
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and travelers was the idea of the other, the exotic, and a clear demarcation 
between “us” and “them.” in her work Imperial Eyes, Mary louise Pratt noted 
that nineteenth-century travelogues also conveyed control, dominance, and 
a sense of superiority over the landscapes and peoples that europeans and 
americans encountered and colonized.36 americans eagerly consumed these 
books and articles, and for “literate americans in the antebellum period, indians 
were everywhere in the print culture—in books, the journals of learned societ-
ies, and popular magazines.”37 Kazakhs, however, appear somewhat irregularly 
in Russian popular media of the day; Russian novelists and other writers were 
far more fascinated with the conquest of the Caucasus, contemporaneous to the 
conquest of the Kazakh Steppe.
This leads, naturally, to a question of language. This study uses both primary 
and secondary Russian- and Kazakh-language sources; however, when possible, 
it cites english-language sources instead in order to reach a broader audience. 
nevertheless, in some cases, such as the collected works of certain Kazakh intel-
lectuals or Russian government documents, no english-language version exists. 
for example, in the early 1830s, aleksei levshin traveled to the steppe and spent 
time with the Kazakhs observing their culture; experiencing (to the extent pos-
sible) the nomadic life; eating their food; and recording their folktales, histories, 
and traditions. his book Opisanie Kirgiz-kazach’ikh, ili Kirgiz-kaisatskikh, ord 
i stepei, first appeared in 1832 and was republished in 1996 after the soviet 
union collapsed. no english-language version exists.38 a comparative study also 
requires a necessary understanding of the historiographical trends evident in 
both american and Russian history—specifically when dealing with issues of 
American and Russian conquest and colonization of the Sioux and the Kazakhs.
A novice to American history quickly learns that numerous historiographical 
diversions and interpretations tie american expansion west to Manifest destiny, 
the frontier, slavery, cowboys and indians, the different gold rushes, and so on, 
as well as the ubiquitous American exceptionalism. In the history of the West, it 
is sometimes difficult to disentangle myth and reality. That overstates the his-
torical complexities of the american West, but the point is that american history 
in general, and the West in particular, seems to be in a state of constant rein-
vention. Professional historians, however, will call it a reinterpretation—particu-
larly the reinterpretation of the West.39 Writing in the early twentieth century, 
frederick Jackson Turner, the father of american frontier theory, suggested that 
if american scholars, “with our own methods of the occupation of the frontier, 
we should compare those of other countries which have dealt with similar prob-
lems—such as Russia, Germany, and the english colonies in canada, australia, 
and africa—we should undoubtedly find most fruitful results.”40
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Russian historiography of the empire’s conquest and colonization of Siberia 
and central Asia remains equally encumbered with its myths and realities. Russia 
too follows its own exceptionalist historiographical path, but one that differs 
from the american narrative yet still remains richly embedded with nationalist, 
rhetorical uniqueness.41 a student of Kazakh history soon learns that there were 
at least two conflicting interpretations of Russian expansion into the Kazakh 
steppe and the colonization of the Kazakh people: voluntary unification or vio-
lent conquest. Soviet scholars—Russian and Kazakhs—used the term prisoe-
dinenie (unification) or the more ambiguous, benign word sblizhenie (coming 
together). Both words suggest a voluntary unification of lands and peoples; they 
belonged together rather than apart. This interpretation was especially prom-
inent during the soviet period, although in the 1920s, numerous interpreta-
tions proliferated about the expansion, conquest, and internal colonization of 
the Kazakhs.42 Post-soviet Kazakh scholars generally reject both interpretations, 
arguing instead that it was conquest and imperialism. Consequently, to deci-
pher Russian expansion, conquest, and internal colonization within this histo-
riographical maze, and mapping and mining the tsarist, soviet, and post-soviet 
historiography, requires patience and perseverance. Interestingly, some Russian 
scholars were already comparing Russia’s expansion eastward with america’s 
expansion west.
Writing in 1905, the Russian statesman and historian P. n. Miliukov observed, 
“Both Russia and the united states have been colonized, not at a prehistoric 
stage of their existence, but in recent historic times. hence, the settlement and 
the exploitation of the natural resources of the country form the very warp 
of their historical texture. Most of the important features of their economical, 
social, and political development must be referred to this process of coloniza-
tion.”43 in the 1950s, american scholar donald W. Treadgold, urged students of 
Russian imperial history to employ Turner’s frontier thesis to the Russian case, 
believing that it could “serve as a basis for a general theory of frontier move-
ments in modern times.”44
Turner’s influence on frontier and borderlands’ studies in the Kazakh steppe 
and siberia received limited scholarly attention; it was too schematic and mar-
ginalized differences between the colonizing peasants and the indigenous 
Kazakhs. among post-soviet Kazakh scholars, the opportunity to cast off the 
restrictive Soviet interpretative shackles invigorated subsequent scholarship; 
however, the new interpretations generally conclude that the conquest and col-
onization of the Kazakhs and the steppe was violent, aggressive, and the worst 
sort of imperialism. it is hardly a nuanced interpretation but rather nationalist 
in tone and content.45 These Kazakh scholars fail to observe what Richard White 
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described as a “middle ground” in which a complex cultural, social, and eco-
nomic exchange happened daily.46
american, Russian, and even Kazakh scholars, however, generally failed to 
embrace comparative history, except in very limited cases. comparative nomad-
ism frequently attracted Kazakh scholars, but, otherwise, comparative history 
remains an infertile field in post-soviet historical investigations. in american 
history, the two topics that seem to attract the most attention from scholars 
working within a comparative framework are the frontier and slavery, which 
are still hotly debated topics, even without using comparative methodologies.47 
nonetheless, in the last two decades, other scholars moved beyond the frontier 
comparisons between the united states and Russia in ways that expand the 
expectations for comparative history, including Peter Kolchin, anne lounsbery, 
irena Grudzinska Gross, Margaret ziolkowski, Mark Bassin, sonja luehrmann, 
and Kate Brown.48
comparative history should illuminate that which might not be evident when 
examined in isolation. Many scholars referred to the united states as an empire 
as it crossed and colonized the continent; some scholars might reject that inter-
pretation. What is the evidence? By comparing the united states to a state that 
exercised a similar process, the comparison illuminates the similarities and dif-
ferences that strengthen the assertion that the united states and tsarist Russia 
were comparable empires. Moreover, it might illuminate why one empire imple-
mented certain policies and practices of internal colonization that were not pur-
sued in the other. it can further reveal colonial practices that failed in other 
contexts, such as asia or africa, but perhaps succeeded in the united states or 
Russia. Why did each state employ sedentarization policies? Why did the united 
states and Russia each establish inviolable boundaries—first to restrict their 
own populations and later to contain the natives? ultimately, both the united 
states moved well past the indian Territory and Russia pushed further south 
past the Kazakh steppe into Turkestan. Why did the united states create reser-
vations but not Russia? What made lands that most observers agreed was suit-
able chiefly for livestock suddenly appealing for settlement? The comparison 
reveals some answers but still masks others that this work attempts to uncover.
as scholars embark upon these new fields of investigation, it is important to 
situate the comparative history as a legitimate exercise within broader historical 
inquiry and interpretations. What is comparative history? It is not a method-
ology or analytical technique used by most scholars. George M. Frederickson, 
the most prominent advocate for comparative history, argued that it is “a way of 
isolating the critical factors or independent variables that account for national 
differences.”49 Michael adas, another proponent, claimed that comparing the 
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united states with an appropriate case allows scholars to place american his-
tory in “broader global frames of reference that allow us to identify and explore 
underlying commonalities in major patterns of societal development across time 
and space.”50 neither of these are precise definitions but rather explanations 
of comparative historical, methodological utility. Marc Bloch suggested there 
were two, perhaps more, types of comparative framework. one is the “univer-
sal comparison,” in which a scholar examines two societies widely divergent in 
temporal and geographic space so that specific “phenomenon can obviously not 
be explained either by mutual influence or by a common origin.”51 The other 
is Bloch’s frequently cited “historical comparison,” which examines parallel con-
temporary societies “exercising a constant mutual influence, exposed throughout 
their development to the action of the same broad causes” but of “common ori-
gin.”52 But even frederickson admits that there is still no clear definition, and so 
scholars are left to their own devices to employ a comparative structure, as carol 
l. higham suggests, in order to compare “two regions, experiences, nations, or 
peoples [so that] one can learn about their similarities and differences.”53
comparison clarifies and refutes myths and misinterpretations based upon 
the isolated analysis in which there is nothing to test the assumptions, theories, 
or historical explanations. it is, as frederickson argued, a mechanism to compare 
systematically “some process or institution in two or more societies that are not 
usually conjoined within one of the traditional geographical areas of historical 
specialization.”54 The comparative prism used to examine the united states and 
tsarist Russia is through the mechanisms of imperialism and internal coloniza-
tion of the sioux and the Kazakhs, the plains and the steppe.
if the argument in this comparative work is that the united states was an 
empire comparable to the Russian empire, that it exercised imperial control 
over the sioux similar to Russian imperial control over the Kazakhs, it is nec-
essary to define imperialism. scholars, however, still debate what defines an 
empire as well as its corollary imperialism. for the purposes of this comparative 
study, a. dirk Moses’s relatively simple definition is best. Moses argued, “There 
is a consensus that empire means domination of one society by another, usually 
backed by military force. Imperialism is a process and set of policies to acquire 
such domination whether by annexation or through less formal means.”55
The process of imperialism, colonialism, and colonization, wonderfully and 
somewhat brutally described—first in 1726 by Jonathan swift, in his satirical 
story Gulliver ’s Travels—seems eerily familiar. according to Gulliver,
they go on shore to rob and plunder; they see a harmless people, are enter-
tained with kindness; they give the country a new name; they take formal 
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possession of it for their king; they set up a rotten plank of a stone for a 
memorial; they murder two or three dozen of the natives, bring away a couple 
more by force for a sample, return home, and get their pardon. here com-
mences a new dominion acquired with a title by divine right. Ships are sent 
with the first opportunity; the natives driven out or destroyed, their princes 
tortured to discover gold; a free license given to all acts of inhumanity and 
lust, the earth reeking with the blood of its inhabitants: and this execrable 
crew of butchers employed in so pious an expedition, is a modern colony sent 
to convert and civilize an idolatrous and barbarous people.56
for more than a century, scholars seriously debated the concepts of empire, im-
perialism, and the corollary, colonialism. in that sense, to consider what some 
scholars might regard as classical empires—for example, Persian, han, Roman, 
Mongol, and ottoman—they were all contiguous empires. it was the creation 
of modern empires through maritime expansion that began in earnest during 
the sixteenth century when historians and others observed the origins of both 
american (under spanish, British, dutch, and french maritime expansion) and 
Russian “imperialism.”
in 1902 the British scholar J. a. hobson, an unabashed critic of empire and 
imperialism, argued that modern imperialism, particularly the “scramble for 
africa,” was an extension of excessive and aggressive nineteenth-century nation-
alism. hobson insisted that it was the “debasement of . . . genuine nationalism, 
by attempts to overflow its natural banks and absorb the near or distant territory 
of reluctant and unassimilable peoples, that marks the passage from nationalism 
to a spurious colonialism on the one hand, imperialism on the other.”57 he did 
not necessarily distinguish between external imperialism and internal expansion, 
nor did he apply his theories to internal colonization. But hobson did consider 
the united states to be a recent imperial power, becoming one only after the 
spanish-american War and the annexation of hawaii.58 he applied the economic 
motivation to imperial expansion, an element certainly emphasized later by scott 
nearing, the american economist, political activist, pacifist, and leading advocate 
for self-sufficient living, who argued in his book, The American Empire that the 
“chief characteristics of empire exist in the United States. Here are conquered 
territory; subject peoples; an imperial, ruling class, and the exploitation of that 
class of the people at home and abroad.”59 for nearing, american expansion 
westward was clearly brazen imperialism and internal colonization, although he 
did not use that term. vladimir lenin, well before leading the Bolsheviks to 
power in Russia in 1917, earlier described Russia’s expansion as “internal colo-
nialism,” which, he argued, was driven by the need for economic exploitation 
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by the Russian metropole (or center) of the periphery or borderlands. he also 
mistakenly used Karl Marx’s definition of a colony “in the political-economic 
sense” as “the existence of unoccupied, free lands, easily accessible to settlers,” 
to which he acknowledged that the lands Russia conquered and colonized physi-
cally and politically occurred long before being incorporated economically into 
the imperial networks.60 The point is that critics of imperialism and colonialism 
often referred to the United States as an empire. Russia was unquestionably one, 
even if these same critics only marginally examined the process of expansion 
across the continent as internal colonization, a concept that slowly gained some 
acceptance later.
in the early to mid-nineteenth century, americans often debated the idea of an 
american empire but often embedded it with other ideologies such as Manifest 
destiny and the Monroe doctrine. at various times before the american civil 
War, advocates eagerly demanded actions against, for example, Mexico, cuba, and 
nicaragua. it created, as Brady harrison argued, a “conflict between idealism 
and adventurism, between the desire to improve the human condition and the 
desire to take the land, wealth, and even life of indians, or Mexicans, or central 
americans, [and] represents a powerful, persistent contradiction in u.s. culture.”61
The difference in the american and Russian case was that neither was an 
overseas empire; rather, both expanded into contiguous territories. This fact 
seems to be the major obstacle to describing the american expansion as empire-
building and internal colonization. in 1961 historian Thomas a. Bailey explained 
the obstacle this way: “still another source of misunderstanding was the alleged 
absence of a far-flung american colonial empire until 1898.” according to Bailey, 
an “authentic world power” seemingly bore the burden of “overseas liabilities, 
as well as huge armies, navies, and national debts.” Consequently, a point often 
“missed during the nineteenth century was that the united states practiced 
internal colonialism and imperialism on a continental scale. When Western 
european nations expanded, they had to go overseas; when we expanded, we 
had to go west.” Moreover, he wrote, “one reason for associating our advent 
as a world power with 1898 is the popular but erroneous assumption that the 
acquisition of the Philippines marked a complete break with the past. We are 
told that hitherto we had shunned colonizing (which is untrue), that we had 
formerly been isolated (which is untrue), and that thereafter we were interna-
tionalist (which is also untrue).”62 Bailey used the terms in the abstract; he did 
not define them.
americans portrayed themselves as reluctant “imperialists,” performing a 
humanitarian service, a civilizing mission, to oppressed peoples—ironically 
mimicking British ideological and philosophical justifications for that country’s 
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civilizing, imperial missions around the globe.63 Russians also debated the con-
cept of empire—its civilizing mission—but prior to the nineteenth century, the 
expansion, usually referred to as the “gathering of the lands,” suggested the 
reconstitution of ancient Rus’ along “historical, dynastic and religious grounds.”64 
few Russians ever doubted that Russia was an empire engaged in imperialism. 
it was only later in the nineteenth century that Russia justified its imperialism 
with a civilizing mission comparable to the united states or Great Britain.65
in order to contextualize the united states and Russia into the community 
of nineteenth-century empires, it is important to recognize that both coun-
tries extended their control and domination of indigenous populations with 
internal colonization. This is not a new concept, but scholars still debate the 
definition of internal colonization. in the nineteenth century, some european 
officials used the term to describe hapsburg and Prussian resettlement. By 
the 1930s, us scholars used the internal colonialism theory to “characterize 
relations between the northern and southern parts of the united states.”66 in 
1946 George c. Guins, a former Russian government official who immigrated 
to the united states in 1941, wrote that the “development of the united states 
and Russia took place by means of internal colonization, which spread of itself, 
by the natural shifting of the population, and not because of government pol-
icy.”67 By the 1960s, social scientists in the united states employed the theory 
to examine the economic exploitative policies in urban areas and the western 
united states, Palestine, ireland, and elsewhere.68 as with the basic concepts 
of imperialism and colonialism, the notion of internal colonization lacks preci-
sion and clarity. scholars carol chiago lujan and Gordon adams provided a 
basic definition best suited for this study: “internal colonialism occurs when one 
group (or government) subjugates another within the same country.”69 This work 
modifies this definition to use the related concept—internal colonization rather 
than colonialism—because colonization extends to the resettlement of peoples 
(i.e., pioneers and peasants), “usually in frontier areas, loyal to the metropole to 
ensure security and encourage economic development of semi- or unoccupied 
land within a national or imperial territory.”70
in both cases, the united states and Russia exerted political, social, economic, 
and cultural control over the sioux and the Kazakhs. They applied direct and 
indirect rule strategies in order to colonize the sioux and the Kazakhs; they 
used coercion, military power, and social and cultural distinctiveness designed 
to subjugate these indigenous populations with the goal of assimilating them 
into what was considered the mainstream of the colonizer’s social, economic, 
cultural, and political structures. The united states and Russia justified this by 
employing other european imperial characteristics, such as humanitarianism, 
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civilization, and christianity. The difference between american and Russian 
internal colonization and european external colonialism was that the americans 
and Russians considered expansion part of the national territorial integration.71 
it was, Peter calvert argued, that “internal colonization parallels in all impor-
tant respects external colonization and that in fact they are in essence the same 
process, differentiated only by their geographical location (the ‘blue water’ fal-
lacy).”72 coupled with the theory of internal colonization, comparative history, 
as Robert J. hind argued, should preserve “seminal value for scholars who are 
attracted to the comparative study of society and history. The treatment of certain 
metropolitan societies, or the experience of certain sections of a metropolitan 
society and that of their colonial counterparts, in a comparative war and within 
an internal colonial framework might help identify features of their respective 
experiences that could pass undetected, or be given insufficient emphasis, or be 
misinterpreted, if they were studied separately by other means.”73
The united states and Russia were contiguous empires that paralleled a com-
parable process called the settler revolution manifest as well in asia, africa, and 
the americas. according to James Belich, within the anglo world, this revolu-
tion took three forms, but evident in both the american and Russian expansion, 
conquest, and internal colonization are “networks, the establishment of ongoing 
systems of long-range interaction, usually for trade; empire, the control of other 
peoples, usually through conquest; and settlement, the reproduction of one’s own 
society through long-range migration.”74
shifting the examination of empires from individual narratives—the isolated 
examination that differentiates between overseas and contiguous empires or 
european empires from non-european empires such as the united states—
allows scholars to analyze shared or common characteristics. it further unlocks 
different prospects to investigate various processes of empire in order to recon-
sider the definitions and interpretations. it might not result in a new historical 
narrative or historical reinterpretation of the american or Russian past; but the 
new prism sheds light on the nuances of empire and the common traits, pro-
cesses, typologies, and tropes used to define that history. The comparative analy-
sis further contextualizes the united states and Russia within the broader, global 
imperial and colonial expansion into asia and africa to provide greater under-
standing of the structural difficulties and interconnectedness that empires ulti-
mately shared. all nineteenth-century empires and colonial regimes employed 
complex and sophisticated strategies to conquer and assimilate segments of 
colonized peoples into the colonial system: the americans and Russians were 
not unique or exceptional empires, although their structures and processes fre-
quently differed from their European counterparts in Asia and Africa.
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The indian scholar Partha chatterjee argued that one key component to impe-
rial, colonial governments was that the universalist claims made by the domi-
nant regime typically excluded native peoples.75 colonial regimes categorized 
natives by differences—language, social structure, religion, governance—that 
required the active colonial intervention and guidance imposed by the colonizer. 
empire and colonialism also revolved around a humanist ideal predicated on the 
belief that the social and cultural benefits justified the policies implemented by 
the colonizing power in order to advance the welfare of the colonized people. 
anthony Pagden described this as a “language of interests and benefits” that 
established criteria and standards of human development and progress, from 
the primitive to civilized.76
it was, essentially, the intellectual ideologies and debates of empire that the 
united states and Russia shared with their nineteenth-century european con-
temporaries, which also severely devastated “indigenous institutions of gover-
nance” and the native “economic systems, ideologies, and identities.”77 These 
imperial ideologies rested on an “integrated system of beliefs, assumptions 
and values, not necessarily true or false, which reflects the needs and interests 
of a group or class at a particular time in history.”78 The european expansion-
ist impulse, according to the conclusion of British explorer-missionary david 
livingston, rested upon an ideological troika stimulated by the three C’s: com-
merce, christianity, and civilization.79 americans and Russians subscribed 
unabashedly to those concepts, although each perceived their imperial, expan-
sionist missions as very different from european imperialism.
Throughout the nineteenth century, americans emphasized assimilation far 
more than Russians did; however, the united states intervened much more 
intensively with its social, political, cultural, and economic policies against the 
sioux than the Russians did with their internal colonization of the Kazakhs. The 
reason was because, in the united states, as John Wunder noted in his work 
“Retained by the People”: A History of American Indians and the Bill of Rights, 
before 1871 americans practiced an expansion and colonialism similar to the 
europeans. Wunder referred to this process as “old colonialism,” a course that 
had “as its primary goal the physical acquisition of valuable western and south-
ern lands and the physical subjugation of its peoples.”80 By the 1870s, he argued, 
old colonialism gave way to “new colonialism” after the united states had 
acquired its continental limits and started to experience “new settler demands 
for lands protected by existing treaties.”81 This new colonialism was “an espe-
cially virulent strain” that “attacked every aspect of native american life—reli-
gion, speech, political freedoms, economic liberty, and cultural diversity.”82 old 
colonialism was, in a sense, motivated by the desire to integrate indigenous 
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lands; new colonialism was the demand to assimilate indigenous peoples. By the 
1870s, Russia altered its policies in the Kazakh steppe, chiefly to make room for 
more peasants to settle there following the 1861 Russian serf emancipation. The 
Russian government also determined to integrate further the Kazakhs’ social, 
political, and economic structures into the empire comparable to Wunder’s new 
colonialism. They eventually abandoned the concept of integration to the rei-
magined and perceived imperial need to assimilate—the so-called Russification 
policies in effect in the last two decades of tsarist rule.
The american and Russian alchemic strategies often manifested as just brute 
force, but other approaches included education, christian missionaries, and 
economic integration—all grounded in the colonizers’ common suppositions 
about nomads, about the land, and about the right of the colonizer to manage 
indigenous peoples. it was, therefore, assumed that the sioux and the Kazakhs 
lacked the civilization and the social and political structures to advance without 
the direct guidance of, and the policies implemented by, the americans and 
the Russians. Both deployed different strategies, with comparable objectives 
and outcomes. The ultimate key to american and Russian policies was, however, 
education, which became the blunt instrument of internal colonization’s social 
and cultural beachhead against the sioux and the Kazakhs.
The united states, far more than Russia, embraced a paternalistic attitude 
with its policies and programs. The united states intruded more deeply and 
broadly, with its social and cultural agenda, to guide the sioux from dark barba-
rism to the enlightened path of civilization. The Russian government generally 
inclined to exclude the Kazakhs from the assimilative cultural and social sphere. 
instead, it devoted its energies to civil and administrative mechanisms to guide 
the Kazakhs from their nomadic habits toward civilization rather than adopt the 
more intrusive cultural, social, and economic tools employed by the americans. 
The Russians expressed their policies as integration rather than assimilation; 
they generally used the word sblizhenie, or “drawing together.” Conquest and 
internal colonization was brutal and successful. at the same time, the americans 
and the Russians distanced themselves from those they subjugated. it was not 
a physical or geographic remoteness but rather a social, cultural, and political 
distance between colonizers and colonized.
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Throughout the nineteenth century, as expansion and colonization accelerated, 
americans and Russians often resorted to stereotypes and perceptions of the 
sioux and the Kazakhs to justify their objectives in the plains and steppe. They 
regarded nomadism as backward, but they were not the first people to confront 
intractable, hostile, barbaric nomads. The united states and Russia embraced 
an epistemological understanding of nomads built on both their own encounters 
and those they read about in the histories of the Greeks, Romans, and chinese, 
and they applied that knowledge to their understanding of the sioux and the 
Kazakhs, which led them to overgeneralize and underestimate the strength of 
the indigenous populations’ social, cultural, political, and economic structures. 
Moreover, Europeans—and, subsequently, Americans—dealt with Indians from 
the moment of first contact and developed relatively inflexible ideas and opin-
ions about them over the course of three centuries. The europeans and Russians 
knew Turks; they knew Muslims; they conquered other nomadic peoples (and 
were conquered by them); and they assembled very strong opinions and ideas 
about what should be done with them. The americans and Russians adopted 
policies designed to supervise peoples that they deemed capable of change only 
when administered by force and coercion because the sioux and the Kazakhs 
possessed inferior cultures, societies, and religions and failed to take full advan-
tage of abundant land and possibilities offered by american and Russian civiliza-
tion. The americans and Russians failed to understand or appreciate that sioux 
Map 1.1. sioux tribes of the american plains (courtesy of department of Geography 
& earth sciences, unc charlotte). 
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and Kazakh society, culture, and economy were in constant flux, and that the 
sioux and the Kazakhs adopted and adapted to suit their needs and their sensi-
bilities, however alien that might seem to the colonizers.
in order to understand american and Russian perceptions and their par-
tial justifications for conquest, it is also necessary to situate the Sioux and the 
Kazakhs in their world—in their social, cultural, and economic milieu—which 
requires a brief overview. There is no shortage of information or scholarship to 
draw on to examine and understand sioux and Kazakh nomadic cultures, societ-
ies, political or economic structures, customs, myths, religion, and even games 
and amusements. unfortunately, generalizations are unavoidable in a compara-
tive study, particularly when treating subjects as complex as “societies” and “cul-
tures” or “customs” and “traditions.”
one facet of the stereotypical image held by the americans and the Russians 
was that the nomadic lifeways of sioux and Kazakh societies made them and their 
economies clearly backward. But in a sense, neither the sioux nor the Kazakhs 
were fully nomads; agriculture, hunting and gathering, and the trappings of sed-
entary life were not completely alien to them. The difference between nomadic or 
seminomadic peoples was that they did not live in fixed abodes or in a fixed place. 
sioux and Kazakh economies were generally dependent upon mobility. The sioux 
lived by the hunt; the Kazakhs raised large herds of sheep, goats, camels, and 
horses. The sioux were migratory hunters and the Kazakhs were pastoral nomads.
Map 1.2 Kazakhs of the steppe (courtesy of department of Geography & earth 
sciences, unc charlotte). 
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americans and Russians based their attitudes on superficial images and rep-
resentations and somewhat subjective oversimplifications; they did not make a 
significant leap into some unknown universe that lacked awareness or experi-
ence with nomads. The image of nomadic culture and society was that they were 
static cultures and societies. american and Russian perceptions were grounded 
in the belief that nomads lived an ancient lifestyle. in the minds of americans 
and Russians, nomadic culture and society were homogenized and easily deci-
phered because of universal conceptions about nomads and traits and charac-
teristics that they believed were common to all equestrian, nomadic, warrior 
societies. yet twentieth-century scholars (chiefly historians and anthropologists) 
demonstrated—in fact, marveled at—the global diversity of nomadic societies 
and cultures.
for centuries, the nomads’ sedentary neighbors observed and commented 
upon nomadism and nomadic peoples—especially the eurasian nomads vili-
fied in chinese literature. The Greeks wrote about the scythians inhabiting the 
steppe lands of southern Russia. With their nomadic mode of life and seem-
ingly endless wanderings, the chinese and Greeks provided the stereotypical 
representations of nomadic peoples living beyond the boundaries of civilization 
whose pastimes consist of “conquest and rapine in the fat lands and rich cities of 
the plain.” The life of the eurasian nomad was “riding a horse[,] living in a tent[, 
and being] menaced by perennial uncertainty of supplies of grass and water. his 
temptation to maraud was strong and oft-repeated. The mobile existence of the 
grassland man made it easy for him to raid and pillage.”1
Writers in sedentary societies depicted nomads as uncivilized, but they also 
generally perceived nomads to be very traditional, almost timeless societies that 
abhorred change and lacked a future: “nomads have no history; they only have 
geography.”2 agrarian, non-nomadic societies relegated nomads to a peripheral 
social, cultural, and political status as barbarians—a “raw” people that lacked 
civilization and were pushed aside in “spatial terms, and to antiquity in tempo-
ral terms.”3 Geography and epoch, not society or culture, were all that seemed 
to distinguish between scythians, huns, vandals, and other nomads such as 
Bedouins, Berbers, sioux, or Kazakhs.4
The quintessential nomadic tribes—certainly in popular imagination—were 
chingis (Genghis) Khan and his Mongol hordes thundering out of the eurasian 
steppe to terrorize the civilized world with plunder and rapine. uttering the 
name of the Mongols was almost a metaphor for savagery, barbarism, wanton 
cruelty, death, and destruction. By the end of the thirteenth century, europeans 
and Russians gradually transformed the Mongol appellation into Tatars (or 
Tartars), convinced that classical Tartarus was their place of origin. in time, as 
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devin deWeese noted, in european consciousness, Mongols, and thus Tartars, 
became demonic nomads from hell sent to purify european christendom for its 
many sins.5 in a rhetorical sense, one might scratch a nomad to find a Mongol 
but dig deeper to find a Tartar.6
The simple reference to Tartar evoked stereotypical images, no explana-
tion needed.7 When europeans encountered indians, they invariably com-
pared them—positively or negatively—to the ancient world cultures that they 
understood, such as scythians and Tartars or the peoples of atlantis or bibli-
cal hebrews.8 early explorers and settlers in the new World, in their effort to 
explain the origins of indians, noted linguistic similarities. John Joselyn, in 1673, 
wrote that the “Mohawks speech is a dialect of the Tartars.” in 1753 spaniard 
father venegas thought indians resembled “Moghul Tartars.”9 similarly, the idea 
of the “red” indian evoked a specific image based on race conceptions in the 
nineteenth century.10 John foster fraser simply described the Kazakhs as the 
“Red indians of the West siberian steppes,” an image that needed no explanation 
or elaboration to his audience.11 americans employed both Tartar and red to 
describe indians, such as referring to “northern plains indians as ‘the american 
Tartars’ ” or the “ruthless red Tartars of the desert.”12 This simplistic type of 
linguistic reference point—equating Tartar to nomad—worked to give the 
nineteenth- century reader an immediate sense of understanding and imagery.
interestingly, scholars provide as many portraits of nomadic societies as they 
do definitions of what exactly constituted a nomadic people. elizabeth e. Bacon, 
analyzing nomads in central and southwestern asia, argued that “true” nomads 
are people that “dwell the year round in portable dwellings and who practice no 
agriculture.”13 Paul Bohannan noted that nomadism is “movement in response to 
the demands of animals for pasture and water.”14 Raphael Patai defined nomads 
as the “mode of existence of peoples who derive their livelihood from tend-
ing herds of one or more species of domesticated quadrupeds and who wan-
der to find grazing for their cattle.”15 nomadism, as identified by these scholars, 
required a symbiotic relationship between man and domesticated animals. It 
required movement—either seasonally or annually—and no fixed abode. But 
europeans and Russians easily applied these brief definitions of nomads not 
just to the peoples of the Middle east, central asia, or africa but to the sioux, 
cheyenne, crow, or other plains’ nomads of the nineteenth century. The one 
major difference, of course, was between pastoral nomadism (livestock herders) 
and the equestrian buffalo hunters of the northern plains.
douglas l. Johnson recognized four nomadic types based upon ecologi-
cal considerations: full nomads living in steppe regions with definite changes 
in habitation; seminomads who bordered cultivated regions and engaged in 
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sporadic agriculture; desert nomads who migrated between fixed water sources; 
and mountain nomads who used vertical, seasonal variation to pasture their 
herds.16 The sioux and the Kazakhs were a mix of the first two types. The 
nomadic society and economy was relatively self-sufficient; it produced almost 
all of the necessities to survive in the harsh plains or steppe environment, such 
as food, clothing, fuel, and shelter. sioux and Kazakh nomadism provided access 
to resources possibly depleted in other regions, such as wood, water, and salt.
This should not suggest that nomads were completely self-sufficient or purely 
independent. nomads both raided sedentary communities and traded with 
them, but that should not make nomads seem more violent or prone to war. 
history abounds with sedentary people who found time to set aside their hoe 
and plow to raid other settled people or go to war, and generally engage in plun-
der and rapine. scholars long recognized that a symbiotic relationship existed 
between nomadic and sedentary peoples, and that nomads eagerly traded, 
attended markets, and coexisted with sedentary communities because, as owen 
lattimore noted, “it is the poor nomad who is the pure nomad.”17 Trade ben-
efited both the nomad and the sedentary. To relieve the burden of transporting 
accumulated goods, nomads traded or jettisoned excess material not consumed 
or used, such as hides, wool, and livestock. Both the sioux and the Kazakhs par-
ticipated in trading networks; they understood that they existed within a larger, 
complex interacting system of exchange.18
The sioux and the Kazakhs are not exact replicas—not mirror images—of 
nomadic peoples found in other places or other times, such as in asia, the 
Middle east, or africa. notions about nomadism, however, were widespread 
in the nineteenth century and often evoked rather negative images of a people 
that wandered the land aimlessly and without meaning or objective. They were 
backward, absent a significant history, and stuck in an economic model long 
abandoned by civilized people. They were backward because they were not sed-
entary and therefore, not consistent agriculturalists.
What is clear now to scholars is that sioux and Kazakh societies were not stag-
nant; they were always in transition, adopting new technologies and strategies to 
cope with internal and external pressures to their way of life. Many early observ-
ers considered the sioux and the Kazakhs to be extraordinarily fine horsemen 
and skilled archers, but that did not stop them from adopting guns or other 
technology to suit their needs. The sioux and the Kazakhs were willing traders, 
often enthusiastically embracing new materials and technologies. But sioux and 
Kazakh nomadism differed from each other, although they shared some com-
mon elements; their social, economic, and political structures were not identical 
simply because they were nomads.
The siouX and The KazaKhs 39
in order to understand the perceptions held by americans and Russians in 
the nineteenth century, it is necessary to examine the sociopolitical and eco-
nomic structures of the sioux and the Kazakhs. american popular consciousness 
firmly affixed the image of the sioux as the “Buffalo nation,” whether hunting 
throughout the plains or killing custer. That evocative, enduring image of the 
mid- nineteenth-century sioux conjured skilled horsemen and powerful warriors 
ready to plunder and kill white migrants along the western trails. if the Mongols—
and, by later extension, the Kazakhs—created the quintessential image of the 
marauding eurasian nomadic horseman thundering out of the vast and barren 
steppe to plunder and destroy peaceful agrarian peoples, it was an image that 
the Russians and other visitors to the steppe attached to the Kazakhs. But these 
powerful images reflected only the negative stereotypes. The reality was that the 
sioux and the Kazakhs were complex societies not easily categorized; but as Brian 
spooner simply noted, there were no absolute “features of culture or social organi-
zation” that are customary to all nomads or that are found exclusively among any of 
them.19 nomadic societies are as diverse as sedentary ones, perhaps even more so.
in the twentieth century, scholars also speculated about why a people might 
embrace nomadism, why they might abandon a semi-settled way of life and 
agriculture to engage in the persistent movement associated with a nomadic 
life, as the sioux did in the mid-eighteenth century. certainly, for many people 
in the nineteenth century, it seemed contrary to normal human progress. Most 
scholars agree that the adoption of equestrian hunting is what compelled the 
sioux to begin their migrations, but the etiological debate about pastoral nomad-
ism remains unresolved and likely will never be completely understood.20 in 
the simplest terms, Kazakhs inherited some 2,500 years of eurasian pastoral, 
equestrian nomadism; the Sioux were, in comparison, relative newcomers to 
equestrian nomadism.
siouX and KazaKh
The sioux were hunting nomads whose social, economic, political, and cultural 
structures were in the process of changing in the eighteenth century as vari-
ous bands moved west from the Minnesota and Wisconsin lakes and woodlands 
into the northern plains. Their language is a part of the siouan family, which 
comprises fourteen “mutually unintelligible languages.”21 for this study, it is 
important to consider only part of that larger family order, distinguished by 
three dialects but two groupings, Dakota and Lakota. The Santee and Yankton/
yanktonai called themselves Dakota and the Teton used the variant Lakota. The 
name “sioux,” a french and english name for the lakota and dakota, is not the 
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self-designation but the transliteration of an ojibwa (chippewa) word—natow-
essiwak—which the french shortened to Sioux. scholars still debate its meaning, 
most often translated as “snake” or “enemy.”22 What was more important was 
what they called themselves, which was dakota or lakota, meaning “leagued” or 
“allied,” according to nineteenth-century american missionary stephen R. Riggs, 
but perhaps intended to mean someone in union or who shared the same lan-
guage, maybe a friend.23
scholars are uncertain about the origins of the sioux, based on somewhat 
inconclusive archaeological data, but Guy Gibbon suggests that their ancestors 
can be located in the northern woodland regions of Minnesota and Wisconsin 
around ad 800. There is no doubt that the sioux were there by the mid- 
seventeenth century, so it is fair to assume that they had occupied the region for 
some time before the first encounter with french Jesuits in 1659 or 1660. Pierre-
esprit Radisson learned about a people that he transcribed as “nadoueceronon,” 
who his hosts claimed were “very strong, with whome they weare in warres with, 
and another wandering nation, living only upon what they could come by.”24 at 
the time of Radisson’s visit, however, the sioux were clearly not the stereotypical 
people americans think of whenever a popular image is conjured. The sioux 
society, economy, and way of life were changing, but scholars identify elements 
that remain vitally important to understand american-sioux relations and the 
development of the powerful “sioux nation” of the northern plains. The sioux 
embraced their own magnificent origin stories that supplied the necessary ele-
ments for sioux society, culture, and traditions.25
on the other hand, the pastoral, nomadic Kazakhs remained deeply con-
nected to centuries of central asian nomadic social, economic, and cultural 
structures and heritage. Their origins are still somewhat uncertain, but most 
sources agree that the name “Kazakh” was in use by the sixteenth century.26 
Writing in the 1930s, Kazakh historian sandzhar d. asfendiarov concluded that 
the Kazakhs appeared as a distinct group in the steppe by the late fifteenth 
or early sixteenth centuries, after the nogai-uzbek-Kazak confederation col-
lapsed.27 alfred e. hudson suggested it designated nomadic groups in the steppe 
who independently established themselves or “transferred their allegiance from 
one to another of the numerous khans then reigning in the steppe.”28 french 
historian René Grousset agreed with asfendiarov and hudson. he referred to 
the Kazakhs at this time as “dissident uzbeks.”29
The Kazakhs emerged, by most accounts, when the “dissident” uzbeks-
Kazakhs migrated north of the syr darya (Darya means “river”; the amu and 
syr are the oxus and Jaxartes Rivers of ancient times) and followed two broth-
ers named Kirei and zhanibek (who identified themselves as the “rulers” of the 
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Kazakhs) to become the nomadic pastoralists.30 others attached themselves to 
the Kazakhs in the steppe regions and, in time, the ethnonym “Kazakh” became 
the dominant identity for all of these peoples.31 lawrence Krader described 
this process of early identity formation that went from being a sort of social 
estate—dissidents from a ruling class—to a rudimentary political confederation 
inhabiting the steppe, to a people who self-identified as “Kazakh.”32
in both the sioux and the Kazakh case, each migrated from one place of ori-
gin—the woodlands of Wisconsin and Minnesota for the sioux and Turkestan 
for the Kazakhs—into the northern plains or the eurasian steppe to become the 
dominant power, displacing others or defending the newly won region against 
the incursions of others. They were societies in transition that americans and 
Russians failed to understand because they perceived them as ancient, even 
static. during those migrations, however, the identities of the sioux and the 
Kazakhs emerged along with the social structures that later observers and schol-
ars identified.
in order to understand the attitudes, perceptions, typologies, and imagery 
that permeated nineteenth-century american and Russian thinking about the 
sioux and the Kazakhs, it is necessary to juxtapose those stereotypes and cli-
chés against what scholars, then and later, identified as the social, political, cul-
tural, and economic structures between the two nomadic peoples. This is not 
an exhaustive analysis but rather is designed to contextualize and identify some 
features and characteristics that shaped the sioux and Kazakh world, at least to 
the extent possible to reconstruct it for a comparative analysis.
oceTi saKoWin and ush zhuz
Kinship relations, consanguineal units, and adoption influenced and determined 
sioux social structures. The sioux also called themselves the Oceti Sakowin, 
the “seven council fires,” which was a mechanism to unite through language, 
kinship, and culture. scholars doubt that any sort of institution or confederacy 
based on the oceti sakowin materially existed or ever met in council or came 
together as the name suggests.33 seventeenth- and eighteenth-century visitors to 
various sioux camps do not mention it, but Raymond J. deMallie believes that 
the first description of it was by William Keating in 1825.34 nonetheless, that 
concept or bond held the sioux together to reaffirm the shared language, history, 
culture, and traditions.
among the sioux, the seven council fires provided that covenant to explain 
their commonalities, shared language and customs, history, and traditions that, 
according to James R. Walker, maintained peaceful relations and prevented 
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raids and reprisals against one another.35 Walker and other scholars were unable 
to find any legend or historical episode to explain the origins of the seven divi-
sions.36 in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, visitors to sioux camps and 
other observers often divided the Sioux into three branches: Santee, Yankton/
yanktonai, and Teton—with the former often referred to as the eastern branch 
and the Teton as the western branch. Moreover, the Santee and Yankton/Yanktonai 
referred to themselves as dakota and the Teton called themselves lakota. after 
the sioux western migrations began, sometime in the early to mid-eighteenth 
century, the Santee remained in Minnesota; the Yankton/Yanktonai occupied 
much of the dakotas and northern nebraska and iowa; and the Teton situated in 
the western parts of the dakotas, northern nebraska, and eastern Montana and 
Wyoming. The Teton were the largest in population and ranged over the greater 
expanse of territory. The Teton also produced some of the staunchest resistance 
to american expansion in the nineteenth century.
The sioux, however, existed within the oyate subdivision, often translated as 
“people,” but which also corresponds somewhat to tribe or nation. The names 
attached to the council fires and the various bands represented the links to 
one’s sioux-ness—to the people’s history—and situated a person in the present. 
These oyate are grouped to make up the santee division: Mdewakantonwan 
(spirit lake village), Wahpekute (shooters among the leaves), sisitonwan or 
sisseton (fish scale village), and Wahpetonwan or Wahpeton (dwellers among 
the leaves). another name for the yankton (end village) and yanktonai (little 
end village) was the Middle, or Wiciyela, division; and the Teton, or Titonwan 
(dwellers on the Plains), were the western division.37 among the Teton, there 
were seven sub-bands—oglala, Brulé, sans arc, hunkpapa, Miniconjou, Two 
Kettle, and Blackfeet.38 according to anthony R. McGinnis, the oglala and 
Brulé were larger in population, but all were noted for their “warlike behav-
ior” and often camped together and migrated among the Moreau, Grand, 
cannonball, and heart Rivers.39 Geographer Joseph n. nicollet gathered some 
valuable information about the various branches in 1838–1839, although he 
does not explain any connection to the seven council fires or why the divi-
sions occurred.40 There was frequent contact and interaction among the vari-
ous sioux bands—linked as they were by shared language, culture, traditions, 
history, and intermarriage—but there is little evidence to suggest that large 
multiband councils or gatherings occurred before the 1850s or that the sioux 
ever amalgamated into something that might resemble a unified nation before 
internal colonization.41
The division into branches existed among the Kazakhs as well: the Ush Zhuz or 
“Three hordes.” There is little debate among scholars that shortly after Kerei and 
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zhanibek separated from the uzbek confederation further fission occurred, so 
that by the late-sixteenth century, the Kazakhs divided into the ush zhuz. each 
horde consisted of various clans. for the kinship relationship to operate in both 
social and political contexts, Kazakhs did not trace descent back to Kerai and 
zhanibek but instead to the mythical Alash or Alash Khan. scholars attempted 
to identify alash to no avail.42 More important was that Kazakhs believed it and 
used it to reinforce kinship, which was a link or covenant to explain what united 
Kazakhs as a people. Kazakhs endowed social and political configurations with 
a patrilineal scheme underscored by belief in a common ancestry to create con-
sanguineal nomadic units. Kinship idioms and genealogies supplied the neces-
sary and common principles to affirm perceptions of shared cultural heritage, 
confirm common territory, and establish the mutual responsibilities and rights 
of each member. Kazakhs, according to Krader, applied the principle of patrilin-
eal descent that possessed rather limited political authority and was quite fluid 
and adaptable.43
The horde located geographically the furthest from the Russian line of 
advance was the Uly Zhuz, or “Great horde.” it was situated in the southeast-
ern part of the Kazakh steppe, close to the Turkestan khanates of Bukhara and 
Kokand, bordering china to the east, and in the semirechie (seven Rivers, in 
Kazakh Zheti Su) region, north of the Tien shan Mountains (home of the Kirghiz 
nomads) and west along the north banks of the syr darya. To the north and west 
of the Great horde was the Orta Zhuz, or “Middle horde,” which was the largest 
horde in population and considered by many to be the most powerful economi-
cally and militarily. it certainly had some of the most prominent leaders in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and resisted Russian expansion and coloni-
zation with a tenacity unrivaled by the other two hordes. its territory contained 
some of the best pasturage and waterways in the steppe. The last horde, Kishi 
Zhuz, or “little horde,” was second to the Middle horde in population and 
geography, but it was also the closest to Russia, located in the northwest steppe 
above the aral and caspian seas. The territory of the little horde was the first 
annexed by the Russian empire.
among the Kazakhs, each of the three hordes had clans, but these divisions 
were extremely fluid. each clan within the horde had what nurbulat Masanov 
called “traditional genealogies,” from the Kazakh word shezhere (genealogy), 
used to group peoples; and each clan was apparently not rigidly bound to its 
own genealogy, history, or traditions. in the Great horde, there were eleven 
shezhere; in the Middle horde seven; and in the little horde, there were three 
large “unions” that formed differently than in the Middle or Great hordes. The 
Alimuly union had six groups, the Baiuly union had fourteen, and the Zhetyru 
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union had seven.44 allegiance could and often did change. Krader cited an exam-
ple that illustrates this fission: when some Kazakhs of the Kangly, Chaichkly, 
and Kereit clans separated from the Great horde and affiliated with the Kongrad 
clan of the Middle horde. in order to assert this new genealogical right, they 
adopted the lineage necessary to claim membership.45 according to alikhan 
Bokeikhanov, Kazakhs rarely asserted the largest form of identity (i.e., Kazakh) 
unless asked by a stranger; in that case, they might also reply that they are the 
“children of alash” or the “children of the three hordes.” When two Kazakhs 
met, however, they identified the clan rather than zhuz, which they employed as 
expressions of their mutual relatedness and potential kinship.46
as with the sioux, there is little evidence to show that the Kazakhs ever united 
to form a single unit, although various leaders attempted to unite all Kazakhs 
under a single khan. Rudi Paul lindner argued that the distance and move-
ment between nomadic units rendered a conical clan impossible and unable 
to maintain rigid, segmented lineage. it might be a useful concept to study, for 
example, “well-defined territorial groups,” but he noted that to study nomads “is 
to study flux and movement.”47 Consequently, there was simply no way that all 
sioux or all Kazakhs could ever migrate together. nonetheless, the sioux and 
the Kazakhs affixed durable bonds to kinship, language, culture, social structure, 
beliefs, and traditions; but the americans and Russians, to borrow Benedict 
anderson’s phrase, “imagined communities” among the nomads as political enti-
ties that simply did not exist, which often complicated relations between the 
colonizers and the colonized.
PoPul aTion
Throughout much of the nineteenth century, population estimates for the sioux 
and the Kazakhs varied considerably and were largely based on lodge or yurt 
counts by visitors and some government officials. for example, according to 
stephen Riggs, by the 1850s, the dakotas numbered about 25,000. Riggs did 
not include the lakota in his estimate. a later approximation based on some 
government information not available at midcentury that included the so-called 
western dakota suggested that the population was closer to 40,000.48 in the 
1830s, aleksei levshin published one of the first demographic estimates about 
the Kazakhs. levshin believed there were roughly 190,000 yurts in the little 
horde, 500,000 in the Middle horde, and 100,000 in the Great horde. using 
a figure of six people per yurt, he concluded that there were almost 4.7 mil-
lion Kazakhs.49 This method to approximate population was similar to the lodge 
counting conducted by americans to estimate the total number of sioux. By 
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the latter part of the nineteenth century, official american government statis-
tics shed only partial light on the sioux population. By the 1870s, some sioux 
lived on reservations; other sioux refused to settle there. in the 1870 Annual 
Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior, 
the dakota superintendency census calculated the total population at 27,921, 
but it likely included various sioux bands and non-sioux, such as cheyenne 
or Ponca.50 By 1880, having finally forced all sioux to live on various reserva-
tions, the report calculated that the sioux population was 31,547.51 That number 
declined during the early reservation years—between 1880 and 1910—perhaps 
due to infant mortality or sioux leaving the reservations following the 1887 
dawes act. By 1910 the sioux numbered only 27,588.52 The Russians, however, 
only conducted their first official census in 1897, and it concluded that there 
were 4.5 million Kazakhs in all territories of the empire, with an average of four 
people per yurt.53 according to the census, 3.4 million lived in the four steppe 
districts, and the others lived in Turkestan and siberia.54 These midcentury esti-
mates, and subsequent official American and Russian census data, demonstrate 
one of the major differences in this comparison: the number of Kazakhs far 
exceeded the number of sioux.
Unquestionably, American Indian populations decreased significantly dur-
ing american expansion and internal colonization and suffered immeasurable 
losses due to disease and military confrontations. This decline among american 
indians, and to some extent the sioux, fostered expectations by many con-
temporary observers, missionaries, government officials, and soldiers that the 
american indian was on the verge of extinction. The american people readily 
accepted american indian decline as the inevitable contraction of an ostensibly 
Figure 1.1. Kazakh yurt (courtesy of central state Museum, Republic of Kazakhstan, 
nvf 5289/11). 
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backward, uncivilized people confronted by civilization. The Kazakhs, on the 
other hand, did not endure similar population declines in the nineteenth cen-
tury. levshin’s estimate appeared generally accurate based on Russian 1897 
census data. Russians were much more inclined to believe that Kazakhs might 
integrate rather than succumb to extinction.
although difficult to conclude with certainty, the demographics might also 
explain the extended period Russia required to conquer and subsequently colo-
nize the Kazakh steppe. from 1732, when some Kazakh khans first swore alle-
giance to the Russians, it took another 115 years for Russia to quell that last 
major Kazakh martial resistance to Russian colonization. in the united states, 
conquest occurred from roughly 1851 to 1890 (the fort laramie Treaty of 1851 
to Wounded Knee, in 1891). nonetheless, the sioux represented the dominant 
force in the northern plains before 1850 and one of the largest demographi-
cally that the americans encountered. The Kazakhs, as well, constituted a large 
population situated on the Russian frontier and represented a significant barrier 
to Russian expansion.
after the second World War, however, lemkin’s term—genocide—gradu-
ally provided scholars a new interpretative framework in which to examine 
american internal colonization and native american population decline.55 
since the 1960s, many american scholars have suggested that the american 
government and people committed genocide against the indigenous popula-
tion. some even argued that this genocide started when the first europeans 
landed in the Americas. Various American scholars equated expansion westward 
and the expulsion of natives as cultural genocide; others observed clear cases 
of physical genocide against, for example, california’s natives, certainly in the 
years following the 1848 california gold rush. By the 1970s, dee Brown’s Bury 
My Heart at Wounded Knee thoroughly popularized the concept of genocide 
against american indians, and it remains a topic of heated debate among schol-
ars, journalists, and activists.56 other scholars—most notably, historian Gary 
clayton anderson—argued that it was not genocide but “ethnic cleansing.”57
in the Kazakh case, soviet scholars, both Russian and Kazakh, did not typically 
apply the term genocide to reinterpret Russian internal colonization. serious 
discussion, however, chiefly emerged during Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika 
and glasnost reforms of the 1980s and captured many Kazakh nationalists’ 
imaginations in the years immediately following the soviet union’s collapse in 
1991. since then, Kazakh and foreign scholars generally identified two distinct 
instances of possible genocide: the 1916 central asia revolt and the soviet col-
lectivization famine in Kazakhstan in the 1930s and the subsequent Stalinist 
purges. The number of Kazakhs who died during these two tragic episodes 
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remains uncertain, and soviet-era interpretations further shrouded historical 
examination. The first work to ignite the debate was a 1989 article published 
in the soviet journal Voprosy istorii, coauthored by two leading Kazakh histo-
rians, zhulduzbek B. abylkhozhin and Manash Kozybaev, and highly regarded 
Kazakh demographer Makash Tatimov. The article, “Kazakhstanskaia tragediia,” 
spawned numerous scholarly articles and books in Kazakhstan that generated 
intense discussion in the press and popular media.58 Most frequently, scholars 
identify the soviet collectivization and stalinist purges among the Kazakhs, in 
which an estimated 25 to 30 percent of the Kazakh population died, as clear 
evidence of state-sanctioned genocide.59 Most Kazakh scholars believe that 
between 1.3 and 1.5 million Kazakhs died during the famine, which they fre-
quently describe as genocide; but many western scholars disagree. Historian 
sarah isabel cameron’s meticulous research led her to conclude, “there is no 
evidence to indicate that these plans for violent modernization [collectivization] 
ever became transformed into a desire to eliminate Kazakhs as a group.”60
neither anderson nor cameron ignore the violence or atrocities committed 
against the sioux or the Kazakhs, but, as anderson concluded, “many indian 
tribes (indeed the vast majority) survived, along with their culture . . . This 
weakens and perhaps makes impossible the argument for calling what happened 
in north american genocide of any sort.”61 in the nineteenth century, anderson 
claimed, “Genocide did not occur in america, primarily because moral restraints 
prevented it.”62 he argued, “for either genocide or ethnic cleansing to occur, a 
legitimate government must plan, organize, and implement the crime . . . But 
other actions such as removal or diminishment of ancestral lands require a dif-
ferent description because they are not genocide.”63 as with anderson’s argu-
ment, the Russian government exhibited no intent to exterminate the Kazakh 
nation during either the 1916 central asian revolt or soviet collectivization. it 
was not the goal of the Russian government in 1916 or the 1930s to pursue eth-
nic cleansing either but to suppress a rebellion brought on by war and internal 
colonization in the former and forcefully implement soviet modernization poli-
cies during the latter.
in the united states, anderson noted that the absence of a clear state or 
government intent to eliminate indigenous peoples weakens the argument for 
genocide.64 This argument is applicable in both the sioux and Kazakh cases. 
historians and others continue to debate the meaning of genocide and ethnic 
cleansing and identify examples or situations; but american and Russian inter-
nal colonization was not genocide. during the nineteenth century, americans 
and Russians altered Sioux and Kazakh cultures, conquered Sioux and Kazakh 
historical territories, and consumed sioux and Kazakh political and economic 
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sovereignty; but the sioux and the Kazakhs survived internal colonization. in 
order to contextualize sioux and Kazakh survival, it is necessary to understand, 
to the extent possible, sioux and Kazakh social, political, economic, and cultural 
structures as they appeared in the nineteenth century.
TiyosPaye and aul
The sioux called their small nomadic communities tiyospaye, consisting of sev-
eral camps (called wicotipi, or households), which joined together and were 
often based on actual and fictive consanguinity. during the winter months, the 
tiyospaye camped together; during much of the year, these camps separated 
for hunts but often reunited for ceremonies such as the sun dance. camps 
generally consisted of kin but were not solely restricted to direct blood or mar-
riage. other kin relations included ritual adoption. outsiders—and this typi-
cally included fur traders or members of other tribes—could acquire fictive kin-
ship. fur traders developed reciprocity networks, which, according to Mary K. 
Whelan, was an exchange “between socially defined partners” that “symbolized 
family relations” among the seven council fires.65 These social or even eco-
nomic kinship relations were as legitimate as blood or marriage. in 1698 father 
louis hennepin witnessed one such ritual adoption. The tribe also adopted 
hennepin. he explained that after an exchange of “presents,” they “adopt those” 
and “publicly declare them citizens, or children of their country; and according 
to their age . . . the savages call the adopted Persons, sons, Brothers, cousins, 
according to the degree of Relations: and they cherish them whom they have 
adopted, as much as if they were their own natural Brothers or children.”66
Kinship was an essential factor in sioux internal relationships at all levels. The 
codes of conduct and behavior were firmly established, which is not to suggest 
violations did not occur. for example, the avoidance taboo forbade a married man 
to look at his mother-in-law, and a similar rule existed between a father-in-law 
and his son’s wife.67 This structure created a means by which the change of camp 
or tiyospaye by an individual or family did not require a fundamental change 
in behavior. each individual, young or old, understood and complied with this 
system, which preserved the essential “harmonious operation” of a tiyospaye.68 
according to ella deloria, “kinship had everyone in a fast net of interpersonal 
responsibility . . . only those who kept the rules consistently . . . thus honoring 
their fellows, were good dakotas—meaning good citizens in society, meaning 
persons of integrity and reliability.” it was, she wrote, “what men lived by.”69
among the Kazakhs, the smallest nomadic unit—the aul—consisted of rela-
tives, usually a father and sons. The next level of kinship was the ru, or taipa, 
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usually translated as “clan” or sometimes “tribe.” Members of the clan might be 
related, but not necessarily. clans conjoined into a single zhuz, or horde. as the 
smallest economic and social unit in Kazakh society, the aul traditionally pro-
vided the strongest connection to genealogy and was the most tangible source of 
wealth and security, but it could also include unrelated members. auls generally 
operated as semi-independent units, gathering only for special occasions and 
wintering together. The economic viability hinged on self-sufficient activities, 
and the political structures reflected that same degree of independence.
one yurt generally consisted of the nuclear family—parents and unmarried 
children.70 When a son married, he remained in the paternal aul, and the family 
provided him with a share of the familial property—chiefly a yurt—and some 
livestock. The woman’s family also provided property, household goods, and some 
livestock as part of a dowry. Rarely did a bride remain in her natal aul. The young-
est son, if there was one, usually remained in his parents’ yurt after marriage, in 
order to care for his parents in old age. When they died, he inherited his parents’ 
remaining property, including the livestock.71 Both the sioux and the Kazakhs 
practiced forms of exogamic marriage.
Sioux rules of exogamy required a degree of separation between potential mar-
riage partners, discouraging marriage between a couple that shared a common 
grandparent. in general, it was best to marry outside the kinship group, tracing 
the lineage as far back as possible to ensure the appropriate separation. arranged 
marriage was the norm; however, the young couple might have a say in the mat-
ter. sioux practice also included a bride price, the hakatakus, which the woman’s 
male relatives received. according to Royal B. hassrick, the higher social status, 
the higher the price, usually paid in horses after the Sioux acquired them in the 
late eighteenth century.72 The couple had the choice to live in the man’s camp 
with his relatives or in the woman’s camp alongside her relations. Polygamy was 
also an accepted practice in Sioux society, but it required a degree of wealth in 
order to support all of a man’s wives. levirate occurred as well, but it was not 
obligatory nor, it seems, frequently applied. A nuclear family shared a tipi, but 
it was the woman’s property. if a man had multiple wives, each woman should 
occupy her own tipi.73
Kazakh rules of exogamy dictated that marriage could only occur between 
unrelated partners, traditionally by seven generations of separation. Marriage 
was a contractual agreement between parents, kalym (bride price) being paid 
to the girl’s parents. a girl sang “weeping” or “lament” songs when departing her 
parents’ aul to live in the aul of her new husband because she was leaving all she 
knew and loved behind to live among strangers in a different aul.74 The Kazakhs 
practiced polygamy, but, generally, only the wealthy had up to four wives; the 
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practice was somewhat unusual. Kazakhs also practiced levirate. a woman with 
no sons passed to the younger brother, but she was exempt if she had a son and 
inherited the property until the son or sons reached maturity.75 Krader noted, 
perhaps with a little levity, that levirate was “not loved” by women because if 
they were compelled to marry a brother who already had one or more wives, the 
recently widowed woman immediately assumed a subordinate position to the 
others.76 she was, simply, no longer the doyenne of her own family. Women were 
important social and economic partners with their husbands in both sioux and 
Kazakh society.
Perceptions by outsiders in the nineteenth century typically characterized 
women as subordinate in sioux and Kazakh society; the women did all the work 
and the men were inherently lazy. for outside observers, gender roles were an 
important demarcation between american and Russian women, in compari-
son to sioux and Kazakh women—a clear contrast between the relative free-
dom american and Russian women enjoyed and the “drudgery, subservience, 
and patriarchal oppression” exhibited in sioux and Kazakh societies.77 These 
ideas reinforced one of the traits that colonizers detected in backward, nomadic 
societies: that a society’s treatment of its women revealed the level of its civi-
lization. as sherry l. smith commented, americans, undoubtedly a civilized 
people, “pampered women; savage people enslaved them.”78 visitors to a Kazakh 
aul described the women as “active and energetic, and [they] perform nearly 
all the labor which should devolve jointly” to men and women; but the men are 
“distinguished for their indolence.” another noted that the women cook and do 
most of the work, while the men are “too lazy to do more than look after the 
horses,” and “lead a lazy, shiftless life.”79 Women exercised some control, but only 
because the men were so lazy.80
among the sioux, women served an essential role in tiyospaye functions.81 
childbearing, food preparation, and handicrafts were all critically important. 
Women made the tipis, an arduous undertaking. Women typically put up and 
took down the tipi, which varied in size. a larger tipi often reflected the hus-
band’s ability to hunt to obtain skins. The expression “[t]he men with the fastest 
horses lived in the biggest tipis” revealed a husband’s ability to provide for his 
family.82 But, Whelan noted, the sioux “women’s ownership of ‘family’ tipis and 
the onerous nature of many of their tasks puzzled euro-americans because it 
challenged their Western gender system.”83 later, missionaries among the sioux 
on the reservations nonetheless considered the status of women to be one of ser-
vitude, and only “[t]ime alone can change this prejudice and raise sioux women 
from their low condition to that of high and noble position such as is attained and 
held by women of civilized nations.”84
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What outside observers either neglected or failed to acknowledge was that 
sioux women could speak at camp councils.85 a sioux woman could divorce, and 
she owned the major property, including furs, clothing, the cooking utensil, and 
other domestic implements. according to Walker, in family matters, a mother’s 
authority exceeded that of the father. and, like male societies (warrior, dance, 
etc.), women had societies as well.86
Women in Kazakh society also played a critical role. They were never veiled or 
secluded. ellsworth huntington visited some Kazakh camps, and he remarked 
that women were “continually engaged in their household tasks. They converse 
freely with men, and make no attempt to keep themselves hidden.” This is some-
thing huntington likely expected to see because Kazakhs were Muslims, and 
Muslim women, in his understanding of islamic society, were secluded and 
veiled.87 contrary to expectations, Kazakh women participated in councils and 
assemblies; they joined in songs and games and “respond readily to jests inter-
changed with men.”88
sioux and Kazakh women raised the children, engaged in domestic handicrafts, 
did the cooking and cleaning, and were fully involved in the day-to-day activities 
of the camp. Men guarded the herds, defended the camp, and made the political 
decisions; women did everything else. despite american and Russian percep-
tions, sioux and Kazakh women were not enslaved. observations by americans, 
Russians, or foreigners, however, rarely dismantled the power of nineteenth-
century negative conceptions and perceptions about the sioux and the Kazakhs, 
which more frequently, and typically, reinforced false beliefs.
econoMy
The foundation on which the sioux way of life and economy existed was the 
buffalo. it played an extraordinarily important role in a culture and economy 
that depended on this one resource to supply almost all the material needs of 
the society. it constituted the principal food source, but not the only one. By 
the nineteenth century, the sioux possessed large horse herds, which greatly 
improved their economic and material prosperity and made buffalo hunting a 
far more efficient undertaking. They used buffalo hides to make clothing, foot-
wear, tipi covers, and small bullboats, and the animal later became a source of 
income as traders sought out the hide, meat, and fur. The sioux used the horns 
and bones as cooking utensils, hide scrapers, and other functions that were both 
practical and ceremonial. in the arid, almost treeless plains, natives and, later, 
pioneers used buffalo dung as fuel. The only flaw in this structure might have 
been the absence of greater diversity. certainly, the sioux hunted other animals 
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and willingly traded and incorporated material goods from europeans, but the 
reliance on the buffalo was susceptible to overhunting and exploitation. horses 
and buffaloes were valuable but vulnerable assets in the sioux economy.
The introduction of the horse was one of two innovations adopted from 
europeans that every scholar acknowledges were critical to the sioux during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; the other was firearms. The sioux func-
tioned fine without them, if they existed in a world in which their neighbors also 
did not have them—but that was not the case. Plains indians adopting the horse 
epitomized the “quintessential American epic” that was a “sweeping story of cul-
tural collision and fusion.” it was the story of some “obscure foot nomads . . . 
reinventing themselves as equestrian people [that] created one of history’s most 
renowned horse cultures.”89 unlike the horse-cultured nomads in other parts of 
the world, or even among some native american tribes, the sioux horse-culture 
nomadic existence was only seminomadic and more hunting nomadic than pas-
toral nomadism. The horse provided a mobility inconceivable in the seventeenth 
century, but that became a reality by the late eighteenth century. The introduc-
tion of the horse made the sioux far more efficient nomads and hunters and cer-
tainly more powerful militarily.90 The horse made hunting more individualistic 
and the family more independent, and acquiring horses intensified intertribal 
warfare to ensure unhindered access to the buffalo, which increasingly became 
a critical subsistence resource.91
as hunter-nomads, the sioux depended on the vast buffalo herds of the Great 
Plains for their subsistence, but according to Robert h. lowie and others, the 
horse gave the sioux the ability to “specialize in bison subsistence.”92 The horse 
made the Great Plains a “place of residence rather than as a place of occasional 
resort” to hunt buffalo more efficiently.93 The horse revolutionized the sioux 
economy and its culture, and it transformed warfare. The sioux had relatively 
small horse herds. They acquired horses, by most accounts, in the late seven-
teenth century, but according to Richard White, “the sioux were hardly noted 
for either the abundance or quality of their herds.”94 other scholars noted that a 
wealthy Sioux family might have forty horses, but that one family could do quite 
well with twelve.95
Many scholars attribute the desperation to acquire more horses to the 
increased frequency of conflict, as wealth was measured in horses and, accord-
ing to colin G. calloway, “horse-raiding and war were virtually synonymous.”96 
Of course, scholars will never know the frequency of warfare between Plains’ 
Indians before the acquisition of the horse, but the animal likely improved the 
military capabilities of the sioux and others who adopted it. By the nineteenth 
century, sioux power on the northern plains rested on military efficiency and 
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mobility (which prevented the devastating spread of disease that greatly weak-
ened other tribes). in addition, as Pekka hämäläinen noted, the sioux developed 
“a functional equilibrium among horse numbers, ecological constraints, and eco-
nomic, cultural, and military imperatives.”97 Popular imagination stereotypically 
and inextricably linked the sioux with the horse and the buffalo. in comparison, 
economically, the most tangible asset the Kazakhs owned was livestock.
The typical measure of Kazakh wealth was the size of one’s herds. no other 
animal was more important than the horse; it fulfilled material, nutritional, and 
symbolic needs. Kazakhs ate horse meat, but more important was kumis, fer-
mented mare’s milk. every visitor, it seems, who ever visited a Kazakh aul com-
mented about kumis. Jules Brocherel, for example, wrote, “Gulping down this 
liquid requires a strong digestion, for it contains a quantity of dirt and gives 
off such a smell that the mere sight of it arouses nausea.” another visitor wrote 
that the taste is “what might be expected—rancid and sour to the last degree.”98 
Kazakhs, however, loved it. during summer months, they made kurt, a sun-
dried cheese ball, and many other foodstuffs that they preserved for the long 
winters. next to the horse in importance was sheep, which provided meat and 
wool—both of which were critical to Kazakh life. at weddings and feasts, or if a 
guest arrived, it was customary to slaughter a sheep for the meal. Kazakhs also 
kept goats, camels, and, during the nineteenth century, cattle. Thomas Witlam 
atkinson, an american who traveled throughout the Kazakh steppe in the 1850s, 
visited one aul and described the enormous size of the herds as he counted 
“one hundred and six camels, including their young; there were more than two 
thousand horses, one thousand oxen and cows, and six thousand sheep and goats. 
even these, large as the number may appear, were far short of the total number 
of animals belonging to the patriarch chief; he had two other aouls [sic], at each 
of which were one thousand horses and other cattle.”99
For both the Sioux and the Kazakhs, maintaining the herds required sufficient 
pasture, water, and defense against raids. The “poverty in horses” seemed to gen-
erate “constant warfare” in the northern plains. according to hämäläinen, the 
sioux (he specifically refers to the “lakota”) found the right balance of herds 
that encouraged them to keep their herds relatively small.100 lowie made a rela-
tive comparison about the role of horses in sioux and Kazakh society, noting that 
among the sioux and other Plains indians, the horse “lacked significant features 
associated with Mongol and Turkic horse breeders. The asiatic nomads gained 
subsistence directly from their herds—by eating the flesh of their animals and 
milking their mares. few of the Plains indian tribes ate horse flesh except in 
times of famine, even the comanche used it as a distinctly subsidiary food; and 
no american natives ever dreamed of milking mares.”101 lowie’s statement makes 
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it seem that meat was the only food the sioux and the Kazakhs ate, but that was 
not the case.
The sioux clearly depended on the buffalo as their principal food source, but 
many visitors and observers in the nineteenth century described the variety in 
the sioux diet. nonetheless, edwin Thompson denig stereotypically described 
the sioux as “a people who depend entirely upon the chase for subsistence,” 
despite the fact that other observers witnessed the sioux harvest prairie turnips, 
wild artichokes, wild peas, red plums, and chokecherries.102 Joseph M. Prince 
and Richard h. steckel noted that the perceptions and generalizations about 
the sioux ignored the reality of their food economy—particularly their use 
of wild plant resources such as onions, chokecherries, gooseberries, and wild 
rice. in addition, they noted that the sioux “were known to use sap from the 
soft maple and box elder for sugar. important cultigens such as maize, beans, 
squash, tobacco, and sunflowers were available to Plains nomads through a long- 
established intertribal trade with the more sedentary horticultural communities 
of Plains villagers.”103
among Kazakhs, meat—chiefly lamb, goat, and horse—supplied their princi-
pal diet, but they also traded for fruits and vegetables, grains, and other food with 
Russians and Turkestan khanates. another industry among Kazakhs that supplied 
food and some income was fishing. Russian government records in the 1860s 
noted that in some regions—particularly those near large lakes (including the 
aral sea)—Kazakhs harvested thousands of pounds of fish and caviar annually.104 
Figure 1.2. Plains indians (courtesy of denver Public library). 
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stephen Riggs also observed fishing among the sioux, as did earlier visitors to 
sioux camps, but it was for subsistence rather than industry and trade.105
nineteenth-century observers generally characterized the nomadic life based 
almost exclusively on the chase or the livestock and often ignored the diversity of 
Sioux and Kazakh economies. These observers equally failed to appreciate the 
diversity also evident within their religious practices, their leadership structures, 
and their cultures.
ReliGion
embedded in the general conceptions of the sioux are what deMallie identi-
fied as three elementary features of lakota traditionalism that likely applied 
to all sioux and symbolized their way of life, including “land and freedom” to 
migrate, male pursuits such as war and hunting, and the “special relationship 
mankind shared with all the rest of the universe and the forces of wakan.”106 
according to Walker, wakan was the “animating force of the universe” and “any-
thing that was hard to understand.”107 sioux religion had rituals and basic con-
cepts that sioux understood and shared but that did not include a specific 
structured or consistent theology. sioux religion was not dogmatic but a belief 
system that made sioux “lives and the world in which they live intelligible and 
acceptable.”108 Rituals gave expression to their beliefs, including the “purifica-
tion lodge,” also referred to as the “sweat lodge,” and ceremonies such as the 
sun dance.109 early visitors and outside observers readily dismissed sioux reli-
gious practices, usually decrying them as pagan and barbaric. George catlin’s 
description is typical and prejudiced. he was repulsed by the sun dance—
although he admitted that he never witnessed the ceremony—as the “most 
extraordinary and cruel custom” practiced, which he called “looking at the sun!” 
he described it as a “sort of worship, or penance, of great cruelty; disgusting 
and painful to behold, with only one palliating circumstance about it, which is, 
that it is a voluntary torture and of very rare occurrence.” according to catlin, 
the “poor and ignorant, misguided and superstitious man who undertakes it, 
put his everlasting reputation at stake upon the issue,” and “if he faints and 
falls . . . he loses his reputation as a brave or mystery-man, and suffers a signal 
disgrace in the estimation of the tribe.”110 catlin’s impression seems archetypal; 
europeans and americans misunderstood the purpose of the sun dance, but 
they also misunderstood sioux religious belief and rituals. according to Joallyn 
archambault, the “sun dance was a focus of religious and social activities 
that confirmed tribal membership and helped secure a healthy, peaceful, and 
bountiful future for the tribe and its individual members.”111
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The sun dance was a ceremonial ritual rather than an artistic expression, but 
dance in sioux culture was ritual rather than strictly art that americans might 
recognize. according to deMallie, “dance was a highly charged symbol . . . of 
religion, a ritual means to spiritual and physical betterment.”112 samuel W. Pond 
described the connection between dance and religious ceremonies, such as 
the War dance and the scalp dance, which he regarded with condescension 
and thought were a bit vulgar.113 others thought sioux dance was beautiful and 
meaningful. outside observers contextualized sioux dance—the custom and its 
practice—based on their own cultural and aesthetic understanding of dance 
and its place in a civilized society. in the minds of most outside observers, the 
sioux and their dance were primitive; if primitive was appealing to the observer, 
likely too was sioux dance.
The Kazakhs, on the other hand, were sunni Muslims. some scholars and 
observers dispute the depth of Kazakh adherence to islam. That they were 
Muslims is unquestioned, but the extent is unclear. According to nineteenth-
century Russianized Kazakh scholar chokan valikhanov, “among the Kirgiz 
[Kazakhs] there are still many who do not know the name of Muhammed.”114 in 
his opinion, however, islam was slowly replacing shamanism and pagan beliefs. 
l. f. Kostenko, following a journey among the Kazakhs, concluded, “islam ter-
rifies its people, so that not only are they incapable of development, but on the 
contrary they digress further still into a type of ignorance.”115 levshin described 
asking two Kazakhs, “What do you believe?” They responded, perhaps somewhat 
confused by the question, “We don’t know.”116 eugene schuyler received similar 
responses; however, he noted, “it is only externally that they are Mussulmans. 
on being asked what religion they have, unaccustomed to such a form of the 
question, they will say they do not know, but at the same time they would repel 
with vigour any insinuation that they were not good Mussulmans.”117
in addition, schuyler mistakenly attributed the Kazakhs’ conversion to islam 
to Russian religious policies. he claimed, “few of their sultans and chiefs had any 
idea of the doctrines of Islam, and there was not a mosque nor a mullah in the 
steppe, but the Russians (just as they insisted on using the Tatar language in inter-
course with them) insisted on treating them as though they were Mohammedans, 
built mosques and sent mullahs, until the whole people became outwardly 
Mussulman, although farther from the Russian lines, and nearer the settled pop-
ulations of central asia, the weaker was the faith.”118 despite what many outside 
observers considered a tepid embrace of islam, most Kazakhs adhered to certain 
islamic practices, such as circumcision, hygiene, and burial rituals.119
americans and Russians often misunderstood sioux and Kazakh religious 
practices, which influenced policies designed to manage them or weaken the 
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nomads’ seemingly stubborn adherence to them. visitors to the sioux often com-
pletely misunderstood and misinterpreted their religion; it was pagan, animis-
tic, absent order, and built exclusively on superstition. in the steppe, however, 
Russians perceived the Kazakhs differently precisely because of islam, which 
they accepted as a monotheistic faith derived from a consecrated book with 
something that Russians recognized as canon law. islam advanced Kazakhs from 
the primitive paganism evident among the other indigenous peoples the empire 
encountered. nonetheless, Russians feared the growing influence that islam 
seemingly had in the steppe (Tatarization) and by the 1880s abandoned the 
decades-long practice of non-interference with local religious orientations. The 
Russians started to fear “fanatical islam” among the Kazakhs, and the govern-
ment encouraged orthodox proselytizing among them.120
leadeRshiP
another feature of this comparison to emphasize is the role that leadership 
played among the Sioux and the Kazakhs. Americans and Russians frequently 
misunderstood the sociopolitical structures among the sioux and the Kazakhs. 
Given the significant diversity in sioux and Kazakh society, especially the 
fact that both were divided into three principal groups—Santee, Yankton/
yanktonai, and Teton among the sioux and little, Middle, and Great hordes 
among the Kazakhs—political leadership was more often exercised at the clan, 
band, tiyospaye, and aul levels rather than at a national level.
The sioux did not develop a centralized system of governance. The process of 
fission simply did not allow one to function. The dakota and lakota maintained 
political structures that fluctuated depending on need, such as an external 
threat or group well-being during communal hunts. coalitions of different tiyo-
spaye formed and when different subgroups, such as the hunkpapa and oglala, 
camped together, a camp hierarchy followed an order of “camp circles.” When 
the lakota and dakota gathered together to celebrate an event, dance, hunt, or 
some other need, even if only in part, they maintained a specific camp order 
and ranking. According to Walker, the order was Teton, Santee, and Yankton/
yanktonai. among the Teton, the order was oglala, Miniconjou, Brulé, Two 
Kettle, sans arc, Blackfoot, and hunkpapa.121 american representatives were 
often confused and frustrated by this hierarchy because it often played out dur-
ing negotiations with bands and subgroups.
Bands had chiefs, or headmen, but their political authority was limited; and a 
chief ’s principal responsibility was to carry out the will of the band. authoritarian 
rule did not exist, nor did simple majority. Governance occurred through 
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negotiation and consensus. There are some examples of leadership through 
descent; although hereditary right to leadership, or some form of aristocracy, 
was absent in sioux society, a son could succeed a father if he had proven him-
self a capable warrior and exhibited wisdom and generosity. Primarily, a leader 
needed supporters willing to follow him. The general mechanism by which the 
sioux governed themselves was through the tiyospaye councils. These councils 
appointed important positions, such as the wakiconza (camp administrator) and 
the akicita (enforcers). The council included itancan (elders, or, as catherine 
Price translates it, “father of the band”);122 wakicun, which alanson skinner 
translates as “councilors”;123 and the blotahunka, meaning war leaders.124 
councils permitted everyone to speak and to express an opinion. councils did 
not meet regularly—generally only when an important decision confronted the 
band or tiyospaye, such as war or negotiations. it was a slow, deliberate process 
that required unanimity. If the council failed to reach consensus, it typically 
adjourned and, perhaps more importantly, maintained camp or band social 
harmony. This meant that authority or political power was never concentrated 
into a single individual but extended to each member of the tiyospaye. But it 
also meant that dissent and disagreement often resulted in splintering and fis-
sion. one disgruntled member could break away, perhaps taking allies with him 
to create a new tiyospaye or attract new followers.125 The akicita enforced the 
council’s decisions and carried out the disciplinary functions when someone 
disobeyed; usually akicita were noted warriors and members of warrior soci-
eties. The key to leadership was seemingly personal prestige, accumulated by 
age; demonstrated acts of courage; and the willingness of other sioux to follow. 
There were no laws in sioux society but rather rules that the people understood 
and collectively enforced. The Kazakhs differed to some extent from the sioux 
in their means of governance and enforcement.
The Kazakhs had khans and others who served as leaders at all levels of society. 
Members of an aul or the clan followed those leaders who best protected and 
represented aul or clan interests. leaders who served the welfare and survival 
of the group in the search for pasture or protected them against hostile neigh-
bors attracted followers and support.126 Political organization at the aul level was 
extremely fluid but usually was based on genealogical structures. The Kazakhs 
invested leadership in the aksakal, literally meaning “white beard.” Because an 
aul usually consisted of many agnatic families, fathers, brothers, uncles, etc., the 
aksakal was not always the oldest male. Moreover, an aksakal was someone who 
inspired confidence, rendered justice, and resolved disputes. an aksakal was 
brave and intelligent, but wealth and social standing also attracted followers, 
even though they had no tangible kinship. an aksakal’s authority was, according 
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to Bacon, “directly proportionate to the willingness of the followers to accept 
the leader.” success in war and peace perpetuated one’s rule, but failure meant 
replacement or abandonment.127 The aul was an agnatic and politically organic 
structure that, according to lindner, was open to all “who were willing to subor-
dinate themselves” to an aksakal.128 The aksakal typically decided when to move 
from one pasture to another, often after council with the other males in the aul. 
in principle, an aksakal could rule in an authoritarian manner, but that might 
lead to discord and fission. another leader in Kazakh society was the bii (often 
translated as judge), who was also easily deposed or discarded by followers if he 
exhibited poor leadership. The next level of leadership was “sultan,” probably 
used to identify Kazakhs claiming “white bone” descent and loosely applied to 
anyone who commanded respect and was considered a strong leader.129 The 
khan was the leader of a horde, with an occasional hereditary structure that sup-
ported a khan’s selection from father to son. But, again, a khan could both attract 
and lose supporters easily. Through marriage or some other relationship, it was 
possible that one khan might rule two different or even all three hordes, but that 
rarely, if ever, happened. in fact, during the eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
turies, when Kazakhs most strongly resisted Russian expansion into the steppe, 
no individual khan united all three hordes to oppose Russian imperialism.
in comparison, sioux and Kazakh leaders generally assumed their roles due 
to personal merits, abilities, and political skills as opposed to a hereditary ascen-
sion to power—although that was possible. leadership was fluid, not fixed in 
a structure that allowed a single individual to speak on behalf of all members 
of the band, clan, or horde. Therefore, in later negotiations with the sioux and 
the Kazakhs, americans and Russians demanded that agreements reached 
with a chief or khan be binding on all under their “authority,” as understood 
by americans and Russians. When the americans and Russians expanded into 
the northern plains and Kazakh steppe, the progression was clearly more than 
simple conquest.
The sioux and the Kazakhs developed political structures that suited the 
nomadic life and shared some similarities. americans and Russians generally 
misunderstood sioux and Kazakh political structures during the nineteenth-
century colonization of the northern plains and Kazakh steppe. american and 
Russian expansion and internal colonization in some cases destroyed sioux and 
Kazakh sovereignty and institutions, but sioux and Kazakh social, cultural, and 
spiritual vestiges adapted and survived in various ways. in order to understand 
the process of internal colonization in the nineteenth century, however, it is 
important to understand the historical foundations for american and Russian 
expansion before 1800.
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The process of american and Russian expansion and colonization of the north-
ern plains and the Kazakh steppe is complex and occurs over centuries. The 
roots and chronology of american and Russian expansion and colonization rep-
resents a major difference between the two processes. french and British trad-
ers and trappers penetrated the north american continental interior very slowly 
in the search for the profitable trade that, in some ways, paralleled Russian 
expansion into siberia.1 in both cases, furs and other natural resources initially 
attracted euro-americans and Russians to the continental interiors; but even-
tually that attraction waned, and the northern plains and the Kazakh steppe 
became contested territory that americans and Russians believed needed their 
active intervention in order to stop indigenous attacks against american and 
Russian traders and settlers.
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, euro-americans were a trifling 
presence in the north american continental interior, whereas Russians were 
already crossing the ural Mountains into siberia and penetrating the north-
ern steppe regions. Russia’s contacts, trade relations, and diplomacy with the 
Kazakhs began almost a century before the french even learned about the 
sioux. The sioux only peripherally integrated into the french and British trade 
networks—certainly not as fully as some other tribes, such as the Iroquois, 
huron, or ottawa. But scholars struggle to understand fully the sioux world of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries because it was a world that generally, 
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as Richard White noted, consisted “largely of dim shadows” pieced together and 
“preserved in fractured memories.”2
White correctly noted that the “history of the northern and central 
american Great Plains . . . is far more complicated than the tragic retreat of 
the indians in the face of an inexorable white advance. from the perspec-
tive of the most northern and central plains tribes, the crucial invasion dur-
ing this period was not necessarily that of the whites at all. These tribes had 
few illusions about american whites and the danger they represented, but the 
sioux remained their most feared enemy.”3 despite their focus on their own 
successes, British, french, and Russian sources reveal that euro-americans 
and Russians expanded into regions that were not empty but were some-
what unstable and contested by numerous challengers. Throughout the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries, the sioux and the Kazakhs fought against 
non-europeans and indigenous rivals for control of the northern plains and 
the Kazakh steppe. The sioux fought against the chippewa, cree, crow, iowa, 
Mandan, and others for control of land and resources and the Kazakhs fought 
against the Bashkirs, Kalmyks, Kirghiz, Bukharans, and Khivans for control 
of the steppe. The sioux and the Kazakhs held their territories with martial 
strength. Moreover, because of their experiences with other indigenous groups, 
they often did not feel threatened by euro-americans or Russians. Both the 
sioux and the Kazakhs developed societies that could resist change, but impor-
tant differences existed. The sioux were an expanding power in the northern 
plains from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries but the Kazakhs were 
fighting on multiple sides, and with each other, as the Russians extended their 
empire into siberia and the Kazakh steppe.
The age of what might be called American expansion unquestionably has 
its roots in the age of european overseas expansion into the north and south 
american continents, asia, and africa in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eigh-
teenth centuries. america’s eventual expansion across the north american 
continent traces its birth to european overseas imperialism, whereas Russian 
expansion was, from the start, an exercise in contiguous territorial expansion. 
That perception gives Russian expansion an organic flavor, a natural reincor-
poration of lands dominated by 250 years of Mongol barbarity. The age of 
Russian imperialism commenced with the slow disintegration of the Mongol 
empire (often referred to as the Mongol yoke), the Golden horde. in the late 
fifteenth century, the rise of the Muscovite state under ivan iii (1462–1505), 
or ivan the Great, continued a process in Russian history often called the 
“gathering of the lands of Rus.”4 in the process, the Muscovite state morphed 
from a relatively small principality into what becomes the Russian empire. 
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euro-americans, on the other hand, understood their expansion precisely for 
what it was: economic expansion and imperialism that morphed into settler 
colonialism.5
Most scholars agree that in the seventeenth century, the eastern sioux 
(dakota) were hunter-gatherers living in the lakes and woodlands of Wisconsin 
and Minnesota. The sioux likely hunted buffalo at this time as well, but they 
were not yet the acclaimed horsemen of the nineteenth century. By the mid- 
seventeenth century, sporadic contacts with french traders and Jesuit mission-
aries slowly incorporated the sioux into the lucrative european trade and com-
mercial orbit of the Great lakes region. external pressures, however, compelled 
the sioux to fight against various rivals to preserve their territory. By the eigh-
teenth century, the sioux started to migrate west into the Minnesota prairies and 
northern plains. nonetheless, it remains unclear why the sioux left; the debate 
centers on whether the external pressures exerted by the fur trade pushed the 
Sioux out or, on the other hand, the acquisition of the horse provided the tool to 
hunt buffalo more efficiently and allowed them to abandon their semisedentary 
existence.6
By the seventeenth century, Kazakhs divided into the Three hordes and lived 
in the steppe regions, but they were not the only peoples fighting to control the 
steppe. violence and constantly shifting authority and control seemingly epito-
mized life in the northern steppe during the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries. zhanibek and Kerei resisted incursions in the southern steppe region 
by former uzbek allies—Kyrgyz, oirats, and others. under zhanibek’s son, 
Kasym Khan, the Kazakhs defeated the uzbeks and seized control of Tashkent 
and the syr darya region, including the silk Road town of otrar, although these 
military victories did not bring peace or stability to the steppe.7 like the sioux, 
the Kazakhs underwent change and expansion.
in the seventeenth century, euro-americans and Russians sought to facilitate 
trade with indigenous populations and ensure security along the boundaries 
and throughout the networks established by europeans and Russians; however, 
in order to facilitate that trade, europeans and Russians used both negotiations 
and military force to secure and expand the trade. They built trading posts 
and military fortifications in order to secure the footholds. in addition, euro-
americans and Russians structured trade relationships through treaties and 
oaths negotiated with indigenous peoples. euro-americans facilitated relations 
with the native populations by reciprocal relations and gift giving; Russians 




comparing sioux and Kazakh history up to the eighteenth century is not exact. 
Whereas sioux history seemingly divided between three distinct periods, Kazakh 
history was less precise, although it roughly corresponded. nonetheless, they 
share many common experiences. euro-american and sioux relations in the 
seventeenth century reflect the “push” forces that later compelled many dakota 
and lakota to migrate from their lakes and woodland homes to occupy parts of 
Minnesota, iowa, nebraska, north and south dakota, and eastern Montana and 
Wyoming, where the americans encountered them in the nineteenth century. 
The first era was the Iroquois Wars (1641–1701), followed by the french era 
(1720–1761) and the British era (1761–1819).9 Russian and Kazakh relations 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not easily partition, but Khan 
abulkhair’s 1732 decision to pledge his allegiance to Russia distinguished the 
two eras.10 This division corresponds approximately to the dzhungarian-Kalmyk 
Wars (1680s–1740s) and the era of rebellion (1740s–1822).
The first phase that brought the sioux into the realm of european expan-
sion began by the late sixteenth century, as the french established settlements 
along north america’s eastern shores but struggled to establish a presence in 
the interior until 1608, when the french founded the colony of Quebec. The 
first french trading companies were already operating—mainly purchasing 
furs—but Quebec settlements were small, with only a handful of inhabitants. 
The French allied with Algonquian tribes that served as essential partners in 
the fur trade. The British allied with the Iroquois and, for much of the seven-
teenth century, the Iroquois and French clashed in small-scale attacks followed 
by retaliations. By the second half of the seventeenth century, french economic 
interests oriented toward the fur trade, with Montreal quickly becoming the 
economic center of the trade. The British firmly established their colonies—
which stretched across the eastern seaboard—east of the allegany Mountains. 
Throughout the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the french designed 
policies to contain Britain and restrict its expansion to the small eastern towns 
and settlements. in general, the sioux did not establish specifically strong trade 
relations with either individual european power; however, they gravitated 
toward the various french and British trading networks then operating in the 
plains and Great lakes region.
Russia’s expansion in the sixteenth century, by comparison, was much more 
vigorous. The conquest of Kazan in 1552 served Russia’s growing trade interests 
to the east, particularly the assumed riches in central asia, Persia, and china.11 
in 1573 one of the first Kazakh delegations visited Moscow, some twenty 
years after the conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan.12 This delegation’s purpose 
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remains somewhat uncertain, but the Russians likely wanted to negotiate with 
the Kazakhs to use routes through the Kazakh steppe to expand trade with the 
central asian khanates of Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand and perhaps with china 
and Persia as well.13 in the early years, the Kazakhs acted as middlemen in the 
central asian trade, but their most important contribution was to provide pro-
tection to caravans crossing the steppe. The problem was that the Kazakhs were 
just as likely to attack a caravan as protect one. an assurance of protection by one 
Kazakh clan or horde did not guarantee that a different Kazakh clan or horde 
was obligated to respect its route or safety.
it is unlikely that this delegation was the first contact between Kazakhs and 
Russians, but it occurred almost a century before known sioux-european inter-
action. The earliest mention of the sioux appears to be in 1641 by two Jesuit 
missionaries, isaac Jogues and charles Raymbault.14 They did not meet any 
sioux. according to the story, they learned from the chippewa about a people 
“who lived eighteen days’ journey to the west”; but it was another twenty years 
before a documented meeting occurred between sioux and french Jesuit repre-
sentatives.15 During this period, the Iroquois were a powerful force in the west-
ern Great lakes region, fighting against the hurons and ottawas and pushing 
these weaker tribes into sioux territories. The sioux, according to Reuben Gold 
Thwaites, “were disposed to welcome the newcomers,” but “the impolitic fugi-
tives repaid their kind hosts with base treachery, and the [sioux] turned upon 
them with fury.”16 War between many sioux bands and those tribes pushed west 
by the Iroquois was common in the 1640s and 1650s. according to historian 
W. J. eccles, in the 1650s—after the Iroquois “virtually destroyed the Huron 
nation”—french traders and missionaries started to establish direct trade rela-
tions with tribes, such as the sioux, who previously hunted and then traded 
with the “huron middlemen.”17 The Sioux met the French after the Iroquois 
destroyed the huron, breaking a trade barrier rather violently.
It was in the epoch of Iroquois Wars that the first record of a French-Sioux 
meeting occurred. in 1659 or 1660 Pierre esprit Radisson and Médard chouart 
de Grosseilliers likely met with the sioux.18 Radisson believed the sioux bands, 
likely dakota, wanted french goods, especially firearms. he wrote that they met 
in order for the sioux to “make a sacrifice to the french, being Gods and masters 
of all things, as of peace, as wars; making the knives, the hatchets, and ye kettles 
rattle, etc. That they came purposely to put themselves under their protection.” 
he also assumed that the sioux desperately needed the french goods to survive, 
noting, “we kept them alive by our merchandises.”19 Radisson and Grosseilliers 
did not introduce the sioux to european commerce or merchandise; the sioux 
likely traded with other tribes in the area and were familiar with some products 
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before they met the two frenchmen.20 in 1665 missionary claude allouez met 
with some sioux who described their home along the “Messepi” River, the prai-
ries that abounded in all types of game, and “their fields of tobacco.”21 in 1685 
nicolas Perrot built a trading post called fort st. antoine along the east shore 
of lake Pepin, in Wisconsin, where he established a brief but profitable trade 
with some sioux bands.22
as these two meetings suggest, the sioux and french coupled trade to diplomacy, 
or at least those who met with the frenchmen did. it seems the sioux hoped to 
establish direct trade relations in order to acquire firearms and other merchandise. 
according to Radisson, the sioux wanted french “protection,” but it was just as 
likely that the sioux perceived the french to be potentially powerful allies against 
their enemies.23 unfortunately for Radisson, the french government refused to 
authorize his trip, and the governor of new france confiscated all his furs and 
profits. The government in new france wanted to control the trade, much as the 
Russians sought to monopolize trade in siberia, but both governments constantly 
dealt with natives and frenchmen or Russians who operated outside official chan-
nels. These individuals proved to be intrepid traders and explorers and typically 
penetrated farther into the plains and steppe than the large, cumbersome govern-
ment-supported expeditions. in many cases, they did not want, nor need, govern-
ment sanction.
The construction of small posts by french traders was comparable to Russian 
expansion, although the french expansion differed in that these were individual 
traders or monopolies and not military or settler posts. The french generally 
established posts on land that no tribe claimed or only built with the express 
permission of the tribe.24 a french post was strictly a commercial site because 
the french did not typically establish agricultural settlements; however, cou-
reurs de bois (runners of the woods) caused the french colonial government 
considerable anxiety as they adopted indian customs and language, married 
indian women, and settled around these posts.25 They played an essential role 
in the french fur trade, which was individually motivated without much military 
or government assistance.
in the seventeenth century, euro-american expansion differed significantly 
from Russian imperial expansion and colonization in the Kazakh steppe, which, 
acclaimed nineteenth-century Russian historian vasilii Kliuchevskii character-
ized by “jerks and jolts.” The Russian government accomplished expansion, he 
wrote, not by “spreading out, but by changing its lines of advance.”26
That line of advance was a series of small cossack posts and forts—the “Trans-
Kama line”—constructed to preserve Russia’s territorial gains around the ural 
Mountains. cossacks manned each fort under the command of a voevoda, or 
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military governor (who was also the top civil administrator), and the Russian gov-
ernment allotted the cossacks land adjacent to the fort to farm.27 security against 
Tatar, Bashkir, and other peoples’ raids on Russian and cossack settlements 
and Russian desires to expand trade pushed the Russian movement eastward. 
euro-american expansion into sioux lands centered on commerce rather than 
the settler agriculture evident in the Russian advance but was also character-
ized by jerks and jolts. interestingly, much as french colonial officials expressed 
concern that the “coureurs de bois were metamorphosing into sauvages, that is, 
men beyond the control of legitimate authority,” Russian officials struggled to 
understand that cossack settlers rarely shared interests that coincided or aligned 
with the empire’s interests.28
The french and cossacks who settled near the sioux or the Kazakhs were not 
agents of the state sent to conquer the region but rather represented typically 
“mutualistic and cooperative” relations that transformed the identity of both.29 
The French were merchants or missionaries; they were not serving a conquest 
agenda. The posts were not zones of imperial subjugation or separation but were, 
as White argued, the middle-ground places “in between cultures, peoples, and 
in between empires and the nonstate world of villages.”30 in both cases, the 
imperial state was unable to regulate fully the interactions between traders-
settlers and indigenous populations; their interests did not coincide because of 
the weakness, or outright absence, of imperial institutions in the distant regions.
The imperial state relied instead on the social and economic networks estab-
lished by the french and cossacks to exert, at the very least, its symbolic power, 
influence, and authority. later Russian historians depicted the cossacks as the 
vanguard and agents of “Russian civilization on the wild asiatic east” but with-
out the similar expectation expressed by the french traders in this early con-
tact period.31 When the cossacks blurred the imperial vision by “intermarriage, 
interactions, conversions, acculturations, and desertions,” that environment was 
comparable to “borderland communities of interests” in north america, where, 
as Thomas Biolsi observed, the “middle ground has commonly been a marrying 
ground” as these posts and places became zones of cultural as well as economic 
exchange.32
Throughout the seventeenth century, while the french busied themselves 
trying to establish their trading networks and fending off the British and their 
Iroquois allies, the Russians struggled to maintain their networks in Siberia and 
the Kazakh steppe. from the fall of Kazan in 1552 until the ascension of Peter 
the Great in 1682, the Russian advance was slow and oriented toward increased 
territorial expansion in siberia and exploitation and trade in the region’s natural 
resources. siberia’s fur and timber wealth continued to attract Russian interest 
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and compelled its further expansion. in 1558 anika stroganov successfully peti-
tioned the tsar to grant him the monopoly rights to develop the western regions 
of siberia, which was followed by similar charters bestowed on his two sons in 
1574.33 shortly thereafter, the cossack ermak defeated the Tatar khan of sibir, 
Kuchum (who fled south into the Kazakh steppe).34 Within a century, Russia 
crossed the continent, and by the early eighteenth century, explorations of the 
aleutians and alaska began.35
To facilitate trade in siberia and central asia, ivan iv’s charter instructed the 
stroganovs to grant traders from the Kazakhs or Turkestan unfettered travel 
to trade. The instructions forbid the stroganovs from imposing a tax or any 
financial burdens on this trade. The problem was that trade traffic required 
mutual benefit. With seeming impunity, Kazakhs frequently attacked Russian 
trade caravans traveling through the steppe, plundered the goods, and often 
sold Russian survivors in the slave markets in Bukhara. an english emissary 
to the Russians in the 1550s, anthony Jenkinson, described how the Kazakhs, 
“living in the fields without house or towne,” dominated the steppe and hin-
dered trade. Consequently, he wrote that the Kazakhs made it “impossible 
for any caravan to pass unspoiled, so that 3 years before our being there, no 
caravan had gone.”36 By this time, the Kazakhs proved to be a significant bar-
rier to Russian trade and expansion, a process that later played out in the plains 
when americans pushed into a region dominated by a powerful indigenous 
force. although the chronology differs significantly, both the americans and 
the Russians perceived barriers to overcome in the plains and steppe with mili-
tary force, trade, and colonization.
By the ascension of Peter i (1682–1725, Peter the Great), the Russian gov-
ernment consolidated its authority in western siberia but found that the fron-
tier along the Kazakh steppe was fragile and perennially threatened by Kazakh 
incursions. under Peter i, Russia’s expansion continued eastward, and the 
regime turned its “gaze to the Kazakh hordes” because the tsar regarded the 
Kazakhs as potential “partners in trade and political affairs”; but he also con-
sidered the Kazakh steppe a “beach-head for extending its own trade objec-
tives in the east.”37 Russia, however, expanded into a volatile situation in the 
steppe, and it was decades before Russia fully controlled it. The Kazakhs weakly 
exercised control over the steppe, and they were constantly fending off rivals 
who attempted to push the Kazakhs from the prime pastures and water sources. 
Kazakhs faced serious incursions by the oirat-Kalmyk hordes in the southeast, 
along the ili River valley, and in the northeast, along the altai region between 
china, Mongolia, and Kazakh territory.38 comparable to the Kazakhs, the sioux 
also struggled to fend off rivals in the lakes and woodlands of Minnesota and 
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Wisconsin. some western sioux bands, particularly the Teton, started migrating 
deeper into the northern plains, and many remained there on a permanent basis.
Throughout the seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries, the sioux engaged 
in intermittent conflict with the chippewa, ottawa, huron, and others. french 
traders in the late seventeenth century also tried to cement diplomatic ties with 
the sioux and other indian tribes in the upper Mississippi River region, which 
meant that trade and alliances, according to White, “became inseparable.”39 The 
British government’s 1670 charter of the hudson’s Bay company motivated the 
french to obstruct British efforts, but the British did not yet desire direct com-
petition with the french in the interior. instead, the British sought profit rather 
than conquest, as “long as enough furs reached its posts to produce a dividend 
for its shareholders, the company’s servants were content to remain in a ‘sleep 
by the frozen sea.’ ”40
in 1671 the french informed the Wisconsin tribes that they were “the subjects 
of the great french king across the ocean,” although this probably meant very 
little to the tribes.41 it took another twenty years before the french government 
established a formal alliance ceremony that some sioux bands acknowledged 
as legitimate. The french wanted to end the intertribal warfare and secure safe 
passage for their merchants and their native allies. in the 1670s, the sioux and 
chippewa were at war with one another, and that disrupted trade. in 1679 daniel 
Greysolon dulhut (duluth) negotiated a tenuous peace between the sioux and 
chippewa at Mille lacs; he also claimed “possession of the sioux country” in the 
name of louis Xiv of france.42
The economic competition to furnish peltries to the french and British in 
order to secure european goods likely increased warfare between the sioux 
and their rivals, creating new motivations, or as Bruce G. Trigger observed, 
“new forms” of intertribal warfare that were often more deadly and more eco-
nomically motivated than before european incursion into the upper Mississippi 
region.43 in 1695 the first sioux delegation, led by Teeoskahtay (or Tioscaté), 
visited the Onontio, the governor of new france, which, according to louise 
Phelps Kellogg, “cemented the alliance” between the sioux and the french.44
By most accounts, it seems Teeoskahtay desired guns—something the french 
were reluctant to trade—but the meeting resulted in the first formal alliance 
between the french and the sioux.45 interestingly, the Russians were also reluc-
tant to trade guns with the Kazakhs and issued a decree in 1749 that forbid selling 
Kazakhs “weapons, gun-powder, flint, or lead.”46 The french and British believed 
that the weapons trade might positively affect the fur trade, but only if natives 
used the weapons to hunt and trap and not in warfare against traditional ene-
mies—or worse, against their traders. The french and the British never resolved 
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the problem. Frequently and hypocritically, they willingly traded in weapons if 
it obstructed their enemies’ trade rather than benefited their own. Restricting 
the trade in weapons was something that both the British and french tried but 
failed to do to limit conflict between the sioux and their enemies. The British 
and french wanted unhindered trade, but they also believed that conflict desta-
bilized the region. The Russians also wanted to expand trade and believed that 
Kazakh hostilities in the steppe needed to cease, but they also failed to obstruct 
the weapons trade with the Kazakhs.47 There was no evidence to suggest that 
trade in weapons increased warfare in the plains and the steppe, but colonizers 
certainly believed it did.
170 0 TO MIDCENTURY
The first half of the eighteenth century marked significant transitions for the 
sioux and the Kazakhs. The sioux—in particular, the Teton—were migrating 
westward, having abandoned Wisconsin Territory to occupy regions between 
the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers, territory claimed by france. Moreover, 
the french presence in the western fur trade greatly weakened after the Treaty 
of Ryswick (1697) and subsequent wars with Britain. These imperial conflicts 
involved numerous indian tribes, but the conflicts between the sioux and their 
rivals continued throughout much of the eighteenth century—in part, for terri-
tory, and also, as White noted, because “exchange and alliances were so closely 
linked, no nation could countenance trade, particularly in weapons, with its 
enemies or its enemies’ allies.”48 The sioux were only one of the dominant tribes 
in Minnesota in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The ojibwa were the 
dominant tribe in the northern forest regions, whereas the sioux occupied the 
southern and western “prairie” parts of the state. other tribes that migrated into 
the region included the hurons, ottawas, Winnebagos, and crees.49
The sioux, between 1700 and 1750, were an expanding power on the eastern 
regions of the northern plains. Most scholars believe that they were motivated 
to move westward to pursue prime buffalo hunting grounds and due to pres-
sures being applied by cree expansion into eastern sioux regions. There is some 
evidence to suggest that some Sioux already acquired horses and became quite 
skilled hunters on horseback. according to the journal of Peter Pond, who spent 
years living among and trading with the sioux, the band he traveled with pos-
sessed large numbers of horses and dogs, and “thay Run down the Buffelow with 
thare horses and Kill as Much Meat as thay Please.”50 as the sioux migrated 
westward, they displaced other tribes, such as the arikara, Mandan, hidatsa, 
assiniboine, iowa, omaha, and Ponca.51 By this time, euro-americans reported 
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that the Sioux possessed firearms and frequently referred to them as “turbu-
lent trouble-makers.”52 The sioux and chippewa seemingly engaged in ceaseless 
warfare during this era as the sioux fought to defend prime hunting grounds, 
which were vital for survival. War parties from both tribes attacked each other 
relentlessly if they found an enemy on disputed territory; these skirmishes were 
necessary for economic security rather than to trade with french or British trad-
ers.53 euro-americans were not occupying sioux territory in this era; although 
they certainly desired to increase trade, the interaction between the sioux and 
Europeans remained chiefly economic, not territorial acquisition.
The Kazakhs were dealing with two slightly different territorial incursions. 
first, the Russians were actively penetrating the Kazakh steppe in the early 
eighteenth century. Between 1714 and 1725, Russia expanded trade with the 
Kazakhs, profitably exchanging raw materials such as hides, wools, and livestock—
especially horses and sheep—and Kazakhs wanted Russian manufactured goods 
such as “iron and metal shovels and axes, trivets, scissors, buckets and barrels, 
metal bits, kitchen wares, stirrups, and other goods.”54 in 1713 siberian governor 
Prince Matvei Gagarin recommended to Peter the Great that the government 
build a line of forts to defend the empire’s interests.55
in 1714 the Russians started construction along a military line—eventu-
ally called the irtysh line—that consisted of a string of towns and small forts. 
several fortified towns started popping up along the Kazakh steppe, including 
omsk (1716), semipalatinsk (1718), Pavlodar (1720), ilek (1731), orsk (1735), 
orenburg (1743), and Petropavlovsk (1752).56 The line extended more than 
2,500 miles and eventually included more than forty forts and over one hundred 
Figure 2.1. indian family on the move (courtesy of denver Public library). 
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smaller posts.57 it would be more than a century before any sort of comparable 
american presence existed in the northern plains. a significant difference was 
that the Russians forbid Kazakhs from migrating across the irtysh line, a restric-
tion ostensibly placed on Russian peasants as well. The french and British posts, 
linked loosely together, imposed no such restrictions; no boundary prevented 
french, British, or, later, americans, from crossing. The tsarist government, on 
the other hand, generally barred its peasants from crossing the irtysh line into 
the steppe.58
By the early eighteenth century, Russians confronted the Kazakhs along the 
irtysh line, but a second territorial threat seriously challenged Kazakh control 
in the steppe and altered the relationship between the Kazakhs and the Russians. 
in the 1720s, a period in Kazakh history called the Aqtaban-shubyryngdy (the 
Great calamity), the dzhungar-Kalmyk invasion threatened to overrun the 
Kazakhs. chokan valikhanov, a nineteenth-century Kazakh intellectual, wrote, 
“the first decade of the eighteenth century was a horrible time in the lives of 
the Kirgiz [Kazakh] people. The dzhungars, the volga Kalmyks, the siberian 
cossacks and Bashkirs from all sides thundered, stole cattle and carried off 
whole families as prisoners.”59 it was during the era of the dzhungar-Kalmyk 
threat that the Russian government exploited the situation and seized nearly 
45 million desiatin (1 desiatin equals 2.7 acres) of the most “fertile” land and 
“secured water sources” for settlement by Russian-cossack peasants.60
here again is an important difference between the sioux and the Kazakhs 
throughout the eighteenth century. Most scholars agree that either the sioux 
fled their homeland or they deliberately migrated westward to camp closer 
to vast plains’ buffalo herds, their principal food source. in any event, as the 
sioux moved westward, they forced migrations by other tribes and, subse-
quently, fought to hold the territory formerly occupied or bounded by tribes 
unable to resist their invasion of the northern plains. unlike the Kazakhs, the 
sioux were an expanding power. By the mid-eighteenth century, guarding and 
occupying the Kazakh Steppe required constant vigilance and defense against 
external aggressors. The Sioux were equally vigilant to incursions by neighbors 
but enemies pressed the Kazakhs from all sides: Russia and its allies; the Tatars 
and Bashkirs, from the west; china, in the east, claimed parts of the steppe; 
and, from the south, Turkestan khanates, Kirgiz, and Turkmen were pressing 
from different flanks. Enemies did not encircle the Sioux in quite the same way. 
clearly, other tribes tried to push the sioux from the prime hunting grounds, but 
sioux enemies never mustered a comparable military power to succeed. added 
to this volatile, tenuous mix, the dzhungar-Kalmyk threat rivaled Kazakh mili-
tary power, and the Kazakhs struggled to find allies to defend their lands. What 
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happened next fundamentally altered the relationship between the Russians 
and the Kazakhs.
in 1730 two missives from abulkhair, khan of the little horde, reached saint 
Petersburg, requesting Russian assistance against the Dzhungar-Kalmyk threat—
a request the Russians seemed eager to exploit. In 1731 the Russians dispatched 
a mission to complete negotiations to bring the horde under Russian suzerainty—
or that was how the Russians viewed this diplomatic mission. abulkhair prom-
ised “faithful service” to Russia, but there continues to be a debate about his 
motives.61 abulkhair was fighting against the Bashkirs, who were already subject 
to Russian rule, and the dzhungar-Kalmyks. Moreover, abulkhair faced internal 
opposition from sultan Kaip for leadership of the little horde. The Russian 
government was well aware of abulkhair’s precarious position and decided to 
exploit it in order to strengthen the irtysh line and advance its trading interests 
with Bukhara and Khiva.62
in taking the oath, abulkhair claimed to be “Khan of all the Kazakhs,” a dubi-
ous notion due to the fact that his authority did not extend beyond the little 
horde—a fact that did not seem to alarm the Russians.63 in fact, it likely served 
Russia’s interests. The problem was that abulkhair’s interests conflicted with 
Russia’s interests and expectations. abulkhair wanted to enhance his own author-
ity and perhaps receive an “official” title from Russia. What he wanted was assis-
tance against both the internal challenges to his rule and aid against the external 
dzhungar-Kalmyk threat rather than incorporation into the Russian empire.64 
he was not surrendering little horde sovereignty, but that was exactly how the 
Russians interpreted the oath of loyalty.65
This was a turning point because from this moment forward, Russia claimed 
sovereignty over all of the Kazakhs, not just Kazakhs of the little horde. in 
addition, Russia claimed control of the territory—the Kazakh steppe—and sim-
ply annexed it into the empire. since the 1730s, many Russians claimed that 
Abulkhair’s request represented the unification (prisoedinenie) of Kazakhstan 
to Russia. nineteenth-century Russian orientalist vasilii Grigoriev insisted the 
“voluntary submission of the numerous horde of Kirghiz [Kazakh] who had 
been formerly hostile to us . . . and it was recalled to mind that Peter the Great 
himself had been of the opinion . . . that ‘this horde, though a nomad and light-
thinking people, was yet the key and the gate of all the lands and countries of 
asia.’ ”66 Historian Geoffrey Wheeler succinctly summarized the consequences 
this way: “it can be said with a fair degree of certainty that although by 1730 
the Russians had formulated no definite plans for the overrunning of the steppe 
Region, the fate of the Kazakhs was sealed in the sense that henceforward their 
future was to be bound up with Russia.”67 The Kazakhs did not cede or sell the 
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land to the Russians, but that mattered little from the Russian perspective. over 
the course of the next several decades, many Kazakhs fought vigorously against 
Russian rule, and others cooperated with the Russian government. Russia 
eagerly bestowed titles, lands, and salaries on Kazakh khans, sultans, aksakals, 
and others who embraced Russian expansion and colonization.
This is an important comparative difference, not just in the temporal sense 
of Russian internal colonization but also in the manner that incorporated the 
land into the empire. a border-frontier zone between the Russian empire 
and the Kazakhs emerged along the irtysh line, but the Russians interpreted 
abulkhair’s oath as not just the allegiance of the little horde to the Russian 
empire but Kazakhs surrendering their sovereignty to Russian imperial rule. 
it was, from the Russian perspective, the surrender of Kazakh claims to the 
land. in comparison, the french might claim parts of Wisconsin for new france 
or interpret Teeoskatay’s visit to Montreal as cementing an alliance between 
the french and the sioux, but it was a commercial alliance, not the surren-
der of political and territorial sovereignty, which is precisely how the Russians 
interpreted abulkhair’s oath. comparatively, the french might claim the posts 
gave them title to the land where they built them, but the original purpose was 
to exclude the British from the region rather than assert spurious title to the 
land or deny indian title.68 The french did not assume title to all sioux lands or 
authority over all sioux bands. The Russians were not the first external power 
to claim suzerainty over the Kazakh steppe, but the numerous pressures in the 
steppe prevented the Kazakhs from using the vast lands to flee to safety; it was 
no longer the refuge from external threats. in other words, flight into the steppe 
no longer provided safety and security for the Kazakhs. for the sioux, however, 
the northern plains and Minnesota prairies became the sanctuary from french, 
British, and, later, american expansion.
another difference was that the British tended to settle along the eastern 
seaboard; the french did not occupy large tracts of land in what became the 
united states. french, British, and spanish colonies were sufficiently distant 
from sioux territories that trade relations remained sporadic. settlements near 
the sioux were small when compared to the Russian presence near or in the 
northern Kazakh steppe. according to the orenburg governor, in 1755 almost 
37,000 cossacks were dispersed along the irtysh line, stationed at the various 
forts and small posts. This does not take into account the number of Russians 
living well behind the line or engaged in trade.69 in the colony of new france, 
in 1698, the population of Quebec was slightly more than 15,000; in 1754, it 
was roughly 55,000, well away from sioux territories.70 in comparison, between 
1719 and 1750, the number of french engaged in the western fur trade was 
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small, perhaps from 200 to 600 men.71 The french were not inclined to leave 
the colony or settle outside the comforts of Quebec. The Russians, on the other 
hand, were actively pushing the line of advance that Kliuchevskii described. no 
such line of advance appeared in the plains until after american independence. 
it was not until the nineteenth century that the sioux confronted american 
pioneers and military power as an escalating source of confusion and conflict.
MIDCENTURY TO 180 0
in the second half of the century, the sioux were an expanding power in 
the Minnesota prairies and the northern plains, but sioux relations with the 
French or British—or, subsequently, the United States—were chiefly economic. 
intertribal warfare, however, caused concern among traders and french and 
British military men, particularly if it disrupted trade. The seven years’ War—
or, as it is often called in the united states, the french and indian War—was 
fought between Great Britain and france for imperial dominance; and when 
it ended in 1763, according to nineteenth-century historian francis Parkman, 
it “made england what she is. it crippled the commerce of her rival, ruined 
france in two continents, and blighted her as a colonial power.”72 The British 
pursued a different course than the french in their relations with indians—in 
particular, many British leaders believed that the french pampered the indians, 
gave unwarranted gifts, and followed a “kind of imperialism that civilized men 
thought they should by right exert over ‘savages.’ ”73 Consequently, the Sioux 
cautiously gravitated toward improved relations with the British. it was a differ-
ent matter altogether in the Kazakh steppe.
following abulkhair’s oath in the 1730s, interludes of peace and trade were 
shattered by periods of internecine conflict and clashes between Russians 
and Kazakhs. The Russians attempted to reinforce the irtysh line with the 
cossacks and expand trade with the Turkestan khanates and china. in 1740 
ablai, of the Middle horde, swore an oath of loyalty to Russia, but that did 
not give Russia dominance in the steppe, nor did it end the internecine con-
flict among the Kazakhs.74 ablai become the dominant Kazakh political player 
in the mid- to late eighteenth century but was unable to assert his control 
over other Kazakh khans, hordes, or clans. By the 1750s, however, Russia and 
china eliminated the dzhungar-Kalmyk threat, reached a trade agreement, 
and temporarily reconciled their imperial differences.
The Russians pursued a different course with the Kazakhs in an effort to 
protect their settlements and secure trade routes with china and the Turkestan 
khanates. in 1757 the Russians imposed further restrictions on Kazakhs that 
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forbid any from migrating and camping within ten versty (versta, singular 
form, a unit of distance equal to 1.06 km) of any Russian fort.75 if any violated 
this territorial restriction, Russians required the aksakal to make an “oath of 
peacefulness” to the post commander.76 By this time, however, many Kazakhs 
openly resisted Russian control and Russian officials wearied of “coddling” the 
Kazakhs and detested addressing their demands with “pleasures and tender-
ness.”77 Russian historian M. a. Terent’ev understood the issue in a respectable 
imperial approach: the “submission of the Kirgiz [Kazakhs] was quite odd; they 
paid no taxes nor fulfilled any obligations, but our government courted them 
only for the honor of being considered the master of the Kirgiz.”78 in both the 
British and Russian case, the expanding empire asserted authority over territory 
claimed by the sioux and the Kazakhs.
The Treaty of Paris (1763) forced the french to cede canada and the territory 
east of the Mississippi River to the British and relinquish the Louisiana colony 
to spain.79 no imperial power consulted the indians affected, nor did the sioux 
fully comprehend that the territory they defended against the chippewa, crow, 
Mandan, and Blackfeet was also claimed by spain. The sioux did understand, 
however, that the french lost the war and the British became the new dominant 
trading partner. The spanish made little attempt to engage the sioux through 
trade, but the Sioux eagerly hoped to acquire more guns and horses from the 
europeans.
following the seven years’ War, the British restricted all commercial land 
transactions between individuals and indians. after 1763 only colonial gov-
ernments, acting on behalf of the crown, conducted and sanctioned land pur-
chases between individuals and indians. The Proclamation of 1763 transformed 
the colonial land market, but more importantly, transactions were agreements 
between sovereign nations rather than contracts agreed to between individuals. 
The British feared that unregulated land purchases unnecessarily increased ten-
sions with the indians, particularly in the ohio valley and trans-alleghany west. 
it transformed a formerly private matter into one in which title to the land was 
conveyed only by treaty. This fact, according to historian stuart Banner, made it 
easier to perceive of indians’ claim to the land as less than title to it.80
There was also a concern that the uncivilized environment might seduce 
european settlers into becoming something less civilized. The fear of the “men-
acing asiatic character of the plains” in nineteenth-century american thought 
echoed British concerns about unregulated settlement in the ohio valley and 
trans-alleghany west.81 one reason so many indians fought alongside the french 
during the seven years’ War was the widespread fear that the war was only for 
the British desire to “plunder indians.” The tribes did not want to surrender 
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their relationship or land rights from one european power to another that might 
dislocate them or, as the British did, claim the land for themselves. The British 
vowed to retreat from the ohio valley region after the war but changed their 
minds and occupied the various abandoned french forts.82
for this comparison, the concern expressed by British parliamentarian and 
philosopher edmund Burke in 1775 is too irresistible to ignore. he explained 
to the house of commons that it might isolate settlers cut off from all civilizing 
influences if the British government failed to occupy the newly acquired ter-
ritory and tried to prevent settlement in the ohio valley and trans-alleghany 
west. he reasoned, accordingly, and with utilitarian imagery, that eventually 
the infected and exposed settlers would “become hordes of english Tartars, 
and, pouring down upon your unfortified frontiers a fierce and irresistible 
cavalry” to plunder and pillage in characteristic asiatic fashion.83 it was a fear 
often expressed by Russian officials as well—namely, that cossacks or Russian 
peasants might become more native than the natives. in other words, the wil-
derness—the wild untamed land, a land without civilization—influenced the 
inhabitants’ character and behavior and caused them to regress from civilized 
to barbarian. Therefore, it was necessary to tame the land and bring the inhab-
itants under the sway of civilization through trade and sedentary agriculture.84 
To settlers and peasants settling on either side of the frontier, there was a 
blurred line between civilization and native. in imperial capitals, there was a 
clear and absolute demarcation.
during the 1760s and 1770s, the Russians also debated the future of rela-
tions with the Kazakhs, particularly the continued internecine conflict in the 
steppe and the Kazakhs’ failure to protect caravans. in addition, the Russians 
were reacting to one of the most serious peasant rebellions in Russian his-
tory—the Pugachev Revolt (1773–1775)—in which many Kazakhs also partici-
pated. emelian Pugachev was a cossack from siberia, a military deserter who 
objected to cossacks’ increasing acceptance of saint Petersburg’s authority over 
them. The revolt tapped into growing peasant discontent and attracted peas-
ants, religious dissenters (“old Believers”), and many non-Russians, including 
Kazakhs, Bashkirs, Tatars, and Kalmyks. Pugachev claimed to be catherine the 
Great’s murdered husband—Peter iii—and promised freedom from serfdom, 
taxes, and military service. catherine dismissed these promises as “castles in 
the air,” but the revolt spread rapidly.85 one reason that many Kazakhs joined 
the revolt was because for several years, the Russians limited and then com-
pletely restricted access to various pastures near the irtysh line and the fertile 
fields between the ural and volga Rivers, commonly referred to as the inner 
side. Kazakhs continued—illegally, from the Russian perspective—to pasture 
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livestock there, crossing the ural or, in the minds of many Russian officials, tres-
passing on regulated lands. These tensions between Kazakhs pasturing their 
livestock on traditional lands and Russian desires to restrict access heightened 
tensions between colonized and colonizer.
The revolt was violent, marked by looting and the destruction of large estates 
and factories. The revolt threatened every major town in western siberia and 
the steppe.86 Well-trained government troops, fresh from Russia’s war with the 
ottoman empire, eventually defeated Pugachev’s rebel forces, and Pugachev’s 
own men turned him over to the government. he was caged, hauled to Moscow, 
tried, and decapitated, with his various body parts displayed throughout the city.
Kazakhs divided during the rebellion; some clans fought with Pugachev, some 
against him, and many remained neutral. some, such as nurali, khan of the 
little horde, switched sides during the rebellion, fighting first with Pugachev 
and then with the Russians.87 after the revolt, in 1801, the Russians rewarded 
nurali for his support during the Pugachev Rebellion and allowed his little 
horde followers to cross the ural River to pasture their herds on the inner side. 
This prompted his rivals in the little horde, and some Kazakhs in the Middle 
horde, to accuse him of perfidy. These internal Kazakh political tensions exac-
erbated the internecine conflict in the steppe. as with american indians, often 
forced to side with the french or the British during their imperial conflicts in 
north america, the Pugachev Rebellion forced many Kazakhs to choose. Many, 
such as nurali, sided with the Russians in order to accrue greater benefits, 
whereas others seemingly believed that rejecting Russian expansion was more in 
their self-interest. similar to the Kazakhs, the sioux confronted difficult choices.
following the British victory in the seven years’ War, some santee dakota 
attempted to establish diplomatic and trade relations with the British. in 1763 
twelve dakota leaders offered allegiance to Great Britain, but the motivation 
to do so was probably similar to abulkhair’s oath to the Russians. Many sioux 
bands sided with the colonizing power, and others did not. it appeared that 
some santee dakota wanted British trade goods and assistance against their 
enemies; siding with the British possibly offered the opportunity to reinforce 
the relationship. in 1774 captain arent dePeyster, commander of Mackinac, 
mediated a dispute between the santee dakota and the ojibwa. early in the 
american Revolution, Wabasha, a santee chief, traveled to Quebec to pledge 
alliance to the British, thereby becoming “King George’s westernmost allies.”88 
some sioux attempted to negotiate with the spanish to increase trade. The sioux 
did not play a noteworthy role during the american Revolution. nonetheless, 
two significant events followed the war that consequently affected the Sioux as 
well as all indians in the newly established united states.
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shortly after the war ended, the united states, following British practice, 
signed treaties with tribes in the ohio valley region that procured large territorial 
cessions.89 it was a tactic the united states pursued throughout the nineteenth 
century, including with various sioux bands. in May 1783 the British evacuated 
their forts, and congress directed the secretary of war to advise the various 
indian nations that the conflict was over and that the united states wanted 
peace with the numerous tribes. in september of that year, congress prohibited 
settlement on inhabited or claimed indian lands outside state jurisdiction and 
banned the purchase or receipt of any indian lands “without the express author-
ity and direction of Congress.” All such acquisitions, either through purchase or 
cession, became invalid.90 These treaties, according to White, were “products of 
american illusions” that “launched the republic into a confrontation” with west-
ern indians.91 The united states was unable to control immigration from the 
eastern states into the ohio valley, yet these settlers were “at once the strength 
of the new republic and the greatest threat to it.”92 More than two thousand fam-
ilies moved onto land in ohio closed to settlement, a problem that also played 
out in the Kazakh steppe throughout the nineteenth century. The Russians 
called illegal settlers samovol’tsy (unauthorized), peasants who defied Russian 
authorities and moved into the Kazakh steppe to settle on land putatively set 
aside for the Kazakhs. as in the united states, these Russian settlers were the 
vanguard of expansion but were doing so illegally. The government decided to 
move the boundary rather than remove the settlers.
The expanding american republic did not initially confront the sioux, as the 
American boundary remained east of the Mississippi River, but subsequent 
events brought significant changes. Many sioux bands continued their own west-
ward migration, but the British and spanish still played a more important role 
in the Mississippi and Missouri River regions.93 The British, in particular, tried 
to block american fur traders from operating there, but the 1780s experienced 
a revival in the upper Missouri fur trade.94 in 1787 the united states passed the 
Northwest Ordinance to govern its newly acquired lands in Ohio. The essential 
feature of this act was that it outlined how to admit new states to the union, and, 
importantly for future expansion, it guaranteed equality between a newly created 
state with the original thirteen states.95
in 1790 the “act to Regulate Trade and intercourse With the indian Tribes” 
stipulated the right of the united states to invalidate any sale of lands by indi-
vidual indians. according to the act, “no sale of land made by any indians, or any 
nation or tribe of indians, within the united states, shall be valid to any person 
or persons, or to any state, whether having the right of pre-emption to such lands 
or not, unless the same shall be made and duly executed at some public treaty, 
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held under the authority of the united states.”96 The government designed the 
act to prevent land speculators from taking advantage of indians, widely called 
the right of “pre-emption,” but, as Banner argued, it was misleading. it was not 
the right to preempt the purchase of land before someone else, but rather to 
deny or prevent anyone but the government to purchase land. section 7 of the 
act mention that it “shall be in force for the term of two years,” but the act 
remained in effect throughout the nineteenth century and, in fact, is still us law.
in the 1790s, the trader Jean Baptiste Truteau noticed that many sioux were 
engaged in hunting beaver and other peltries that they “exchange for merchandise 
with the other sioux.”97 Jay’s Treaty in 1794 established reciprocal trade privileges 
for americans and British canadians, easing tensions that trade with the sioux—
in particular, among the yankton and Teton—improved substantially.98 The close 
of the eighteenth century witnessed further expansion of the sioux into the west-
ern plains but also set the united states on its own course of westward expansion. 
Thus, whereas the united states was only establishing the mechanisms to incor-
porate and colonize new territories that brought american traders and pioneers 
closer to the sioux, the Russians encountered stiff Kazakh resistance to their fur-
ther colonization in the steppe.
in the 1780s and 1790s, relations between Russia and Kazakhs worsened. in the 
winter of 1782–1783, srym Batyr crossed the ural River to pasture on the inner 
side. The Russians attempted to stop him and managed to force him back across 
the river. intermittent fighting between Kazakhs and cossacks, Kazakhs and 
Russians, and inter-Kazakh spread throughout the steppe. Typical of the fighting 
was the complaint made to catherine by one Kazakh aksakal, who claimed that 
some 1,500 cossacks attacked his “innocent aul, plundered, looted, and killed 
150 people, took fifty-seven prisoners, and ran off with a large number of horses, 
camels, cattle, and sheep.”99 This is only one example of the complaints Kazakhs 
made to the Russian government that foreshadowed similar complaints made by 
the sioux to the american government; but Kazakhs were also committing depri-
vations against Russians and cossacks and against each other. Russia was taking 
sides in the internecine Kazakh conflict, favoring some against others. This cul-
minated in 1801, with the creation of the Bukei (or inner) horde, although it did 
not end the opposition of many Kazakhs against Russian expansion.
in conclusion, euro-american and Russian expansion into the lands claimed 
by the sioux and the Kazakhs, respectively, followed different paths. Russian 
expansion started roughly two hundred years before an american presence in 
the northern plains. Before the nineteenth century, the northern plains and 
the Kazakh steppe were in constant flux and constant struggle, and neither the 
sioux nor the Kazakhs controlled the lands they claimed except through the 
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exercise of their own military power. Powerful external forces pushed and pulled 
the sioux and the Kazakhs to defend the land against various rivals, of which the 
Russians, europeans, and, later, americans, were only one part.
europeans barely penetrated the eastern shores of north america when the 
Russians conquered Kazan in 1552. The waves of the euro-american trajectory 
into the northern plains is decidedly different than Russia’s route to siberia 
and the Kazakh steppe, but it eventually shared a similar pattern of contiguous 
territorial advances and stages. Russians had already started building a line of 
forts bordering the Kazakh steppe, manned by cossacks, by the time of the 
first known tentative meeting between a french Jesuit trader and a sioux in 
1659–1660.
from euro-american and Russian perspectives, it was necessary to support 
imperial expansion in order to secure economic profit, which required fur-
ther access and expanded networks. Moreover, the expansion required security 
and, ultimately, peace and stability in the frontier regions, but when the euro-
americans and Russians moved closer to the regions inhabited by the sioux and 
the Kazakhs, what they encountered was sporadic warfare that was an obstacle 
to economic and settler expansion. euro-americans and Russians sought to end 
conflict on the northern plains and in the Kazakh steppe in order to facilitate 
trade. The sioux and the Kazakhs engaged in the fur trade sporadically and in 
some capacity, but neither were principal participants.
By the nineteenth century, americans and Russians eventually used the con-
flicts in the northern plains and the Kazakh steppe to justify their own mili-
tary presence and territorial expansion, claiming that violations and depreda-
tions committed by the sioux or the Kazakhs demanded a martial response.100 
in the eighteenth century, as Jeremy adelman and stephen aron observed in 
the north american context, the sioux and the Kazakhs lived astride frontier 
regions that became the sites of “intense imperial rivalry and of particularly 
fluid relations between indigenous peoples and european interlopers.”101
Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the french and British 
sought to increase trade with the sioux, not expand their territory to force 
the sioux to surrender their political or territorial sovereignty. in the seven-
teenth century, Russia played a minor role in the Kazakh steppe, but following 
abulkhair’s oath, the threat to Kazakh sovereignty became tangible. in north 
america, the sioux control over their territory was threatened, which lessened 
as the sioux migrated west, but the french and British threat was not, as it was 
with abulkhair’s pledge, an attempt to incorporate the sioux into the french or 
British empires in north america. The french and British wanted trading part-
ners; there was not the comparable territorial extension, which was evident in 
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Russia’s territorial expansion, by the french and the British that posed a threat 
to sioux sovereignty. The more strident threat, however, as it was in the steppe, 
to sioux sovereignty came from the chippewa or other tribes and not from 
european imperialism. Russia’s expansion was both a commercial and territorial 
expansion, whereas in the centuries before american independence the french 
and British expansion was chiefly economic. in both cases, however, commer-
cial expansion instigated intertribal or internecine conflict.102
The sioux and the Kazakhs defended their territory against powerful, non-
european rivals, but euro-americans and Russians used their economic rela-
tions to foster relations with the sioux and Kazakhs that slowly evolved to serve 
as levers for territorial expansion throughout the nineteenth century. in a sense, 
land was central to these agreements and central to the disputes. The Russians 
apparently never hesitated to annex the land, whereas europeans in north 
american pursued two different paths. Generally, they tried to purchase the 
land from native americans, but on some occasions, they too simply annexed 
it by right of discovery and conquest. What emerged in American and Russian 
expansionist thinking in the nineteenth century was a moral argument, or civili-
zation versus savagery, that was largely absent in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, when trade and security were the principal incentives for expansion 
that was more indirect than the direct settler internal colonization of the nine-
teenth century.
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Conquest and Martial Resistance
doi: 10.5876/9781607325505.c003
comparing american and Russian expansion and internal colonization of the 
sioux and the Kazakhs naturally leads to a discussion of the martial resistance 
by the indigenous population against the imperial power. The internal colonizer 
destroyed native sovereignty as it asserted social, political, and economic author-
ity over the lands and peoples colonized. scholars, politicians, commentators, 
and participants in the events have long chronicled the wars, rebellions, upris-
ings, revolts, battles, and massacres so often associated with the conquest of 
the sioux and the Kazakhs that a complete retelling of the Battle of the little 
Bighorn or srym Batyr’s rebellion does not necessarily need to be done again. 
american scholars examined so many facets of the so-called indian Wars that 
comparing them to the Kazakh revolts reveals the idiosyncratic nature inherent 
in each battle, war, revolt, or conflict but does not illuminate a feature, context, 
or perception not already scrutinized by other scholars.
More importantly for this comparison, it was the process, the perceptions, 
and the consequences of conquest and colonization rather than an examination 
of the separate events or episodes that matter. But sioux and Kazakh efforts 
to resist reinforced american and Russian perceptions that the nomads must 
settle and that pioneers and peasants must occupy the land. sioux and Kazakh 
opposition bolstered american and Russian views that the natives were natu-
rally uncivilized communities. When examined through the prism of process 
and consequence rather than the particulars of each confrontation, resistance 
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and suppression became part of the internal colonization. Therefore, this chap-
ter examines the process of military conquest—the comparable objectives, poli-
cies, and consequences—that resulted in the eventual suppression of Sioux and 
Kazakh martial resistance.
diffeRenT oBJecTives
in the first half of the nineteenth century, both the united states and Russia 
initiated active military and commercial expansionist policies into the northern 
plains and the Kazakh steppe. initially, it was an economic penetration—chiefly 
by fur trappers and merchants. The expanded military movement often followed 
economic expansion into those regions in order to secure trade and the move-
ment of goods and people. in the first half of the nineteenth century, pioneer 
and peasant expansion was a modest, relatively measured movement that accel-
erated rapidly after 1850. Consequently, the United States and tsarist Russia 
both demarcated land and subsequently allotted it in ways that restricted inde-
pendent movement by the sioux and the Kazakhs. Both the united states and 
Russia attempted to contain the indigenous populations’ access to the land and 
resources necessary for the sioux and the Kazakhs to exercise their traditional 
economic, social, and political sovereignty. simply put, the colonizer wanted the 
colonized to stop being nomads.
Through various mechanisms, the united states and Russia managed liter-
ally and metaphorically to divide and conquer the Sioux and the Kazakhs. The 
concept of divide and conquer may not have always guided the policies, or 
even considered the objective, but that was the practice. By gradually asserting 
political sovereignty over the sioux and the Kazakhs before completing their 
physical subjugation, the united states and Russia ushered in an era of armed 
resistance. The united states and Russia mistakenly anticipated the exact oppo-
site sioux and Kazakh reaction. They drew lines on the map and expected the 
sioux and the Kazakhs to acknowledge and respect those lines. The americans 
and Russians expressed surprise, disappointment, and exasperation when the 
sioux and the Kazakhs exhibited independent decision-making and hostility to 
american and Russian political actions.
up to the 1820s, the situation in the northern plains and the Kazakh steppe 
generally reflected american and Russian expectations of control rather than the 
reality. The americans and Russians desired essentially two things: initially, rec-
ognition of american and Russian political authority followed by peace among 
the peoples living there. acknowledgment by the sioux and the Kazakhs of the 
first objective required the colonizer to suppress Sioux and Kazakh political 
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sovereignty and a serious military commitment by the americans and Russians 
before the second objective: a safe and secure resettlement for american pio-
neers and Russian peasants. Peace in the northern plains meant signing numer-
ous treaties with all of the tribes that lived there, including the sioux, crow, 
Blackfeet, cheyenne, and others. it was a slow, piecemeal process that took sev-
eral decades to accomplish. The united states used these treaties to force ter-
ritorial concessions and required the various tribes to settle on reservations in 
order to prevent conflicts between each other and, more importantly, conflicts 
with white americans who were moving through the northern plains or settling 
on land that tribes claimed as their own. The united states managed to divide 
and conquer the northern plains from the 1820s to the 1870s.
By aligning with one band or tribe, the united states separated different 
indian tribes and bands from one another, a process it followed with the sioux. 
in a strict legal sense, treaties signed by one band—for example, a treaty with 
one band of the santee—did not obligate the Teton to adhere to its stipulations; 
however, in practice, the united states often tried to impose its will on the so-
called non-treaty sioux. Band by band, tribe by tribe, the united states was 
able to isolate and conquer the northern plains and the Sioux. The Russians 
employed a similar tactic; clan by clan or horde by horde, the Russians were 
able to divide and conquer the Kazakhs and the Kazakh Steppe. From the 
american and Russian perspectives, expansion meant security and enhanced 
trade; the incremental divide and conquer was more the result of American 
and Russian actions rather than an articulated strategy, but one that worked 
to isolate and incorporate disaffected and potentially loyal and peaceful sioux 
and Kazakhs from the more hostile bands, clans, and hordes. in the Russian 
case, the government believed it had to end what was, essentially, a Kazakh civil 
war exacerbated by Russian policies designed to exert imperial control in the 
Kazakh steppe from the 1820s to the 1840s. at no time in either case were the 
sioux or the Kazakhs able to unite into a single military, economic, or territorial 
force that— although unlikely given the military and economic superiority of 
the united states and Russia—might possibly resist a determined, expanding 
imperial power.
There was, however, a notable difference in the comparison of american and 
Russian expansion and internal colonization: chronology. While the americans 
slowly edged into the plains between 1820 and the 1840s, the Russians were con-
solidating their control in the Kazakh steppe. in 1847 the last major rebellion by 
the Kazakhs against Russian expansion culminated with the death of Kenesary 
Kasymov, which essentially ended more than a century of sporadic Kazakh resis-
tance to Russian expansion. for the rest of the nineteenth century, the Russian 
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government consolidated its control of the Kazakhs and the steppe, and by 1881 
the Russians conquered, annexed, and colonized the central Asian khanates 
(Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand). Because of this continued Russian expansion, 
by the 1890s, Russia and Britain resolved their geopolitical differences and 
agreed to boundary commissions to establish the southernmost extension of the 
Russian imperial border on the Persian-afghan frontier. By comparison, the 
American conquest of the Sioux and the northern plains occurred much more 
quickly and later in the century but without the similar imperial, geopolitical 
dynamics and rivalries in central Asia that frequently erupted between Britain 
and Russia (the era called “the Great Game”).
in the united states, the federal government resolved its northern and south-
ern borders with British canada and Mexico by 1848.1 The spanish and British 
were still powerful imperial rivals who could be potent impediments to any 
american expansionist agenda. american expansion and settlement ultimately 
required defined boundaries and stability. Conversely, it was the absence of 
defined boundaries and the persistence of instability that propelled Russian 
expansion into the Kazakh steppe and central asia. Thus, in comparison, the 
United States made certain, although not as a prerequisite, that its imperial 
rivals, Britain and spain, agreed on defined, international boundaries before 
the massive westward movement began in earnest. Russia, on the other hand, 
used the absence of defined boundaries to justify its expansion and colonization 
into the Kazakh steppe and, later, Turkestan.2
Therefore, unlike the Russian-Kazakh case, in which the violent resistance 
to Russian expansion occurred between 1732 and 1847, most scholars argue 
that sioux resistance to american expansion starts in 1851, with the signing 
of the fort laramie Treaty, and concludes in 1890 at Wounded Knee. some 
scholars claim the resistance ended in 1877–1878, with the death of crazy 
horse. Regardless of which dates are used, Kazakh resistance ends in the 
first half of the century, whereas the sioux resistance is a second-half-of-the- 
century story that accelerated rapidly after the american civil War. despite 
this temporal difference, throughout the nineteenth century, the united states 
and Russia unquestionably planned, revised, and implemented the economic, 
political, social, and cultural policies of subjugation.
one other distinction to acknowledge, but far more difficult to evaluate, was 
that the trade goods that the americans and Russians desired differed consider-
ably. Trade and settlement, in a sense, differed in these two cases. one reason 
was that the northern plains initially was the route to someplace else during 
much of the nineteenth century—meaning that migrants going to the Montana 
or colorado goldfields or oregon were not the vulnerable or rich targets of 
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opportunity for the sioux. That was not the case in the steppe, as Kazakhs fre-
quently attacked Russian or central Asian caravans throughout the eighteenth or 
nineteenth centuries. The sioux facilitated the early nineteenth-century trade, 
but it was nearly a one-product (fur) trade that attracted the British, french, 
and americans. The Kazakhs’ trade was more diversified, as they supplied the 
Russians with wool, meat, livestock, and hides. The sioux and the Kazakhs 
desired manufactured products as well as modern weapons, ammunition, and 
powder—items that the United States and Russia were equally reluctant to trade.
The Russians wanted to tap into the central asian markets, trading with mer-
chants from china, Persia, and the ottoman empire who visited the ancient silk 
Road market towns of Bukhara and samarkand. Because the americans were 
not sending large caravans of trade through the northern plains, with the goal 
of returning with goods from elsewhere, the need to protect the trade differed 
somewhat. in time, the Russian government built fortified lines that presumably 
separated Russian territory from the rest of central asia—particularly Turkestan 
and the southern Kazakh steppe. The boundary crept over the territory claimed, 
or at least used, by the Kazakhs, whereas the united states superficially cloaked 
sioux lands within american territorial boundaries, initially moved through it, 
but american pioneers ultimately came to settle on it. contiguous expansion 
and settlement was more common in Russia than the pattern in the united 
states, although americans claimed the northern plains before physically incor-
porating western territories such as California or Oregon. As a consequence, 
the americans leapfrogged sioux territory due to the california gold rush, the 
Mexican-american War, and the boundary demarcation between British canada 
and the united states—all occurring in the 1840s. in Russia, expansion was one 
small step after another; in the united states, it was one giant leap.
In addition, there was an element to the trade that is ubiquitous in the histo-
ries written about the conquest of North America generally that is almost com-
pletely absent in similar histories about Russian eastward expansion: the use 
of liquor to bilk the natives. There is no question among scholars of American 
history that traders, merchants, and others used alcohol and hard spirits exces-
sively and to the detriment of indians throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. The American government worked hard—some may question how 
hard—to obstruct the trade and prevent alcohol from ever reaching indians; but 
it was, by all accounts, a serious issue in which simple prohibitions failed to stop 
it. Many indians also tried to stop the trade. nevertheless, little disagreement 
exists about the role liquor played in the American expansion and disposses-
sion of indians from the land; similar evidence was not a part of the Russian 
experience. There is anecdotal evidence about drunken Russians on the frontier, 
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but they were not part of the conquest and colonization story in the American 
example.3
another interesting, but somewhat minor, difference is that, unlike the sioux 
Wars of the nineteenth century, there are no infamous battles or massacres that 
one can point to as turning points or seminal moments in the Kazakh resis-
tance to Russian expansion. There was no Grattan Massacre, no fetterman 
Massacre, and certainly no equivalent to the Battle of the Little Bighorn in the 
Russian conquest and colonization of the Kazakhs.4 There were, however, pro-
longed “rebellions,” as the Russians defined them, led by charismatic, generally 
enigmatic figures. There were no large-scale, pitched battles; the vast majority 
of these encounters were relatively small skirmishes or raids.5 in a sense, that 
differs little from the well-known violent encounters between the american 
military and the sioux, or even american civilians and the sioux. That does not 
mean, however, that subsequent scholarship neglected to examine the rebel-
lions. Quite the contrary, it is more likely that Russian children do not know the 
name or exploits of ablai Khan or Kenesary Kasymov. americans, on the other 
hand, know the names of sitting Bull or crazy horse. The reason—or so it 
seems—is because there were few occasions during Russia’s expansion into the 
Kazakh steppe that scholars can identify as major, seminal battles. The Russians 
always considered these conflicts and skirmishes to be merely rebellions and 
not wars because after 1732 the Russian government considered the Kazakhs 
subjects of the empire. Moreover, and perhaps as a consequence, during the 
Figure 3.1. southern Kazakh steppe, June 2008 (photo by author). 
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soviet era, scholars interpreted the rebellions as little more than feudal reac-
tions by khans and sultans who sought to oppress their own people rather than 
submit to Russian rule.6
on the other hand, the united states referred to conflicts with the sioux as 
wars. in a practical sense, Red cloud’s War or the Black hills’ War were com-
parable military events to rebellions by srym Batyr or Kenesary Kasymov. Red 
cloud, sitting Bull, and crazy horse rebelled and resisted american expansion 
as much as srym or Kenesary rebelled and resisted Russian expansion.7 The 
americans called them wars, but they differed little from the military efforts 
the Kazakhs conducted against the Russians. interestingly, america had its cel-
ebrated and tragic indian Wars in the nineteenth century; Russia had its cel-
ebrated and tragic wars in the caucasus and central asia but not in the Kazakh 
steppe. for the Russians, the major wars or battles that captured the public’s 
attention—comparable to Red cloud’s War or the Battle of the little Bighorn—
occur in the caucasus against imam shamil or, later, against the Turkmen and the 
tragic Battle of Geok-Tepe. The Russians, however, never defined or described 
the more than century-long struggle to subjugate the Kazakhs as a war.8 in the 
minds of Russian officials, from the moment of abulkhair’s 1732 oath, Kazakhs 
were subjects of the Russian empire. in that context, subjects rebelled and sur-
rendered political sovereignty to the emperor, but they did not go to war against 
the colonizer. nevertheless, in a comparable sense and in that context, as Robert 
M. utley noted, “every important indian war since 1870 [was] essentially a war 
not of concentration but of rebellion—of indians rebelling against reservations 
they had already accepted in theory if not in fact.”9
Thus, to call the resistance a war or a rebellion does not change the sim-
ple fact that the sioux and the Kazakhs fought to prevent the americans and 
the Russians from expanding into the plains and the steppe. These wars or 
rebellions were a response to imperial expansion, territorial loss, and internal 
colonization. The Russians interpreted abulkhair’s 1732 oath differently than 
americans interpreted their government’s practice of signing treaties with the 
sioux. This may also account for the two different terms—wars or rebellions—
used to define sioux and Kazakh resistance.
concePTs of suBMission
following independence, the united states adopted many elements of British 
economic and political policies in its relations with indians. it was not until 
1789 that article 1, section 8 of the us constitution assigned and preserved 
the conduct of indian relations. according to the constitution, it gave congress 
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the power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several 
states, and with the indian Tribes.” Treaties throughout the nineteenth century 
echoed British practice, shaped partially by the Proclamation of 1763—a decree 
designed to acknowledge indian rights to land but also to establish the only legal 
procedure to extinguish that right. Treaties became the principal instrument 
of Indian-British, and subsequently American-Indian, relations.10 according to 
stuart Banner, after american independence, the treaties represented “strong 
political pressures to acquire land quickly and cheaply. The result was a dra-
matic change in the method of obtaining indian land. The federal government 
began to dictate to tribes the extent of land they would be allowed to occupy.”11 
until 1871 the united states understood that treaties, in concept and practice, 
operated between politically sovereign entities; however, most treaties signed 
between the united states and some sioux bands were more akin to real estate 
ventures than transactions between sovereign peoples.
The Russians, on the other hand, never signed treaties with the Kazakhs. 
Throughout the eighteenth century and into the nineteenth century, the tsar-
ist government administered oaths rather than employed legal documents. The 
Russians simply annexed the land and claimed sovereignty over the people liv-
ing there. Whereas the British and, later, americans took “great pains to estab-
lish the legality, morality, and philosophical legitimacy of their possession and 
occupation of new lands,” the Russians, according to valerie Kivelson, appear “to 
have not lost a wink of sleep over this issue.”12 Moreover, as Russia lacked a con-
stitution, government-native relations were always the prerogative of the tsar, his 
or her government, or its official representatives. once the Russian government 
administered an oath, it assumed that the people—including Kazakhs, Poles, 
Georgians, and others—became subjects of the empire. it assumed that they 
voluntarily surrendered their political sovereignty to the tsar or tsarina. from 
the Russian perspective, treaties were legal accords agreed to only by coequal 
sovereigns.
after a subject people surrendered their sovereignty through an agreement 
sworn to by a khan or some other recognized leader, treaties were superfluous 
and irrelevant. The treaties in the united states, however, served a somewhat 
different purpose. The united states ratified 367 indian treaties, as well as oth-
ers congress never ratified, from 1778 to 1868.13 The vast majority of these trea-
ties forced land concessions; or, to describe it more simply, these treaties created 
a legal mechanism to get land from indians but did not affect their sovereignty. 
in fact, the united states needed sovereign indian nations so that the federal 
government could sign treaties beneficial to the government. initially, treaties 
between the united states and various tribes did not subvert indian sovereignty 
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to the american government; however, in Russia, the system of oath-taking was, 
in the Russian mind, a clear act of submission.
The TRouBle WiTh fRance
despite these differing concepts of submission to the prerogatives of the 
colonizer, during the era of early expansion, in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, the united states and Russia both administered rela-
tions with the sioux and the Kazakhs as military matters. shortly after estab-
lishing the first executive branch departments—which included state, treasury, 
and war—the us congress placed management for indian affairs in the War 
department.14 The ordinance of 1785 and the northwest ordinance of 1787 
laid the groundwork for american settlement in these territories. The pas-
sage of these acts, according to historian Robert f. Berkhofer Jr., created a 
“novel colonial system” because these new territories, after achieving statehood, 
incorporated easily into the federal system as coequals. Ohio, Wisconsin, and 
Minnesota, for example, were initially territories, as Berkhofer argued, to dis-
tinguish american expansion “from the old imperial type.”15 historian Jeffrey 
ostler described the process as a way to establish “new colonies that were 
organized into territories and then states.”16 The administration of indigenous 
peoples in the united states started first under the department of War but 
was placed later under interior department control. The Russians, on the 
other hand, never doubted that they expanded as an “old imperial type” that 
colonized newly acquired territory, but territorial administration was always 
under military control. civilians and bureaucrats always reported to mili-
tary governor-generals, a structure that differed markedly from the american 
administrative process. Throughout the nineteenth century, control of indian 
affairs in the united states periodically erupted into heated debate and power 
struggles between the interior and War departments and often marred rela-
tions between the two. it was a political and institutional rivalry, often bit-
ter and controversial. Russia did not experience a similar debate. Governance 
in the provinces was a military matter, although a Russian department of 
internal affairs existed and administered some native (inorodtsy “alien” or “of 
another people”) civil concerns. different Russian ministries surveyed the 
land and administered resettlement, but political rule in the steppe was always 
under military rule. an interesting and parallel element to the process of con-
quering and eventually colonizing the plains and the steppe originates in the 
shadow of the napoleonic Wars, which diverted Russia’s attention and eventu-
ally ensnared the united states as well.
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in the nascent united states, the napoleonic Wars caused the young republic 
to vacillate between enthusiasm for the french Revolution and anger at both the 
french and the British for the impunity with which they violated american neu-
trality; seized american ships, men, and goods; and generally ignored american 
protests and sovereignty. as the situation changed in europe, it proved benefi-
cial for the united states in ways that can never be overstated. The american 
purchase of the louisiana Territory from the french in 1803 was, perhaps, the 
most significant imperial step taken by the united states in its history. it funda-
mentally altered the united states, creating in one stroke of the pen a country 
that expanded, almost effortlessly, past the magnificent Mississippi watershed 
to the Rocky Mountains. Just one year before the sale, napoleon declared that 
france must “engage herself not to sell or alienate in any manner the property 
or enjoyment of louisiana.”17 The spanish opposed the sale, which napoleon 
simply ignored in his need to raise revenue and divest france of unwanted real 
estate. But events in europe, american diplomacy, and napoleon’s mercurial 
character resulted in such a momentous occasion that historian henry adams 
later euphorically exclaimed that the “annexation of louisiana was an event so 
portentous as to defy measurement . . . but as a matter of diplomacy it was 
unparalleled, because it cost almost nothing.”18
Tools of suBJuGaTion
The full extent of the louisiana Territory was unclear; the united states was 
uncertain of the boundaries and had little knowledge about the people and 
resources that it just paid $15 million (less than three cents per acre) to own. 
The course of american and sioux relations, however, changed significantly 
after the louisiana Purchase. some americans were already trading with the 
Sioux prior to the acquisition, but those meetings and trade opportunities were 
sporadic. in addition, the louisiana Purchase changed the relationship between 
the united states and Great Britain in the northern plains. up to this point, the 
British still dominated the fur trade, and the americans were a minor annoy-
ance. The united states controlled ohio, but american pioneers were aggres-
sively expanding and settling in regions east of the Mississippi River.
President Thomas Jefferson had plans and imperial ambitions to exert 
American authority in the newly acquired lands, and he quickly, and somewhat 
quietly, dispatched various expeditions to explore the territory, hopefully to 
find waterways to the Pacific ocean and to inform the indians that they had 
a new “Great father” in Washington. The lewis and clark expedition estab-
lished trade relations with various tribes, including the sioux. These expeditions 
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commercially benefited the united states and enticed indian tribes away from 
the more experienced British traders and merchants. for example, in 1805 
zebulon Pike commanded an expedition to explore the upper Mississippi region, 
where he met some dakota at lake Pepin. Pike’s visit with some santee was far 
more profitable than lewis and clark’s encounter with the Teton. little crow, 
chief of the Mdewakanton sioux, visited Pike, who was then traveling on to the 
mouth of the Minnesota River. Pike signed the first treaty between one band of 
the sioux and a representative of the united states.19
Little Crow agreed to relinquish a nine-mile strip of land on both sides of the 
Mississippi River, from the mouth of the st. croix River to the falls of st. anthony. 
The united states agreed to pay $2,000. The land was to be used to construct a 
military and trading post, but it was not until 1819 that the american govern-
ment started construction of a fort on the newly purchased land. Consequently, 
Pike’s 1805 treaty apparently opened the door to further land cessions from 
other sioux bands after the united states purchased little crow’s tract. This 
treaty also represents the instrument by which the united states began to divide 
and conquer the Sioux, although it differs slightly from the process employed by 
the Russians against the Kazakhs.
Russia’s relations with france were complicated and unsettled. The french 
Revolution horrified catherine the Great—as an autocrat, no matter how 
enlightened, it was disturbing to watch from afar a rabble of peasants and revolu-
tionaries execute a fellow monarch. after 1789 catherine’s relations with france 
intended to prevent the spread of revolutionary ideology, particularly in the 
Russian empire. ideologies that preached individual liberties, the rights of man, 
and nationalism were anathema to an autocrat who ruled over a multinational 
empire. she died in 1796, ending a remarkably complex period in Russian his-
tory. her son, Paul i (1796–1801), was an ignorant sod. his domestic and foreign 
policies seemingly reflected his unstable mind. an 1801 palace coup ended his 
erratic reign.
his son, alexander i, ruled until 1825. from 1801 to 1815, Russia clearly 
focused its attention on european affairs and the napoleonic threat. Because of 
these external issues, Russia’s territorial expansion into the Kazakh steppe was 
haphazard. Consequently, Alexander’s Russia sought merely to consolidate its 
administrative control in the territories behind and along the irtysh line. The 
Russians focused on expanding trade in the Kazakh steppe and central asia, not 
territorial expansion and colonization. Kazakh clans and hordes continued to 
fight among themselves for access to pastures and territory, raid Russian caravans, 
and seize goods and Russian and cossack peasants to sell as slaves in Bukhara, 
Kokand, and Khiva. The Kazakh steppe remained a dangerous place for Russians. 
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More importantly, the allegedly constant conflict in the steppe convinced many 
Russian officials that only military conquest there could provide the necessary 
security and stability for trade.
in 1801 the Russian government manufactured the Bukei horde, a fanciful 
Kazakh entity designed to reward some Kazakhs for their good behavior by mak-
ing the inner side pastures available. The Bukei horde, whom the Russians 
often called the inner horde, permitted Bukei’s followers to remain perma-
nently west of the ural River.20 it made available millions of acres of lush pas-
tures for Kazakh shepherds, but for the Russians it meant improved security 
along the irtysh line. The Russians allowed Bukei to pasture on the inner side, 
between the ural and volga Rivers, separating his factions of the little horde 
from other little horde clans. his reward for good relations was that Russia 
acknowledged him as khan and bestowed gifts and lands, which attracted fol-
lowers but essentially divided Kazakhs between those considered friendly and 
loyal and those that the Russian government considered hostile and rebellious. 
Permitting Bukei to pasture on the inner side became a measured device to 
incorporate clans from the little horde into the Russian empire. Bukei’s follow-
ers had access to prime grazing land and, equally important, Russian economic 
and military support and protection from Kazakhs who opposed Bukei.
Some scholars argue that this was part of the Russians’ divide and conquer 
strategy, but it seems more likely that the Russians were able to take advantage 
of divisions and internecine conflict in order to penetrate the Kazakh steppe 
because, more than anything else, the Russians wanted peace and stability rather 
than expansion simply for expansion’s sake. By splitting the little horde and 
privileging some Kazakhs with benefits such as pastures, the Russians unwit-
tingly intensified internecine conflicts among the Kazakh clans and hordes 
rather than secured a more stable environment to increase trade. during the 
napoleonic Wars, the united states expanded exponentially, whereas Russia 
sought merely to consolidate its earlier territorial gains. nonetheless, each used 
the opportunity to divide and conquer, albeit in sporadic and tentative ways.
The americans and Russians used treaties and oaths to secure, as much as 
possible, friendly relations and trade. Treaties and oaths also, perhaps unwit-
tingly, created wedges in which to reward friendly sioux and Kazakhs—espe-
cially between various sioux bands and Kazakh clans—in order to pacify and 
segregate those sioux and Kazakhs who opposed further american and Russian 
expansion. allowing Bukei and his supporters to access specifically defined land 
and favoring certain Kazakh clans with benefits divided Kazakhs among the 
little horde clans and forced them to choose between cooperation and opposi-
tion. in the american case, the sioux bands that signed treaties were favored 
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with gifts and annuities. Of course, the consequence for this cooperation was 
the loss of sioux and Kazakh lands and, concomitantly, their political sovereignty. 
in each case, the united states and Russia considered these steps necessary 
actions in order to promote peaceful relations and, more importantly, secure 
trade and promote agriculture, civilization, and, eventually, assimilation.
This is evident in the united states in the early nineteenth century as 
americans hoped to wrest the fur trade away from the British. in 1806 the 
War department appointed an agent, nicholas Boilvin, to the sacs, but he also 
had contacts with some sioux around Prairie du chien. one of his tasks was 
to invigorate trade with the various tribes. By 1808 British traders withdrew 
from the region, opening the trade for american commercial development. at 
a council held at Prairie du chien in 1809, many dakotas expressed a desire for 
american merchandise. Boilvin seemed confident that american traders could 
carry on a profitable trade with the upper Mississippi tribes, but american trad-
ers did not cultivate the necessary relationships with the sioux to exploit fully 
the commercial opportunities following the British departure.21 The process in 
the steppe, however, favored a more rapid divide-and-conquer process because 
the Russians had the one thing that some Kazakhs desperately needed: rich 
pastures that lay behind the Russian fortified lines. The Russians managed to 
penetrate politically rather than economically at first because they controlled 
certain lands. The Russians also believed that political control facilitated and 
secured trade. The united states also wanted to facilitate trade, but the sioux 
and other indian tribes still controlled the land. The united states could claim 
ownership, but ownership did not represent control.
The era of american dominance in the western fur trade follows the war, 
despite continued efforts by the British to interfere with american ambitions. 
The sioux actively participated in the trade throughout the heyday in the 1820s 
and 1830s. american fur trader Joshua Pilcher claimed, “no indians ever mani-
fested a greater degree of friendship for the whites in general, or more respect 
for our government, than the sioux.”22 Great fur trade scholar hiram chittenden 
noted that the yanktons “were the least troublesome of all the sioux tribes and 
gave the traders comparatively little annoyance.” he claimed, however, that the 
yanktonai were “treacherous, stealthy, vindictive, and caused a great deal of trou-
ble.” he also observed that the sioux regarded “the approach of the american 
traders with an unfriendly eye . . . But as time wore on and the traders became 
firmly established among them, this hostile feeling largely passed away.”23 one 
reason the sioux thrived during this period was that the fur trade was changing 
from beaver and other fine fur to buffalo fur and hides. The sioux—in par-
ticular, bands in the western plains such as the Teton—were more easily able to 
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facilitate this trade due to the extensive buffalo herds that roamed the plains and 
prairies, profiting economically and militarily.
in July 1815 the Treaty of Portage des sioux was signed between the united 
states and various sioux bands, although absent from the negotiations were two 
prominent sioux chiefs, Wabasha and little crow. The essential fact of the treaty 
was that each party desired “perpetual peace and friendship between all citizens 
of the united states of america” and the sioux people. in addition, the treaty 
stipulated that tribes place themselves “under the protection” of the american 
government and that “every injury or act of hostility committed by one or either 
of the contracting parties against the other, shall be mutually forgiven and for-
got.”24 doane Robinson described the “great council” that met to haggle out the 
terms of the treaty “one of the most notable ever held on the continent.” he 
claimed that, at this time, the sioux “gave complete submission to the united 
states government, and since that date, no matter how hostile they may have 
been in local matters, they have never failed to recognize the sovereignty of the 
great father at Washington.”25
it is difficult to understand how or why the sioux might ever consider that this 
treaty represented the complete surrender of their sovereignty to the united 
states; certainly, later sioux leaders, such as sitting Bull and crazy horse, 
rejected american domination. This illusion was reminiscent of Russia’s beliefs 
that abulkhair’s 1732 oath made all Kazakhs “subjects” of the Russian empire. 
vasilii Grigoriev recognized the futility of abulkhair’s actions when he wrote 
that it was merely a trick “by which they hoped to get from us presents and 
other advantages.”26 The american-sioux 1815 treaty—or, in the Kazakh case, 
the 1732 “oath—did not accomplish final submission by the sioux, as Robinson 
assumed, but required military defeat; and even then, subjugation was political. 
More importantly, by the 1820, the us government resolved to extend into the 
Mississippi and Missouri River valleys and the Russians determined to move 
deeper into the Kazakh steppe, where resistance was more strenuous.
conflicT WiThin The Pl ains and The sTePPe
one obstacle, however, that both the united states and Russia had to overcome 
was conflict in the plains and the steppe. There was a major difference in this 
regard: conflict in the plains was generally between different indian tribes, 
whereas in the steppe it was Kazakh against Kazakh. although the sioux rarely, if 
ever, fought another band—internecine conflict—they were often in conflict with 
neighboring tribes. By the 1820s, many western sioux bands lived and migrated 
in and around the Black hills. They managed to drive the Kiowa out of the region 
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and laid claim to much of the Missouri River region. The Teton and Yankton/
yanktonai managed to expel other tribes such as the Ponca, Pawnee, arikara, 
Mandan, and crow from the contested territory and became, as utley exclaimed, 
the “monarchs of the northern Plains.”27 conflict in the plains, however, in the 
early nineteenth century was the direct result of sioux, not american, expansion. 
americans perceived this intertribal conflict as a serious hindrance to future 
expansion—a threat to american trappers, traders, and, eventually, settlers. in 
the Kazakh steppe, Russian expansion was the reason for the internecine conflict 
because Russia’s divide-and-conquer strategy caused Kazakh clans and hordes to 
fight each other for access to pastures and trade. in order for Russian economic 
penetration into the steppe to increase, the Russian government believed that it 
needed to end the Kazakh internal fighting and restore order.
in 1803 the Russians managed to hold a council at orenburg, inviting many 
of the hostile Kazakh leaders, at which they agreed to promote peace, stability, 
and trade in the steppe. Governor-General Grigorii volkonskii issued a decree 
demanding an end to all conflict. he also stated categorically that Russia would 
withhold all titles, salaries, and privileges in the event the fighting continued. 
This declaration outwardly produced the desired affect, and the fighting abated 
for a while. More likely, the growing presence of Khiva in the southern steppe 
quelled the fighting among the Kazakhs than any demand made by the governor-
general. Much as the dzhungarian threat a century before pushed abulkhair to 
seek Russian assistance, the extended threat from Khiva caused some Kazakh 
khans to move toward improved relations with Russia. in other words, Russian 
expansion into the steppe, and its accompanied tactics to reward those deemed 
loyal, further fractured Kazakh society. it increased competition for Russian 
gifts and, additionally, the desire for Russian protection or support. The one 
gift, of course, that caused the biggest problem for the Kazakhs was the Russian 
habit of making certain pastures available to loyal Kazakhs and denying access 
to those deemed hostile. land became the imperial wedge used to compel the 
Kazakhs to submit to Russian expansion.
in the united states, conflicts between tribes ostensibly increased in the plains 
by the presence of an old enemy that threatened to thwart american claims to the 
region. in 1819 secretary of War John calhoun insisted that the united states 
exert its influence in Minnesota Territory, fearing that the British were continuing 
to outmaneuver americans in the region. calhoun ordered the army to construct 
a permanent post in the territory. The fort, initially called fort st. anthony—in 
1825 it was renamed fort snelling—was located at the junction of the Minnesota 
and Mississippi Rivers on land acquired by Pike in 1805.28 Just three years before, 
the us congress passed a law calculated to oust British fur traders from american 
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territory. This act proposed to supplement the trade and intercourse laws with 
indians, which stipulated, “licenses to trade with the indians within the territorial 
limits of the united states shall not be granted to any but citizens of the united 
states.”29
The line of forts, comparable to the Russian irtysh line, became a chain 
of american military posts—from fort st. Philip and fort Jesup in louisiana, 
northward to fort atkinson in Wisconsin, up to fort snelling—and defined, as 
utley noted, the “so-called Permanent indian frontier.” These posts represented 
american authority in western regions but did very little to exert that influence 
successfully to suppress the continuing intertribal warfare or exhibit in any real 
way american power.30 it was, however, as utley astutely described it, a “tanta-
lizing abstraction” that ultimately “crumbled” and “collapsed” under the “wheels 
of wagons bearing gold seekers to the new us possessions on the Pacific.”31
in the 1820s, the Russians reasserted their power and influence in the Kazakh 
steppe in the decade following the napoleonic Wars. Throughout the 1820s, the 
Russians constructed a second line of forts and posts chiefly within the territory 
of the Middle and Great hordes, running from Kokchetav through akmolinsk 
to sergiopol and Baian-aul; called the ilek line (or iletskii) that connected the 
provincial capital, orenburg, closer to the steppe trade. cossack stanitsy (settle-
ments) were interspersed throughout the ilek line, often constructed near the 
best water sources and wooded regions.32 according to historian Madhavan Palat, 
it is only with this new line of forts that Russia entered the steppe “purposefully, 
politically, administratively, legally, and economically, with the intention of con-
verting it into a colonial appendage, and later, a territory for Russian peasant 
colonization.”33 The americans and the Russians used artificially constructed 
boundaries to limit sioux and Kazakh mobility and intertribal or internecine 
conflicts to provide for more stable environments for traders and settlers.
The anticipated goal in both cases was to maintain the peace in the american 
plains and prairies or in the Kazakh steppe by assigning territory and forcing the 
sioux and the Kazakhs to acknowledge american and Russian political control. 
in the 1820s and 1830s, the sioux transformed into a “hegemonic power” that 
successfully warred against sedentary tribes along the Missouri and by the 1830s 
had forced the Kiowa from the rich Black hills and forged alliances with other 
powerful plains tribes, such as the cheyenne and arapahos.34 Moreover, in order 
to stop continued attacks against american fur traders, in 1823 an american 
expedition commanded by col. henry leavenworth joined with a number of 
Teton and yankton warriors to punish the arikara for attacking a party of trap-
pers who had come to their village to trade for some horses. leavenworth hesi-
tated, although the sioux were ready to attack the arikara who had garrisoned 
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themselves inside their village. according to George hyde, the Tetons were dis-
gusted with leavenworth’s timidity and packed up their horses, gathered some 
corn from arikara fields, stole eight of leavenworth’s horses as trophies, and 
departed.35 it seems these events greatly diminished any fear or concern these 
sioux had regarding american military capabilities, perhaps even evoked some 
contempt among the sioux. indeed, it gave them little to fear that the americans 
posed a menace to their supremacy in the northern plains.36
in 1824 indian agent lawrence Taliaferro, at the st. Peter’s agency near fort 
snelling, convinced some santee to travel to Washington, dc, to meet with 
american political leaders. While in Washington, Taliaferro convinced secretary 
calhoun to convene a meeting for the following year at Prairie du chien in 
order to negotiate treaties with the various sioux bands under his jurisdiction 
to end the intertribal warfare that hindered trade. The conference opened in 
august 1825; the american delegation included Gov. lewis cass (Michigan 
Territory) and superintendent of indian affairs William clark. The plan they 
proposed to the indians who gathered was to draw tribal boundaries that clearly 
defined hunting lands, which the americans believed were the root of the con-
flicts. creating specific tribal territories dominated american thinking through 
most treaty-making attempts in the nineteenth century. The american govern-
ment planned to create inviolable boundaries and segregate tribes from one 
another and from white americans. unfortunately, creating tribal boundaries 
also required accurate maps, of which there were none.
ResisTance: KazaKhs
at this point, it is necessary to examine sioux and Kazakh resistance through 
separate contexts because the chronological differences reflect as well the idio-
syncratic distinctions. While the grievances expressed by the sioux and the 
Kazakhs reveal many similarities, conflating the resistance into a single com-
parative prism might inadvertently mask the colonizers’ efforts to subjugate 
the indigenous populations. The americans and the Russians each wanted the 
land; they each sought peaceful and stable frontiers and wanted to make room 
for settlement by pioneers and peasants, but the resistance by the sioux and 
the Kazakhs to american and Russian expansion was in direct relation to poli-
cies and tactics employed against them. it is to the Kazakhs’ resistance that this 
chapter now turns.
in 1822 the governor-general of siberia, Mikhail speransky, issued reforms 
that fundamentally altered the relationship between the Kazakhs and the 
Russian empire, which reflected the Russian government’s desire to regulate 
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and demarcate Kazakh mobility. The key element to affect the Kazakhs was the 
Regulations on the siberian Kirgiz. administratively, it segregated little horde 
Kazakhs from the Middle horde. The Russian government designated Kazakhs 
from the little horde “orenburg Kirgiz,” whereas Middle horde Kazakhs 
became “siberian Kirgiz.” Great horde Kazakhs remained outside this structure 
until the 1840s, when the government designated them “semirechie Kirgiz.”37 
under this administrative system, the Russians subdivided Kazakh administra-
tive forms, comparable to the Russian model that appealed to a bureaucrat’s 
sensibilities, which cut across traditional Kazakh sociopolitical structures. The 
Russians restricted movement between districts, and the regulations dictated 
that Kazakhs could migrate only within their specifically designated territory. 
In the event a Kazakh aul wanted to leave the district, the government required 
Kazakhs to receive special permission from a Russian government official or 
military officer to do so. as land later opened to Russian and cossack resettle-
ment, the Russian government further limited permission to cross a restricted 
district boundary. in this case, it differed from american efforts to impose 
boundaries on indian tribes, including the sioux. The americans believed 
explicit and recognized boundaries reduced intertribal conflict, not interne-
cine sioux conflicts. The Russians, however, desired to limit conflict between 
Kazakh auls, clans, or hordes that might affect trade and resettlement. Kazakhs 
from both the little and Middle hordes resisted Russian subjugation with a 
vigor that caught the Russian government by surprise and represented the most 
serious rebellions against Russian expansion in the nineteenth century. The goal 
in both the american and Russian cases was the same—reduce conflict that 
threatened expansion and trade—but the targets differed. in the united states, 
intertribal warfare required multiple treaties and negotiations with numerous 
tribes; in Russia, different Kazakh clans and hordes required frequent negotia-
tion and manipulation.
Between 1824 and 1847, four significant, widespread, and intense Kazakh 
rebellions against Russian colonization kept the Kazakh steppe in near-con-
stant turmoil. The Russians interpreted the rebellions as little more than mere 
banditry, led by men who preferred to remain uncivilized and nomadic; but 
these rebellions were not just against Russian colonization. in each case, the 
fight was against Kazakh sultans and khans who superficially benefited from 
Russian colonization—between those who owed an allegiance to Russia and 
those who did not. it was particularly strident among Kazakhs in the Bukei 
horde supported by Russia and Kazakhs in the little horde who lost land, 
pasture, migration privileges, and opposed Russian colonization. in the Middle 
Horde, the conflict was equally against Russian colonization and Kazakhs not 
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allied to Russia. The conflicts were as much anti-Russian as they were part of 
a Kazakh civil war.38
following speransky’s 1822 reforms and the Russian government’s 1824 deci-
sion to abolish the title of khan, Kazakhs in the little horde, led by sultan Kaip-
Galii ishimov, rebelled against Russia. a particularly harsh winter in 1826–1827 
prompted Kaip-Galii to pasture on the wrong side of the ilek line. The Russian 
government sent a large force to push the Kazakhs back, but as punishment, 
the government also seized thousands of heads of livestock, prompting violent 
protest by the Kazakhs. The government’s ham-fisted treatment led to several 
small, but fierce exchanges between Kaip-Galii’s supporters and Russian troops. 
By 1828 the Russian government arrested and tried more than two hundred 
Kazakhs, but Kaip-Galii avoided arrest and fled south to Khiva, where the khan 
there gave him sanctuary. Russia’s decision to fortify its military line spawned 
other rebellions.
The ilek line intersected rich pastureland and migratory routes claimed by 
the Tabyn clan of the little horde. in response to the Russian expansion, in 1830 
the Tabyn clan leader, zholaman Tlenchiev, rebelled against the Russians and 
Kazakhs loyal to Russia. zholaman and his supporters successfully disrupted car-
avan trade and harassed cossacks living along the ilek line. in 1830 the Russian 
orenburg frontier commission reported that on one raid against zholaman the 
government seized goods, livestock, and prisoners, but that zholaman escaped.39 
zholaman wrote the commission that he wanted the ilek line disbanded—some-
thing Russia was unwilling to consider. he claimed in the letter that the Kazakhs 
had abundant lands to graze their herds, but that after the Russians constructed 
the ilek line, they had none.40 he wrote again to demand that Russia remove the 
forts. he claimed, “when you return those places, then we will be friends, and if 
you give them away [to cossacks], we will be enemies.”41
at the peak of zholaman’s revolt, and a principal cause for the insurgency, the 
Russian government allotted roughly 7 million desiatin along the ural River 
region for Russian and cossack peasants.42 In another request to the governor-
general, Zholaman requested permission to pasture between the Ural and Ilek 
Rivers, but the Russians denied this request, fearing that it might spark a land 
dispute between Kazakhs and cossacks who settled there.43 it was an example of 
Russian divide-and-conquer tactics in that by designating only specific territo-
ries that Kazakhs might use, the government managed to reward some Kazakhs 
who exhibited good behavior with access to pasturelands and punish those that 
it deemed antagonistic. Russian punitive attacks and raids against zholaman’s 
aul and the loss of land and livestock eventually forced him to flee but not sur-
render, as he allied with sarzhan Kasymov to fight against the Russians.
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zholaman’s decision to ally with sarzhan reveals the nature of the various 
rebellions in the steppe between 1824 and 1847. Weakened Kazakh leaders were 
readily willing on many occasions to join with other Kazakhs of different clans 
or hordes to oppose Russian expansion. sarzhan’s rebellion grew significantly, in 
part because so many Kazakhs from different clans or hordes rallied to his ban-
ner. in July 1826 one report suggested he had more than one thousand men 
under arms and that the “thieves” stole livestock and attacked Kazakhs friendly to 
Russia.44 another report indicated that Kazakhs from several volost abandoned 
their territory, joined sarzhan, or attempted illegally to cross over to the inner 
side, which created a crisis in the steppe.45
The Russian government attempted to negotiate with sarzhan, but between 
1827 and 1830, the situation in the steppe calmed a bit, and from the Russian 
perspective, it seemed the rebellion had ended and peace, or at least some 
security, had been restored. The reason had nothing to with Russia; in fact, 
sarzhan and his followers had moved south, and he was involved in an armed 
struggle with Tashkent—one of the wealthiest cities in central asia, nominally 
under Kokand’s control but desired by Bukhara—to control the southern steppe 
regions. The Russian governor-general called him the “dangerous enemy” who 
had “significant influence among the Kirgiz [Kazakhs] of the Middle horde.”46 
sarzhan continually attacked caravans, raided Kazakh auls loyal to Russia, and 
in 1835–1836, he attempted to ally with Kokand against the Russians, although 
Kokand was an inconsistent partner. in the summer of 1836 the Tashkent 
Kushbegi (ruler) feared that sarzhan’s influence among Kazakhs living around 
his dominion potentially threatened his territorial possessions; his assassins 
managed to kill the unfortunate Kazakh leader.47
sarzhan’s death was not the durable respite that either Russia or Tashkent 
hoped because his younger brother, Kenesary, quickly assumed command of 
sarzhan’s forces and inspired the revolt to become an even broader and more seri-
ous obstacle to Russian expansion. The Kenesary Kasymov Revolt was the turning 
point in the steppe, as Russia committed more men and resources to fighting 
Kenesary than any other previous Kazakh rebellions. one element that made the 
revolt unique was that at various times it extended to all three hordes, attract-
ing Kazakhs regardless of clan or horde to rally to his cause. indeed, the revolt 
was unique because at different times during the revolt, according to its most 
prominent historian, ermukhan Bekmakhanov, every clan allied with Kenesary. 
The problem was that at no time during the revolt did all clans at the same time 
ally with Kenesary.48 despite what might seem to suggest that he marshaled huge 
numbers to his side, the best estimates are that at the revolt’s peak (1844–1845), 
he could field between two thousand to ten thousand “well-armed horsemen.”49
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in december 1838, Kenesary sent a letter to Tsar nicholas i (1825–1855) that 
included four demands Russia must agree to before he would lay down his arms 
to end the rebellion. in the letter, Kenesary insisted that Russia abandon the 
aktau fort and destroy it. he further demanded that Russia “destroy all other 
establishments in steppe locations” in order to dismantle the akmolinsk judicial 
tribunal (divan), and “free our imprisoned people.”50 in June 1841, Kenesary 
wrote to the chairman of the orenburg frontier commission to explain the rea-
sons for his continued hostility to Russian expansion in the steppe. he claimed 
that in 1825 ivan Karnachev, with a force of three hundred Russians and one 
hundred sympathetic Kazakhs, attacked his brother sarzhan’s aul. They “sacked 
the aul . . . [and] plundered an untold quantity of livestock and property, and 
slaughtered 64 people; the remainder saved themselves by flight.”51 he cited a 
number of different atrocities purportedly committed by Russians or cossacks 
that demanded defensive, retaliatory acts by Kazakhs. Kenesary described the 
Russians as “leeches sucking the blood of the Kazakhs.”52
Most observers at the time, as well as subsequent scholarly accounts, fault 
Kenesary for the continued internecine struggle in the Kazakh steppe. Kenesary, 
according to these interpretations, made a political miscalculation that he could 
force clans hostile to his resistance to Russian colonization to join him and pro-
claim their allegiance to him.53 By 1845, Russia was fully committed to defeating 
Kenesary and restoring order to the steppe. The constant warfare resulted in 
lost warriors, lost livestock, and increased hostility among Kazakhs who refused 
to submit to Kenesary’s rule. Kenesary fled south—a tactic Kazakhs often used 
to escape Russian retaliation—eventually finding temporary sanctuary among 
the Kirghiz in semirechie. The problem was, however, that Kokand was fight-
ing Bukhara and attempting to assert control over semirechie, where Kenesary 
was camped. The Kirghiz were fighting against Great horde Kazakhs for the 
province, and Kenesary, weakened by the flight south, attempted to get the 
Great horde Kazakhs to join his cause to resist Russia and oust the Kirghiz 
nomads from the lush semirechie pastures. Kenesary started negotiating with 
the Kirghiz, to end the fight against the Kazakhs and Kokand, but at some point 
in the negotiations, the Kirghiz decided Kenesary was a liability and took him 
prisoner. sometime in april 1847, the Kirghiz executed him, bringing to an 
ignoble close the last major Kazakh military resistance to Russian expansion 
into the Kazakh steppe.54
There will be other, relatively minor rebellions in the 1850s among some 
Great horde clans resisting Russian expansion into semirechie, but in 1854 
the Russians took the region and established a permanent settlement at vernyi 
(present-day almaty). This opened the metaphorical door to Kokand, Khiva, 
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and Bukhara, but that push was temporarily delayed by the crimean War (1853–
1856) and the subsequent “great reforms” under the “tsar liberator” Alexander 
ii (1855–1881). The greatest of the great reforms was the 1861 peasant eman-
cipation, which liberated Russian peasants from the burdens of serfdom but not 
from the harsh realities of life in the empire. There were other reforms—judicial, 
military, and economic—but the reforms also, unintentionally, unleashed a wave 
of peasant migration to siberia and the Kazakhs steppe that challenged the gov-
ernment’s ability to manage it, resulting in the further loss of Kazakh economic 
and social sovereignty.55
A consequence of this new attention was a wave of administrative reforms 
in siberia and the Kazakh steppe as well as a renewed imperial effort to con-
quer the Kokand, Bukhara, and Khiva. In 1867 cash-strapped Russia decided 
to abandon its colony in alaska, selling it to the united states for the paltry sum 
of $7.2 million.56 alaska clearly lay outside Russia’s imperial vision of itself. in 
1864 Russian foreign minister Prince alexander Gorchakov, issued what many 
scholars consider the government’s clearest justification for the empire’s contin-
ued expansion into central asia. he explained for all “civilized states ‘which are 
brought into contact with half-savage, nomad populations, possessing no fixed 
social organization . . . it always happens that the more civilized state is forced . . . 
to exercise a certain ascendency over those whom their turbulent and unsettled 
character make most undesirable neighbors.’ ” he continued, using language 
that any ardent american expansionist might appreciate: that the “tribes on the 
frontier have to be reduced to a state of more or less perfect submission.” it was, 
he claimed, a “peculiarity of asiatics to respect nothing but visible and palpable 
force; the moral force of reason and the interests of civilization has as yet no 
hold upon them.”57
ResisTance: siouX
comparable to Kazakh resistance to Russian expansion and colonization, with its 
three major rebellions from 1824 to 1847, scholars tend to identify three major 
sioux uprisings, or wars, following the so-called 1857 spirit lake Massacre. The 
first comes within five years of the tragedy at spirit lake—the 1862 dakota 
War—followed by the 1866–1868 Powder River War (Red cloud’s War) and 
the 1875–1877 Black hills War (sitting Bull’s War). These three conflicts rep-
resent the most serious clashes waged between the sioux and americans in 
the 1860s and 1870s, ending with the vast majority of sioux forced to settle on 
government- approved reservations and the near complete loss of sioux political 
and economic sovereignty. as with the Kazakh rebellions, the three major sioux 
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conflicts are a series of battles, skirmishes, and raids that conflate into larger 
episodes that americans describe as wars.
following the 1825 Prairie du chien treaty, the united states remained a rela-
tively minor player in the northern plains. The south–north line of forts created 
a somewhat porous boundary that demarcated american territory; americans 
expressed a desire to remove all indians east of the line, which meant, essentially, 
all indians east of the Mississippi River. The treaty established not just boundar-
ies between the united states and western tribes but also boundaries between 
the tribes in the plains, in order to reduce intertribal warfare and stabilize the 
environment for the lucrative fur trade. By the 1820s, the sioux—especially the 
Teton—benefited from westward migration; according to colin G. calloway, the 
strength of the Teton derived from their “ruthless exploitation of a favorable 
economic position and to reduction of enemy tribes by european diseases.”58
in 1830 the united states signed another treaty of Prairie du chien with 
some santee bands, sacs, fox, omaha, and others, in which, according to the 
preamble, the signatories acknowledged the “unfriendly feeling” between them 
but, more importantly, sought to “provide sources for supplying their wants 
besides those of hunting, which they are sensible must soon entirely fail them.” 
in essence, in order to survive, they ceded land to the united states and agreed 
to live within allotted territory and receive annuities to sustain them.59
in 1836 and again in 1837, the yankton ceded lands to the united states, sur-
rendering their claim to almost 2.2 million acres. despite these significant ces-
sions to the united states in the 1830s and 1840s, these decades witnessed years 
of continued sioux territorial expansion. different sioux bands forged alliances 
with arapahos and cheyennes, secured the Black hills from the Kiowa, and, 
as Richard White argued, the united states moved into a region in which the 
people did not consider themselves “wards,” were not some defenseless people 
but an overly confident and powerful people that was also expanding.60 This was 
partially a clash of nations and partially a clash of civilizations, but it was clearly 
a clash of expanding powers into a region that both claimed.
in the 1840s, Manifest destiny became the dominant theme of american 
expansion westward, and the discovery of gold in california in 1849 acceler-
ated that migration. Relations between the united states and the sioux during 
those decades were generally peaceful, but the various peace initiatives of the 
previous decade began to crumble with the declining fur trade economy. some 
sioux bands, led by Mdewakanton and others in the Minnesota prairies and 
woodlands, became farmers and grew a variety of crops, such as potatoes and 
corn. They represented, as Gary clayton anderson noted, a dakota subculture, 
but it was vulnerable to climate and crop failures.61 By the end of the 1840s, the 
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united states confronted a growing crisis on the plains that many americans 
believed was necessary to resolve with treaties, removal, and reservations.
Many scholars agree that 1851 was a turning point in us-sioux relations. 
The united states signed treaties with the sioux at Traverse des sioux in July, 
at Mendota in august, and at fort laramie in september. Representatives of 
the united states, including superintendent of indian affairs david Mitchell 
and numerous indian representatives, which the americans insisted on iden-
tifying as chiefs and head chiefs, from the sioux, cheyennes, crow, arapahoes, 
Mandans, arikaras, assiniboines, and Gros ventres negotiated and concluded 
a treaty near fort laramie in Wyoming. certainly, the americans wanted the 
treaty to reestablish peace between the sioux and their allies with their neigh-
bors in order to stabilize the northern plains and end intertribal conflict. from 
the american perspective, defined, specific tribal boundaries opened the door 
for additional american expansion. in the treaty, the united states also gained 
the right to construct roads and military posts across indian lands. The tribes 
agreed not to harass emigrants that used the trails to california and oregon. 
for agreeing to the terms, the various tribes expected to receive a substantial 
annual annuity and, more importantly, the right to hunt on un-ceded lands.62 
in fact, between 1851 and 1858, the sioux treaties extinguished their title 
to almost 28 million acres, which they exchanged for annual annuities and a 
reservation.63
These 1851 treaties, as Jill St. Germain noted with subsequent treaties, 
demanded certain behavior by not just the bands but by all sioux as individu-
als.64 in other words, the burdens to fulfill the treaty obligations had almost no 
consequence for an American emigrant or pioneer but imposed financial and 
administrative action on the us government and its representatives (agents and 
others). The consequence, however, was that if a single Sioux violated an article 
of the treaties, the american government reserved the right to withhold its obli-
gations to the sioux. The act of an individual meant that the united states could 
punish all Sioux people, which it did frequently. Article 8 of the Treaty of fort 
laramie stipulates that the “united states may withhold the whole of a portion 
of the annuities mentioned . . . from the nation so offending, until, in the opin-
ion of the President of the united states, proper satisfaction shall have been 
made.”65 in 1857 the spirit lake Massacre, sometimes called inkpaduta’s War, 
refocused american attention on the Minnesota frontier (Minnesota was made 
a territory in 1849) and what becomes the sioux problem.
it is difficult to call the spirit lake Massacre a rebellion, and even harder to 
consider it part of the larger sioux Wars of the 1860s and 1870s. nonetheless, 
it was an act of resistance and, more importantly, a signal many americans 
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interpreted to suggest that the frontier remained a dangerous place that needed 
final subjugation to complete american control. The only way to do that was to 
commit military force and either compel the sioux onto reservations or exter-
minate them. The united states did not control the frontier. The settlements 
where the attacks occurred were located on the border between northern 
iowa and southern Minnesota, found on the “extreme frontier . . . although on 
ceded lands, were really in the very heart of the indian country, and absolutely 
unprotected and defenseless.”66 The winter of 1856–1857 was a severe one, and 
the annuities failed to alleviate sioux suffering in the region. Many sioux were 
forced to beg, and someone in inkpaduta’s camp killed a settler’s dog (which had 
bitten one of them), prompting a confrontation with some americans. shortly 
thereafter, inkpaduta’s group attacked and killed thirty-four settlers, moved 
to the settlement of springfield near spirit lake, and attacked the settlers 
who were prepared and had found refuge in an impromptu fortification. The 
attacks killed some settlers and others were taken prisoner, and they caused a 
panic throughout the territory. The crisis ended almost as quickly as it started. 
inkpaduta and his followers fled west, although the americans captured some of 
them. The government repeatedly failed to capture the notorious inkpaduta.67
Many scholars, however, argue that the failure to punish inkpaduta embold-
ened the sioux to resist american colonization, but, as Roy W. Meyer writes, it 
also meant that “hostility towards the indians increased enormously . . . [and] 
the danger of a real uprising was intensified because of a shift in the attitudes of 
both whites and indians.”68 five years later, Minnesota erupted again in sense-
less violence. in august 1862, in the midst of the civil War, four young santee 
murdered five settlers near acton, Minnesota. it was an arbitrary act of violence 
that sparked a larger, more violent clash between the sioux struggling to survive 
on the reservations and settlers who both feared and distrusted them.69
one thing that appears repeatedly in many of the recollections, memoirs, and 
reports published over the years about the conflict was the clearly expressed fear 
among many sioux that the americans held the entire tribe responsible for the 
violent acts committed by four young men—that, once the murders occurred, 
many sioux leaders reluctantly agreed to join the hostiles rather than try to 
prove their innocence. The Minnesota sioux rightfully feared american retri-
bution, and that the american government held all sioux in the state account-
able. it happened before, and many treaties signed between the united states 
and the sioux apparently enshrined the very concept.70 Equally fascinating, of 
course, was that, during the uprising, a large number of sioux defended whites 
against violence, saved their lives, and literally put themselves between white 
men, women, and children and those who wanted to kill them. There were deep 
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divisions among the sioux about this conflict, which the conflict manifested and 
amplified and further fractured the bands.
Roughly two thousand sioux surrendered to the americans, but hundreds of 
others, including little crow, fled to the plains. sibley placed some 400 sioux 
on trial for various crimes, including murder and rape, and the government 
convicted and sentenced to hang 303 of them. The state’s newspapers fueled 
the desire to exterminate or expel all sioux from the state. “The cruelties perpe-
trated by the sioux nation in the last two weeks,” one editor wrote, “demand that 
our government shall treat them for all time as outlaws who have forfeited all 
rights to property and life.”71 of course, the failure to conduct proper investiga-
tions and hold legitimate trials to determine guilt or innocence, followed by the 
merciless decision to executive over three hundred sioux deemed guilty by the 
military tribunal, smacks more of vengeance than justice. President abraham 
lincoln’s intervention saved the lives of most, but the military tribunal still 
bore the mark of retribution and not jurisdictive integrity. in december 1862, 
the Justice Department reversed the tribunal’s conviction and subsequently 
hanged 39 sioux. for the sioux, according to angela cavender Wilson, the 1862 
Minnesota-sioux conflict became “a pivotal point around which many stories 
within the oral tradition are referenced. not just because this was a traumatic 
period in dakota history, but because this is the event which marks the separa-
tion from the homeland.”72
Between 1862 and 1866, the united states engaged in a number of small bat-
tles with the sioux throughout the dakota, Wyoming, nebraska, and Montana 
Territories. The sioux and their allies continued to harass and attack travelers 
along the Bozeman Trail, which led to the Montana goldfields, and kept the 
army on constant alert. in october 1865, the united states signed treaties with 
several different sioux bands at fort sully, including the Miniconjou, lower 
Brulé, Two Kettle, Blackfeet, sans arcs, hunkpapa, yanktonai, upper yanktonai, 
and oglala.73 The treaties demanded an end to the hostilities and reasserted 
the us right to construct roads and defend travelers. in June 1866, col. henry 
carrington met with several sioux leaders at fort laramie to negotiate an end 
to the crisis, but the sioux refused to surrender the Powder River region to 
american forts.
in 1866 the united states built three forts along the trail, ostensibly to pro-
tect travelers from indian depredations. from the american perspective, the 
articles of the 1851 fort laramie Treaty clearly permitted these forts. several 
sioux bands in the Powder River region disagreed. in december 1866, one of 
the notable defeats for the united states occurred when a young lieutenant—
William fetterman—inadvertently led a force of eighty men into a skillfully 
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executed ambush near fort Phil Kearny. The sioux killed fetterman and all his 
men. “We must,” insisted Gen. William Tecumseh sherman, “act with vindictive 
earnestness against the sioux.”74
frustrated by the crisis in the northern plains, the united states, in July 1867, 
created the indian Peace commission, charged by the government to return 
peace and stability to the region. it consisted of civilians and military men. 
The commission traveled west to meet with the sioux to resolve the conflict; 
they did this eleven times. Typically absent from these meetings, however, were 
two of the more influential sioux leaders—Red cloud and sitting Bull—both 
of whom refused to meet with the commissioners. Red cloud made specific 
demands—namely, that the united states completely abandon the three forts 
along the Bozeman Trail and remove all whites from the territory. only then, 
Red cloud made clear, would he meet with the government’s representatives. 
his insistence that the united states abandon the forts strongly echoed simi-
lar demands made by zholaman and Kenesary during the Kazakh rebellions. 
unlike the situation in the Kazakh steppe, however, the united states ultimately 
agreed to abandon the posts.
ultimately, the negotiations resulted in the signing of the 1868 Treaty of 
fort laramie. it conceded significant swaths of territory to the sioux and the 
americans agreed to abandon the forts, but it also acknowledged the Black hills 
were located on sioux land; tragically, the government surrendered land to the 
sioux that was already reserved for the Ponca.75 it was a flawed treaty. if the 
commissioners’ goal was to establish a durable peace with the sioux, this treaty 
failed miserably. although Red cloud never again went to war against the united 
states, the treaty’s provisions were dependent upon the united states fulfill-
ing its obligations explicitly. it did not. That failure, and continued american 
expansion, pushed the united states and the sioux toward another military 
confrontation.
The united states forced many sioux onto the Great sioux Reservation, but 
it quickly became clear that the Sioux interpreted the provisions differently.76 
as a case in point, the sioux established peace with the united states, but that 
had no bearing on their relations with other tribes and the intertribal warfare 
on the northern plains continued much as before.77 Moreover, pioneers, eager 
to take advantage of the homestead act, continued to pour into the dakotas, 
nebraska, and, to a lesser extent, Montana. The perception of conflict between 
pioneers and the sioux kept the american government on edge. having com-
pleted the first transcontinental railway in 1869, a new northern route conceived 
of a different westbound line that cut through northern dakota Territory, which 
required further negotiation with the Sioux to permit its construction. Various 
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sioux bands continued to live by the chase and had occasional skirmishes with 
american soldiers or emigrants, but in 1872–1873, these encounters increased 
significantly. sioux often attacked surveying teams of the northern Pacific 
Railroad—Jay cooke’s Gamble— planned to go from duluth, Minnesota, to 
seattle, Washington.78
of all the conflicts between the united states and the sioux in the nineteenth 
century, none received even close to the same amount of attention from schol-
ars, commentators, or casual observers, as the 1876 conflict. The immediate 
source of the conflict erupted in 1874, after the us government dispatched an 
expedition, led by lt. col. George custer, to investigate rumors of gold in the 
Black hills, although that was not the mission’s explicitly stated purpose. Miners 
and others frequently violated the 1868 fort laramie Treaty and moved into 
the region well before custer’s expedition. The american government made 
half-hearted efforts to remove them, but the expedition itself spent almost two 
months in the Black hills. unable, or unwilling, to control its own citizens, who 
daily violated the treaty’s provisions, the united states reached the conclusion 
that it was necessary to “violate the treaty in order to restore it.”79 By late 1875, 
more than fifteen thousand miners and others had rushed to the Black hills to 
exploit its natural resources.80 in the end, however, a treaty that american offi-
cials pledged would last forever barely lasted six years.
unlike previous conflicts between the american and the sioux, in which fault 
could be attributed to each side, possibly with varying degree of responsibility, 
the Great sioux War of 1876 was initiated by the united states for naked con-
quest and differed not a whit from the British in Africa, the French in Algeria, or 
the Russians in the Kazakh steppe. it was the clearest evidence that the united 
states exercised imperial ambitions that mirrored other nineteenth-century 
powers. as ostler observed, President ulysses s. Grant faced a difficult choice— 
expansion or honor—and in this situation, he “sacrificed the latter.”81 in late 
1875, the american government ordered all Plains’ tribes to return to the reser-
vations. in december of that year, secretary of the interior zachariah chandler 
ordered the sioux to return to the reservations by the end of January 1876 or 
accept the label “hostile.” if they failed to return, the government determined 
to use military force to compel compliance. despite the enormous victory at 
the Battle of the little Bighorn, several sioux and cheyenne bands, through-
out the fall and winter of 1876–1877, migrated toward various reservations to 
surrender. The army kept the pressure on the sioux, and in May 1877, crazy 
horse and his followers surrendered at Red cloud agency. The war ended, as 
Jerome a. Greene noted, with a “whimper.” The united states achieved the spe-
cific goal of forcing the sioux onto selected reservations and abandoning their 
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nomadic, buffalo-hunting economic lifeways and opening territory to pioneer 
settlement.82 The sioux Wars were essentially over. The united states militarily 
and politically subjugated the sioux. internal colonization in both the united 
states and Russia began in earnest.
Throughout the nineteenth century, the sioux and the Kazakhs opposed differ-
ent colonizing agendas and policies, but they exhibited similar martial reactions. 
They each fought against the loss of land and their political sovereignty. in short, 
specific sioux and Kazakh conflicts are not the key to this comparison. They were 
each peculiar to the imperial environment as it existed in the plains and steppe. 
There was little in common between Red cloud’s War in the northern plains 
and Kenesary Kasymov’s Rebellion in the Kazakh steppe that this comparison 
exposes, except that american and Russian expansions triggered the martial reac-
tions with obvious conclusions. Red cloud and Kenesary resisted the expansions. 
The conflicts reveal, however, in both cases that indigenous peoples vigorously 
resisted; but comparing the course of the conflicts does not illuminate as much 
as comparing the reasons behind the conflicts and, more importantly, the con-
sequences. The United States and Russia determined to settle the nomads and 
allot the land, effectively ending, or severely restricting, the sioux and Kazakh 
nomadic existence.
The benefit of this comparison is that examining motivations to resist through 
the comparative prism demonstrates that the united states engaged in an expan-
sionist agenda that differed little from the Russian experience. The conflicts 
produced an overwhelming response and use of force to localized affairs but 
was clearly motivated by a desire to complete the colonization of land arguably 
controlled by a native people. These conflicts were rebellions, and they repre-
sented military resistance by a people whose political sovereignty the colonizers 
already determined lacked national unity or national integrity to treat as equals. 
In that sense, the American expansion west was not a unique colonizing exercise.
The ultimate failure of the martial resistance by the sioux and the Kazakhs to 
prevent american and Russian expansion into the plains and the steppe did not 
mean that all resistance ceased. Resistance took different forms as the sioux and 
the Kazakhs continued to resist cultural and social pressures to change and, to 
the extent possible, maintain their fractured identities into the early twentieth 
century. What is interesting in this difference of chronological resistance is that 
Kazakh opposition to Russian expansion began well before Kazakhs experienced 
intensified Russian settler colonialism, before the massive influx of Russian 
peasants settling on land designated for Kazakh use in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Kazakh hostility seemingly anticipated this settler-colonial 
expansion, but the conflicts were a twofold reaction to cossacks settling along 
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the irtysh line. The Russian prohibition against Kazakhs migrating to pastures 
on the inner side fully exacerbated Kazakh internal political strife, represented 
by abulkhair’s 1732 oath and other Kazakh khans and sultans fighting each other 
for political and economic dominance in the Kazakh steppe. sioux resistance, 
on the other hand, occurred most vigorously after 1851, after treaties signed 
between some sioux bands ceded territory to the united states. it was after 
1851, and clearly after the american civil War (although the 1862 Minnesota 
uprising was a significant exception), that american expansion and colonization 
on the northern plains intensified and sparked much broader, more passionate 
hostility by the sioux. There was internal disagreement among the sioux, as well, 
about how to respond, but it did not result, as it did among the Kazakhs, in an 
internecine conflict.
for comparison, the construction of the ilek line corresponds to the 
Bozeman Trail forts that Red cloud and other sioux opposed so vigorously 
in the 1860s. The physical presence of the Russians in the steppe—and, later, 
the americans in the plains—meant that the visible and tangible reminder 
these forts represented added considerable anxiety and hostility to american 
and Russian colonization. That issue, certainly more than whether or not the 
americans or the Russians recognized a head chief or a khan, fueled the rebel-
lions. sioux and Kazakh economic decline was associated with—and, in part, 
a product of—American and Russian expansion. Consequently, the Sioux and 
the Kazakhs responded with martial force. one difference, of course, was the 
duration of the rebellions against american and Russian colonization; but both 
the united states and Russia determined to crush the military capability of the 
sioux and the Kazakhs and make the northern plains and the Kazakh steppe 
secure for trade and settlement.
The conquest of the Sioux and the Kazakhs was both a military and economic 
process. As the Americans slowly squeezed the Sioux by territorial limitations, 
the sioux also suffered from the loss of the main economic necessity that sus-
tained them in the northern plains: the buffalo. in the Kazakh steppe, severe 
winters and the absence of available pasture also diminished Kazakh eco-
nomic power, and, subsequently, in both cases, the loss of economic autonomy 
resulted in the ability to resist american and Russian expansion. Without the 
buffalo, the sioux needed other sources for food—something the americans 
offered but only on reservations, where the american government assumed it 
was easier to control them. Without pastures, Kazakh livestock suffered, and 
only by agreeing to Russian demands that restricted migration patterns could 
the Kazakhs receive the assistance Russia offered. although confined to dis-
tricts rather than reservations, the Russians believed they could better control 
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the Kazakhs by imposing territorial limitations. in both cases, restricting move-
ment compelled the sioux and the Kazakhs into a dependency on the american 
and Russian governments that completely eroded their political and economic 
independence.
here the comparison shares some similarities with the us-sioux case, but 
there were differences as well. for example, the americans and the Russians 
both stressed the need to identify individuals who could be held accountable, 
and that were possibly already acknowledged by other sioux and Kazakhs as 
chiefs or khans. The problem was that, in principle, these positions in sioux 
and Kazakh society were not specifically hereditary titles but rather based 
on a more culturally ambiguous recognition of the individual’s personal skills, 
courage, wealth, and prestige. This does not mean that hereditary transfers 
of power from father to son did not occur; instead, sioux and Kazakh society 
was fluid enough to allow sioux or Kazakhs to select their leaders based upon 
this other criteria. The title was essentially meaningless without followers, but 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the united states and tsar-
ist Russia acknowledged men designated as chief or khan by the colonizer in 
order to advance expansion. Two such examples were securing little crow’s 
signature on an 1805 treaty and abulkhair’s 1732 oath. Both the united states 
and Russia also employed a couple of common colonizer tactics in the quest to 
expand. They awarded titles, selected leaders, granted benefits, and attempted 
to marginalize chiefs or khans who did not acknowledge the colonizer’s right 
to create what Robert K. Thomas called “cooperative marginal people,” leaders 
elevated by the colonizer in order to subvert recognized indigenous authority 
or leadership.83 according to utley, this practice created a “chaos of authority” 
that plagued american-sioux relations in the second half of the nineteenth 
century.84 “from the outset,” ostler argued, “as the united states tried to 
established control over the Plains sioux, the government’s relationship with 
sioux leaders was structured by a basic contradiction . . . officials were depen-
dent on native leaders, at times going so far as to declare particular leaders 
‘head chief ’ of the sioux nation or one of its subdivisions. on the other hand, 
the government’s goal of assimilation called for the eventual destruction of 
native political organization.”85 in both cases the united states and Russia 
destabilized sioux and Kazakh sociopolitical structures in order to diminish or 
tear down leaders opposed to expansion and colonization. Therefore, american 
and Russian government officials typically perceived internal power struggles 
as evidence of backwardness or traditionalists opposing american or Russian 
civilization; it was evidence of the cultural, social, and political inferiority of 
native structures.
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aleksei i. levshin summarized Russian frustration when he wrote in 1832,
for over 90 years they [the Kazakhs] have been under Russia’s authority, and 
for 90 years the government has tried to establish amongst them some sort 
of order, but only now are we starting to see the beginning of success. The 
reprimands, labor, expenses to establish trading centers, schools and mosques; 
the construction of homes for some sultans to accustom them to a sedentary 
life; the creation of the council of khans, tribal jurisdictions and frontier 
courts, providing salaries for khans and clan officials; supporting the costs of 
the mullahs and secretaries; permitting them to winter beyond the empire’s 
frontier—all has been in vain. These measures have not advanced the Kirgiz-
Kazakhs toward civilization [obrazovanie].86
critics of indian policies echoed this sense of futility in the united states during 
the 1860s and 1870s, at the height of the sioux Wars. The fact that levshin trav-
eled through the Kazakh steppe during the rebellions in the little and Middle 
hordes characterized his sense that only by imposing a firm order, a powerful 
military presence, would the Kazakhs be compelled to behave in a manner that 
advanced Russia’s civilizing mission in asia.
in the united states, similar comments punctuated the concerns of the gov-
ernment, the military, reformers, and observers of american policy. one differ-
ence, however, appeared in an 1867 report submitted to congress that, just as an 
example, identified failures by the us government to fulfill its treaty obligations 
and explained the rebellions. in 1972 William Welsh (of the Board of Missions 
of the Protestant episcopal church) repeated the charge against the govern-
ment.87 certainly, helen hunt Jackson, in her classic monograph, A Century 
of Dishonor, convicted the united states for its failures, which sparked a new 
round of reform efforts.88 in each case—and there are numerous other examples 
that can be cited—americans were far more willing to criticize us government 
policies for the rebellions than Russian observers experiencing similar difficul-
ties in the Kazakh steppe. in a sense, Jackson and Welsh almost proclaimed that 
the sioux were justified (there are just as many observers unwilling to agree 
with those interpretations), something Russians were unable to concede until 
the 1890s, when the evidence of impoverishment and utter economic disloca-
tion among the Kazakhs was readily apparent. only then did some—a small 
minority to be sure—Russians demand reforms.
What this also suggests is that americans and Russians typically blurred and 
linked perceptions and policies during the military conquest of the Sioux and the 
Kazakhs. american and Russian perceptions also linked the sioux and Kazakhs 
to a general imperial expansion—particularly, negative attitudes about sioux 
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and Kazakh society, culture, and behavior. Perceptions, positive and negative, 
based typically on clichés, stereotypes, and misunderstanding sioux and Kazakh 
sociopolitical and economic structures, animated policies that the americans 
and Russians designed to deal with these powerful, seminomadic peoples. it is 
to perceptions of the sioux and the Kazakhs that this work will now turn.
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The progression of american and Russian expansion across the continents was 
conquest based on military might and populations willing to migrate, endure 
harsh terrains and climates, and settle on the land. The american growth across 
the plains and the continent did not precisely parallel the Russian advance east-
ward into the Kazakh steppe and siberia, but there were comparable percep-
tions and attitudes expressed about the land and people being colonized to jus-
tify internal colonization. americans and Russians shared with their european 
contemporaries the same philosophies, science, ethnologies, and agrarian moti-
vations prevalent in the nineteenth-century imperial vision. These mutually 
held beliefs shaped the relationships and policies between the colonial frontier 
and the metropole, between the central government and local administrations, 
and between colonizer and colonized.
The american and Russian perceptions and attitudes were not, however, 
mirror images of each other, but americans and Russians nonetheless held 
firmly entrenched perceptions and attitudes about the sioux and Kazakhs. 
Backwardness and barbarism were like conjoined siblings in the minds of 
americans and Russians, whose civilizing missions could elevate the sioux and 
Kazakhs sufficiently from their backwardness and barbarism to prevent the seem-
ingly inevitable extinction. When analogized against competing perceptions, atti-
tudes, typologies, and images—particularly american and Russian exceptional-
ism—the result was denigration and dislocation of the sioux and Kazakhs.
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internal colonization operated under amalgamated typologies and imagol-
ogy in the depiction of other peoples, as well as one’s own, which fused with 
american and Russian nationalisms in the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
according to Margaret ziolkowski, typologies and imagology was “not transpar-
ent but a conventionalized process” that placed value on social constructions 
and identities.1 Typology and imagery presented portraits of sioux and Kazakhs 
that did not “simply reflect stereotypes—it reinforces or even helps to engender 
them.”2 contrasted against concepts of “american” and “Russian,” these typolo-
gies and imageries reinforced imperial expansion that resulted in the process of 
internal colonization.
in order to understand this process, it is important to note that the military 
conquest and subsequent internal colonization of the Sioux and the Kazakhs did 
not happen in a political, economic, or social vacuum. The united states and 
Russia eagerly consumed the land and adopted and implemented strategies to 
assimilate the people but failed consistently to achieve the objective using the 
policies and programs designed with that purpose in mind. in this regard, the 
two processes differed considerably despite sharing similar objectives. in the 
end, however, the consequences for the Sioux and the Kazakhs were compa-
rable. americanization or Russification, two policies designed to assimilate the 
sioux and the Kazakhs, also intentionally destroyed or severely undermined the 
social bonds that seemed to americans and Russians as the reason for sioux and 
Kazakh backwardness and barbarism.
Therefore, while the process is manifest, that alone does not explain the con-
sequences for the Sioux or the Kazakhs, nor does it necessarily illuminate the 
perceptions and attitudes voiced by americans and Russians about expansion, 
conquest, and internal colonization. It was clear that the seemingly empty spaces 
of the plains and the steppe attracted pioneers and peasants to that presumably 
free land, which pushed the united states and tsarist Russia to expend consid-
erable resources and effort to conquer and colonize the regions claimed by the 
sioux and the Kazakhs. This chapter examines the american and Russian typolo-
gies and imageries of the land and people used to justify and eventually imple-
ment expansion and internal colonization.
aMeRican veRsus Russian eXcePTionalisM
Throughout the nineteenth century, americans and Russians created exception-
alist narratives to justify expansion and conquest and to explain the accompa-
nying cultural, social, political, and economic rejuvenation. The united states 
and Russia both desired to distinguish themselves from european traditions, 
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empires, societies, and cultures. in the american case, the goal was to illustrate 
that the united states differed from europe; but the Russians desired to dem-
onstrate their similarities. The american narrative, according to Barbara Bush, 
imagined “an exceptional republic [destined] to spread the superior american 
way of life, rooted in democratic republicanism and Protestant religious values.”3 
Thomas Jefferson explained in an 1809 letter to James Madison that “we should 
have such an empire for liberty as she has never surveyed since the creation: & 
i am persuaded no constitution was ever before so well calculated as ours for 
extensive empire & self government.”4 it was as optimistic an expression as one 
could possibly imagine that prophesied an american expansion across the conti-
nent. historian Walter nugent summarized american ideologically constructed 
exceptionalism that exuded “progress, national glory, and successful steward-
ship all rolled into one. White americans were certain that they had the right 
and duty to take land because they would make it more productive than native 
peoples, or spaniards, or Mexicans, had done.”5
american exceptionalism situated american expansion as something differ-
ent from the old european imperialism and colonialism; it was a break with old 
european social and political edifices. The american vision for the future was 
optimistic and enlightened; it had a destiny. it was none other than alexis de 
Tocqueville, in his classic Democracy in America, who envisioned a destiny for 
the united states that paralleled the destiny of the Russian empire—only the 
obstacles and consequences seemed to differ. He explained that the “American 
struggles against the obstacles that nature opposes to him, the adversaries of 
the Russian are men. . . . The conquests of the American are therefore gained by 
the plowshare; those of the Russian by the sword.”6 Much as the expansion west 
rejuvenated and invigorated american ideals, Russia’s expansion east resurrected 
Russia and moved it beyond the self-loathing sometimes evident in literature.
Russian writer Peter chaadaev lamented, “from the outset of our existence as 
a society, we have produced nothing for the common benefit of all mankind; not 
one useful thought has sprung from the arid soil of our fatherland; not one great 
truth has emerged from our midst; we have not taken the trouble to invent any-
thing ourselves and, of the invention of others, we have borrowed only empty con-
ceits and useless luxuries.”7 Most Russian intellectuals and government officials 
did not share chaadaev’s views.8 according to historian andrzej Walicki, chaadaev 
believed Russia was “forgotten by Providence, a country without past and without 
future . . . isolated from mankind and playing no part in universal history.”9
foreign observers also wondered about the civilizing benefits of Russia’s 
expansion, as charles Rudy suggested, “the rising sun of progress” casting “its 
golden beams over the regions of the east. are these to be intercepted by the 
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clouds which envelop the Russian empire?”10 Russia’s burden, however, was 
the deleterious stereotypes that one unyielding but prominent critic of Russian 
imperialism in asia—George curzon, an ardent Russophobe—voiced in 
expressive but rather misanthropic imagery. he claimed that Russia’s expansion 
into central Asia was a “conquest of Orientals by Orientals, of cognate charac-
ter by cognate character.”11 it was not, curzon asserted, european civilization 
that “marched forth to vanquish barbarian Asia. This is no nineteenth-century 
crusade of manners or morals; but upon its former footsteps to reclaim its own 
kith and kin.”12 nonetheless, Walicki rightly noted that Russian backwardness—
and to some extent, its exceptionalism—radiated a “peculiar advantage.” Russia 
“could learn from the experience and use the achievements of europe, that the 
intellectual and cultural impact of the West served as a powerful catalyst in the 
emergence and development of Russian social thought.”13 The diverse intellec-
tual currents in Russia likewise juxtaposed Russia with the united states, often 
relying on de Tocqueville’s descriptions.14
in 1837 Russian historian, journalist, and slavophile Mikhail Pogodin cri-
tiqued the United States as a country that “cares solely for profit; to be sure she 
has grown rich, but she will hardly ever bring forth anything great of national, 
let alone universal significance.”15 according to historian abbott Gleason, many 
Russian intellectuals believed that the Russian empire and the Russian peo-
ple represented a “healthy collectivism” and a “peasant socialist utopia” that 
compared favorably to an america “fated to embody extreme individualism.”16 
slavophile thought was, Walicki argued, rooted in a “retrospective utopia, a 
yearning for a lost harmony, a Russian variant of conservative romanticism, 
setting itself in opposition to the institutions and values of modern, capitalist 
civilization.”17 american and Russian intellectuals and political leaders tended to 
imagine their empires rooted in the agrarian ideal, although it differed somewhat.
americans sought to distinguish their social and political institutions from 
Europe, which de Tocqueville highlighted. Those institutional differences 
became the basis of american exceptionalism, which intensified the contrast 
between whites and indians (as well as blacks, Mexicans, and other minorities) 
in the american milieu. Russia shouldered a different, but very onerous, excep-
tionalism. Russian autocracy, serfdom, and economic backwardness persisted 
in the minds of most europeans and many Russian intellectuals and statesmen. 
europeans often used orientalist rhetoric to characterize Russian social and 
political institutions, as curzon did in his polemic against Russian imperialism 
in central asia.
These images of Russia as being equally backward and little more than tal-
ented imitators of europe permeated Russian exceptionalist typologies. in 
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this convoluted calculus, Russians were little more than oriental orientalizers. 
Russian novelist feodor dostoevsky, for example, echoed the thinking of many 
Russian intellectuals who enthusiastically supported Russia’s expansion into the 
Kazakh steppe and central asia. he wrote, in “europe we were hangers-on and 
slaves, while in asia we shall be the masters. in europe we were Tatars, while 
in asia we are the europeans. our mission, our civilizing mission in asia will 
encourage our spirit . . . a new Russia will be created that will restore and resur-
rect the old one in time and will clearly show her the path to follow.”18 Russia’s 
nineteenth-century imperial expansion into central asia and the far east rep-
resented Russia’s future; it made Russia equal to its European neighbors, who, 
more often than not, praised Russian mimicry rather than Russian innovation. 
Russia’s autocratic, subservient past and seemingly unlimited present and future 
firmly grounded its exceptionalism; however, for many, Russian exceptionalism, 
its contributions to mankind, directly correlated to its eastward expansion.
Thus, american expansion and the pioneer exemplified the new empire of 
liberty and the rugged individualist, unshackled by the european cultural and 
social limitations. an 1871 Handbook for Immigrants to the United States, pro-
duced by the american social science association, explained, “The american is 
born free, he lives free, and he dies free. his government regards him not as a 
subject, but as a citizen. His laws treat him as equal with everybody about him . . . 
The whole spirit of this society is in favor of personal independence.”19 for many 
Russian intellectuals, unquestionably for Russian Slavophiles, the Russian peas-
ant symbolized and embodied the communal rebirth of the Russian empire 
and the Russian nation that european influences unnecessarily corrupted. 
historian hans Kohn, an astute student of Russian history, explained Russia’s 
exceptionalism: “out of the very consciousness of her backwardness and lack 
of liberty grew extravagant dreams of Russia as the founder of a new civiliza-
tion, as the bearer of universal salvation.”20 As part of the rhetorical conquest of 
the sioux and the Kazakhs, americans, Russians, and foreign observers evoked 
ancient images—what later scholars defined as orientalism—to justify expan-
sion and to characterize the obligation of civilization and progress on ostensibly 
backward and barbarian peoples.
coMPaRaTive oRienTalisTs
Typologies and imagery were essential elements in american and Russia excep-
tionalist concepts and vital to the perceptions and attitudes that influenced 
policies. edward W. said’s influential study, Orientalism, defined the term in 
its most negative connotations—exploitative, dominating, and expropriating—a 
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european invention to describe the exotic, the unusual, the romanticized but 
not realistic east.21 The american West, and the indigenous people who lived 
there, provided a comparable opportunity for americans to exoticize the region 
and the people. Writers expropriated orientalist rhetoric to explain the geogra-
phy and the people living beyond the frontier of civilization in terms that read-
ers would associate with difference—not one of us, but something old, exciting, 
perhaps even dangerous, but also weak and slowly dying. Richard francaviglia, 
however, defined it in the american context as “a mind-set that readily imag-
ines or perceives an east when it encounters non-eastern peoples and places.”22 
according to francaviglia, the orient fascinated americans, which created an 
exotic region and peoples to colonize; the americans exoticizing the “american 
landscape worked hand in hand with the orientalization of people in frontier 
america.”23 in 1858 William Pidgeon observed, “Traits of ancient nations in the 
old World are everywhere seen in the fragments of dilapidated cities, pyramids 
of stone, and walls of immense length; but here, in north america, is found 
the wreck of empires . . . older than the beginning of the pyramids, and whose 
history may only be read in the imperishable relics of tumuli, and such great 
records.”24 The orient these writers described, or the images conveyed, was 
decadent and backward. although the orient once had a glorious past, its pres-
ent and future was rapidly and indisputably vanishing when confronted with 
modern civilization.
The travelogues, memoirs, histories, literature, and even official reports used 
terms, languages, and expressions that a reader readily recognized and that 
needed no explanation. in the 1894 book Slav and Moslem, Jane Milliken napier 
Brodhead descriptively wrote, “the steppes of asia, for so many centuries the 
scenes of permanent rapine and pillage, have been made safe highways by these 
noble [Russian] pioneers.”25 The steppe and its nomads axiomatically meant 
“rapine and pillage.” The words savage or barbarian evoked specific images of 
the people encountered; lengthy definitions were unnecessary. as Robert f. 
Berkhofer Jr. noted in the american case, “commentators linked indians with 
most of the cultures known previously to Westerners from Old World antiquity: 
to ancient Greeks, scythians, Tartars, spaniards, hebrews,” but Russians under-
stood these concepts as well.26 in medieval europe, the term barbarian meant 
“Tartar.”27 americans embraced the belief that civilization and agriculture 
were synonymous. The antonym was barbarism, and americans, Russians, and 
europeans readily depicted nomadic peoples to be barbarians and uncivilized. 
Thus, in the nineteenth century, americans expropriated some of these ideas 
and references to describe the american West. “The analogues,” to reference 
Plains tribes such as the sioux, according to henry nash smith, that appeared 
ThRouGh The colonial looKinG-Gl ass 145
most often were “the Bedouins of the arabian desert [and] the Tartars of the 
asiatic steppes.”28
american readers clearly understood indians as comparable, and writers 
framed their analysis, observations, and depictions in expropriated orientalist 
images. for example, one description of a possible attack on a wagon train 
by indians evoked central asian imagery without ever mentioning the tribe: 
“nothing could be more interesting, than to witness this little caravan surrounded 
by hordes of the ruthless red Tartars of the desert, brandishing their lances 
on horseback, and scenting the plunder with panther keenness of instinct.”29 
The author even noted that the scene described served to “remind the classical 
reader of the deportment of the ten thousand amidst the strange and innumer-
able hordes of barbarians, through which, partly by battle, and partly by policy, 
they made their way.”30 every reader understood the context and image: old 
World antiquities applied to the American environment. For what other reason 
would an author refer to “red Tartars”? it was literary typology; america had red 
Tartars, but so did Russia.
Russians often referred to all Muslims as Tatars—particularly in siberia 
and the Kazakh steppe—failing to distinguish specifically between Tatars 
and Kazakhs or Tatars and Bashkirs. Russian writers often used terms that a 
Russian reader interpreted differently although in context might make sense to 
an american or european. Kochevnik (nomad) needed no explanation in the 
Russian milieu, nor did musulman (Muslim), and, therefore, Russian writers 
rarely used terms such as savages or barbarians to describe the Kazakhs but 
instead relied on words that inferred the inferior character of the non-Russian 
population. The most authoritative four-volume Russian dictionary of the 
period defined Tatar to mean “dishonest, cunning, sly, and crude.”31 There was 
no need to translate Tatar—americans understood it as well, and many used the 
term to define indians, including the sioux. Russians easily embraced the term 
as well. Kazakh and Tatar languages were part of the large Turkic language fam-
ily; Kazakhs and Tatars were both Muslims, but Kazakhs were not members of 
the Tatar nation. in the united states, similar etymological transfers occurred; 
a sioux was an indian, a savage was a nomad, but not all indians were sioux, 
nomads, or even savage. in the american lexicon, nineteenth-century american 
colonizers and pioneers simply carried the typologies and imageries westward 
to graft these orientalist concepts onto indigenous peoples. if indians were red 
Tartars, so too was an indian sly, savage, crude, and so on; a sioux shared those 
characteristics and was a nomad.
americans, however, had a term to describe indians that did not penetrate 
Russian thinking about the Kazakhs. americans had, or so they believed, their 
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own uncivilized barbarians to observe; and by the mid-eighteenth into the nine-
teenth century, interest in the “noble savage” of the american West replaced 
fascination with barbarians in asia or africa.32 according to Roy harvey Pearce, 
americans embraced the image of the indian as noble savage, a supposed oppo-
sition to civilization, in order to justify expansion, colonization, extinction, and 
assimilation.33
The Russians never considered Kazakhs to be noble savages.34 in america 
the noble savage was dying; in Russia the noble east was already dead—its his-
tory lost and replaced by nomads who had no future because they had no past. 
nomads existed within the landscape, but they did not remake it. nomads were 
a part of the natural world; they were not able to influence it but merely react 
to its whims. nomads could follow a trail; they could not make a road. nomads 
left no discernible impression on the world they occupied. a nomad never built 
a library because he had no need for a book. observers defined nomads by what 
they were not, not for what they were. for the Russian poet alexander Pushkin, 
as with many of his contemporaries, peoples of the east had no sense of history, 
which he regarded as necessary for a civilized people. he wrote that a “respect 
for the past is a characteristic that distinguishes the educated person from the 
savage; nomadic tribes have neither a history nor a nobility.”35 Thus, using lan-
guage that evoked images of a distant place or a distant past also meant that 
the people encountered—sioux or Kazakh—represented a “natural history, not 
quite human history. Indians became, in the eyes of Euro-Americans, a people 
with a past, but without a history.”36 nomads, such as the sioux and the Kazakhs, 
were part of the landscape; and when americans or Russians entered the plains 
or the Kazakh steppe, they perceived “places empty of history, and gave them a 
beginning and thus meaning.”37
The noble savage was living history but also primitive and often a disappoint-
ment to americans hoping to catch a glimpse of a member of a dying breed 
of man. sarah Raymond herndon, describing her encounter with some sioux, 
noted that they “were the most wretched-looking human creatures i ever saw, 
nothing majestic, dignified, or noble-looking . . . i fail as yet to recognize ‘The 
noble red man.’ They are anything else than dignified; they seem lazy, dirty, 
obnoxious-looking creatures.”38 it should be noted, however, that by the time 
herndon encountered her “creatures,” the concept of the noble savage was 
withering away and being replaced by thoughts that the sioux, as nomads, were 
prisoners of their primitive society and environment.
in the course of the nineteenth century, americans and Russians focused 
on so-called scientific discoveries to explain the backwardness of the sioux and 
the Kazakhs, who became objects for study. americans and Russians embraced 
ThRouGh The colonial looKinG-Gl ass 147
science to justify expansion and colonization as well as to provide seemingly 
empirical evidence to characterize whole societies as barbaric, backward, unciv-
ilized, ignorant, superstitious, warlike, and untamable. Berkhofer noted that the 
“effect of physical environment as an explanation of human social and cultural 
diversity goes back at least to the ancient Greeks, but as a way of analyzing the 
place of the american indians among the races of man it was particularly char-
acteristic of enlightenment thought. an environmental explanation of indian 
life originated in europe, but this approach particularly appealed to thinkers in 
the newly founded united states.”39 as sherry l. smith asked, “Was savagery an 
inherited state, or did physical environment explain it?”40 a nineteenth-century 
traveler to the Kazakh steppe, ellsworth huntington, raised a similar notion of 
the “primitive” Kazakhs. he wrote that the “Kirghiz [Kazakhs] are so primitive, 
their manner of life is so simple and so closely bound up with their physical sur-
roundings, and they are so little influenced by outside forces, that they furnish 
an unusually good example for the study of the influence of environment on 
human life.”41 huntington also subjectively asserted, “everywhere the Kirghiz 
are lazy, according to occidental standards.”42
The disappointment expressed by herndon and the curiosity conveyed by 
Huntington reflect two essential perceptions—and one unquestioned assump-
tion—that seemingly merged during the expansion into the plains and steppe: 
perceptions and attitudes proliferated about the land and people and their 
relationship to one another. The land was rich, open, untamed, undeveloped, 
unsettled, and unquestionably an integral part of the expanding state. The peo-
ple were wild, warlike, in the way, and unquestionably compelled to assimilate 
or suffer extinction. The land and people both were dangerous, unconquered, 
untamed, and living in a world outside american and Russian state structures. 
These perceptions often melded into common attitudes, typologies, stereotypes, 
and clichés to explain the environment and its inhabitants; they shared similar 
socio-environmental explanations to describe the failure of the indigenous pop-
ulations to exploit the land or socially evolve above their barbarism. americans 
and Russians assumed that the sioux and the Kazakhs must assimilate—to which 
americans, more than Russians, also accepted the probability of extinction.
Thus, the idea of the noble savage was an exaggerated exoticism that dimin-
ished by the time the United States determined to conquer the Sioux, but 
americans measured themselves by the images and typologies they constructed 
and encountered. Russians continually used europe—its culture, its own civi-
lizing progress—to evaluate their societal growth; it was also a useful barom-
eter easily measured against the peoples of the steppe. The united states and 
Russia juxtaposed their own societies against the exotic other, the axiomatic 
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backwardness of those peoples colonized; americans and Russians both exhib-
ited their own different brand of orientalism.
oRienTalisM in The aMeRican WesT 
and The Russian easT
Writers and travelers in the united states or Russia provide some of the richest 
descriptive orientalist accounts that reflected not only their own perceptions 
and attitudes; travelogues conveyed to the reader those essential elements of the 
people or the environment they encountered in a language and utilitarian man-
ner that reinforced attitudes and perceptions about the other. it is also a form of 
orientalism that is not often attendant with american expansion and coloniza-
tion but is typically associated with British, french, and Russian imperialism in 
south asia, the near east, north africa, and central asia. it was not always an 
overtly conveyed juxtaposition but was often surreptitiously concealed within 
the narrative.
american and Russian perceptions, attitudes, typologies, and imageries were 
not nineteenth-century fabrications but manufactured over two or three centu-
ries of expansion and reinforced during the nineteenth-century era of conquest. 
Equally important, Americans and Russians had perceptions of themselves as 
superior, civilized, and christian that easily juxtaposed against the people they 
encountered during expansion, conquest, and colonization. The Americans 
knew indians—or at least thought they did—dealt with them, fought against 
and with them, and perceived them, ultimately, as obstacles to expansion. Just 
as the wilderness needed to be conquered and tamed, it was understood that so 
too the people should be governed and disciplined. When americans encoun-
tered the sioux, they already possessed, in their minds, indisputable facts about 
their indianness that made the sioux obstacles to american expansion. in the 
world that americans created during westward expansion, the sioux were war-
like and uncivilized. it was almost axiomatic—supported by new science and 
reinforced by seemingly weekly reports of attacks and depredations despite evi-
dence of intelligent, articulate, educated sioux who shared and exhibited all the 
characteristics of americanness that americans wanted, such as faith, frugality, 
and labor.
similarly, when Russians encountered the Kazakhs, they possessed attitudes 
already shaped by a discourse that evolved over centuries, reinforced during 
the nineteenth century by scholars and government officials, and not quickly 
abandoned by a newly formed respect or disgust for these incorrigible Turkic 
nomads. in the nineteenth century, the Russian perspective evolved through 
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an emerging sense of greatness and empire, christian civilization, and both 
americans and Russians regarded nomadic peoples as obstacles to expansion, 
empire, and civilization. But Russians also equated the Kazakhs with a horrific 
past—the Mongol yoke—a memory not easily erased during expansion. it was, 
instead, partial justification for further expansion, which was always about land 
and people. as both empires expanded their frontiers, they incorporated new 
territories and new populations. The land, whether the american West or the 
Russian east, was fresh; untilled; and a vast, open space just waiting for the right 
people to exploit its bounty. Many americans and Russians believed fervently 
that they were the people chosen to civilize and tame the untapped riches long 
neglected by the indigenous peoples. in a sense, the sioux and Kazakhs saw the 
land as it was; americans and Russians saw the land for what they wanted it to be.
Pl ains veRsus sTePPe
The american Great Plains for decades persisted in the public consciousness as 
the “great american desert,” comparable to the “sandy wastes of the deserts or 
steppes of siberia rather than to the dead sands of africa.”43 zebulon Pike, one 
of the first americans to cross it, described it as a desert that might “become 
as celebrated as the african deserts,” although he also believed it could support 
pastoral livestock rather than intensive agriculture.44 sir arthur conan doyle 
described the plains as preserving “the common characteristics of barrenness, 
inhospitality, and misery. There are no inhabitants of this land of despair.”45 it 
was a region that “for many a long year served as a barrier against the advance 
of civilization.”46
Russians had no illusions about the steppe; it was arid, dangerous, and absent 
all signs of civilization. But while it might not possess anything of great value, 
the steppe was the path to asia’s riches. in the united states, the plains were not 
always the destination; the plains gave access to the West’s riches (california’s 
or Montana’s gold). in both cases, the plains and the steppe opened the doors 
to something better, richer, and settled after americans and Russians charged 
through to the other side. of course, accounts of a journey across the barren 
Kazakh steppe mirrored similar fears and dangers expressed by american travel-
ers across the barren plains. one seemingly fatigued writer revealed, “fourteen 
weary days were occupied in crossing the steppe; the marches were long, depend-
ing on uncertain supplies of grass and water, which sometimes wholly failed them; 
food for man and beast had to be carried with the party, for not a trace of human 
habitation is to be met with in these inhospitable wilds.”47 and so, the weary trav-
eler notes the “[a]rid uniformity and silence characterize the steppe. Throughout 
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its entire extent of four hundred and thirty-four miles, one discovers trees in 
two places only; moreover, everywhere only small prickly shrubs sprouting three 
feet in height, and but sparingly distributed, so that the eye of an european is 
unable to support the monotony of this horrible desert.”48 British traveler fred 
Burnaby described his venture into the steppe as a place that “underwent an 
entire change. We had left all traces of civilization behind us, and were regularly 
upon the steppes”49 The american Great Plains could be likened to “the dead 
level extending on either side the father of Waters . . . like an ocean petrified in 
the midst of a great storm . . . where, if ever, broken surface and pines, sparse and 
stunted, bring relief to the eye.”50
Many travelers compared the plains and steppe to the ocean: “a vast unbroken 
plain, like that in which we now travelled for nearly one hundred and fifty miles, 
is little less tiresome to the eye, and fatiguing to the spirit, than the dreary soli-
tude of the ocean.”51 for many observers, the rolling, treeless, and stunted hills 
prompted the ocean images, with those unending gentle waves. Perhaps it was 
the horizon, so distant yet always seemingly within reach; mountains with trees 
become a new but formidable shoreline to attain. Quoting geographer alexander 
von humboldt, another writer notes that the plains and the steppe resemble “the 
ocean, the steppe fills the mind with the feeling of infinity; and thought, escaping 
from the visible impressions of space, rises to contemplations of a higher order.”52 
a British journalist offered this description of the american plains and prairies: 
“walk out to the east till all sight and sound of the little village is lost in the dis-
tance, and then look round you. There is a huge, undulating ocean of long, rich 
grass and flowers . . . not a shrub or bush to break the dead level of the distant 
horizon—nothing to vary the wide-spread sea of verdure.”53 father Pierre de 
smet described his journey across the plains as “a troubled sea that had suddenly 
calmed. day after day the scene is unchanged. like waves, hills succeed valleys 
interminably . . . in summer it is an ocean of verdure strewn with flowers.”54
The ocean metaphor was ubiquitous: “that terrestrial ocean well styled ‘The 
Great Plains’ ” where one sees “that wonderful platitude of the continent . . . as 
far as the eye can reach—not a house, not a tree, not shrub, except the dwarf 
sage-brush! it is one rolling sea of light green, often settling into a level as 
smooth as holland.”55 emigrants and traders departed independence, Missouri, 
to “embark upon the great prairie ocean” along the oregon Trail,56 where they 
encountered “scenery, though tame, [that] is graceful and pleasing. here are 
level plains, too wide for the eye to measure; green undulations, like motionless 
swells of the ocean.”57 Railroads across the plains and, much later, the steppes 
and siberia, became “those palace ships that navigate the great ocean of the 
plains, ay, and run the breakers of the mighty mountains, dashing through 
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canons and over devious passes.”58 on the steppe, “not a tree nor a shrub is 
to be seen on which the wearied eye can rest. The whole steppe may be com-
pared to the boundless ocean when its wide-spreading waves have become all 
at once motionless.”59 sunsets conjured stirring and romantic visions on the 
plains, where “out at sea in this green, waveless ocean, the sun goes down upon 
us. seldom has such a setting been seen.”60 similarly, on the Kazakh steppe, 
charles Rudy observed that its “uninterrupted expanse . . . lends an almost 
inconceivable splendor to the reddened sky, and the sands, rendered blood-red 
by the sinking orb, are reflected upon the overhanging sky in innumerable and 
ever-changing forms.”61
Trees, mountains, trails, and even a solitary cabin or hut morphed into majestic 
symbols of civilization; the plains and steppe remained barren and strangely wild, 
backward, and uncivilized. as historian Katya hokanson explained, “the flatness 
of the [plains and steppe] indicated a lack of cultural and historical highs and 
lows—names and places that should have left their mark on history but instead 
remained uninscribed by culture.”62 a Russian traveler, Baron von Meyendorf, 
wrote after crossing the steppe, “i can scarcely give the reader an idea of the 
joy which i experienced when i found myself once more in a wood; the roaring 
of the wind through the branches, the quivering of the leaves of the trees, the 
greenness of the landscape, all this seemed to me as something entirely new, 
recalled to me the memories of my father-land, and raised in me the most plea-
surable sensations. amongst the deserts and with the nomads one first learns 
to appreciate the good fortune of being a european.”63 americans had similar 
thoughts, rediscovering civilization at some point along the overland trails head-
ing west, and writers often used analogies and similarities between the plains 
and the steppe that appeared frequently in scientific and popular literature. 
Many writers described the plains or steppe by referring to the other, tapping 
into preconceived images. one such author described the plains as “solitary as 
the steppes of siberia, crossed only by roaming herds of buffaloes or by indian 
warriors on their wild horses, darting swiftly as the wind, and occasionally by the 
train of the immigrant moving slowly along and disappearing on the horizon like 
the caravan on the desert.”64 Referencing siberia immediately conjured images 
of distant, remote, desolate, and uninhabited regions of Russia, with its long “ara-
ble plains [that] are comparable to our prairies and argentina’s pampas.”65
american John W. Bookwalter employed a different tactic to describe his jour-
ney through the grassland regions of Russian siberia into the Kazakh steppe. 
he described images that he knew his readers would easily understand: to 
“all americans who have traveled to the Rocky Mountains through the states 
of illinois, Minnesota, iowa, Kansas, and nebraska, the country i have come 
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through is easy to describe. To simply say it is exactly like it would constitute a 
more or less perfect description. indeed, i have never seen any two things more 
absolutely similar than are the prairie and plains regions of our country and 
that vast region lying in southeast Russia.”66 it was easy for most americans to 
perceive the region he visited by sketching the analogous impression of a com-
parable climate and topography. americans had a fixed perception of the plains 
that Bookwalter exploited in his description of the steppe; he relied on canoni-
cal typologies to conjure specific images. But Bookwalter was also a tourist; his 
eyes focused on descriptive features of the land and its inhabitants. he was not 
there to study, merely to describe what he experienced.
frederick von hellwald, who echoed Meyendorf ’s appreciation of trees after 
weeks on the steppe, argued that “steppes and mountain tracts here also form 
that fundamental contrast which pervades all conditions of nature and civili-
zation. The lofty mountains with their plenteous supply of water tend to pro-
duce food, to impart animation, and advance civilization; whereas the low level 
steppe causes everything to waste away and become depressed, and thus acts 
as a hindrance to civilization.”67 hugo stumm traveled throughout the steppe 
and claimed that west of the urals was Russian civilization, but east was “inter-
minable plains and steppes . . . and, like the nomad Kirghiz-Kaissaks by which 
they are inhabited, giving a picture of thorough asiatic wildness and absence 
of civilization.”68 nature was, as Mark cocker noted, “fruitful but she was also 
wild and threatening, which carried profoundly negative implications for those 
humans who lived closest to her.”69
american, Russian, and foreign travelers depicted the sioux and the Kazakhs, 
living closest to the wild plains and steppe, as representatives of ancient man-
kind, observed for what they might explain about mankind’s social and cultural 
evolution. The americans and the Russians eagerly dispatched scientific expe-
ditions to study the land and the people. in a sense, the conclusions and inter-
pretations merged into one: the barren land created barren peoples—peoples 
who lacked civilization, modernity, and culture. not all imagery was negative, 
however. The plains and the steppe appeared, occasionally, to be a garden, a new 
eden, beautiful and welcoming but desperately in need of enterprising pioneers 
and peasants willing to tame and exploit its bountiful possibilities. That control 
and exploitation of the land meant taking it from those who stood in the way 
or neglected nature’s gifts.70 The sioux and Kazakhs occupied land they failed 
to exploit; the sentiment was so eloquently expressed by John Quincy Adams in 
1802 when he asked, “shall the liberal bounties of Providence to the race of man 
be monopolized by one of ten thousand for whom they were created? shall the 
exuberant bosom of the common mother, amply adequate to the nourishment 
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of millions, be claimed exclusively by a few hundreds of her offspring?”71 similar 
views appeared countless times in the press, historical works, fiction, and scien-
tific or other published sources.72
foreign travelers to the steppe, however, generally used language and expres-
sions to describe the Kazakhs that illustrated the literal comparison their readers 
easily recognized and understood. for example, John foster fraser visited an aul 
and described the Kazahks as the “Red indians of the West siberian steppes.”73 
He noted that the Russians “have conquered them, and pushed them upon the 
least fertile tracts of land to make room for immigrants. The race is decreasing 
in number, and will one of these days disappear from the face of the earth alto-
gether.”74 he observed parallels between the fate of Kazakh and sioux popula-
tions in the united states. according to fraser, Kazakhs “lost their heritage and 
are soon to be extinct. The touch of civilization means death to them.”75
The idea of extinction was axiomatic to describe the fate of indians in the 
united states; when confronted with the sioux, americans were prepared to 
accept the same fate for them as they acknowledged it for all colonized, uncivi-
lized peoples. according to Pearce, americans were also of “two minds about the 
indian whom they were destroying. They pitied his state but saw it as inevitable; 
they hoped to bring him to civilization but saw that civilization would kill him.”76 
for fraser and others, echoing adams, the Kazakhs must civilize or die in order 
for Russia to exploit “land capable of immense agricultural possibilities, great 
stretches of prairie waiting for the plough . . . i saw a country that reminded me 
from the first day to the last . . . of the best parts of western america.”77
Blinded By science and The idea of PRoGRess
in the nineteenth century, educated americans and Russians embraced the 
idea that society progressed through clearly delineated phases, and widely read 
enlightenment philosophies reinforced those beliefs. art, science, and technol-
ogy progressed society toward civilization, and progress involved all facets of 
the human condition. eventually, science seemingly proved the idea of prog-
ress, evident in the rapid technological and social advances made throughout 
the nineteenth century. in his work History of the Idea of Progress, historian 
Robert a. nisbet noted, “faith in arts and sciences” was “still further intoxicated 
by confidence in progress as a universal law in mankind’s history.”78 nineteenth-
century americans enthusiastically embraced progress, whereas many Russians, 
according to historian sidney B. fay, were more skeptical.79 nonetheless, many 
revered science and embraced the notion that man could understand the natu-
ral world, control it, and bend it to humanity’s will.
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educated americans and Russians believed that the natural world served 
humanity’s progress. Those closer to an untamed, natural world—the nomads—
either progressed or succumbed to extinction. By the early nineteenth century, 
lord Kames’s theoretical four distinct stages of human development were widely 
influential in both the united states and Russia. The four stages—hunter-gather, 
herder, farmer, marketer—echoed strongly in the emerging fields of history, phi-
losophy, anthropology, and sociology. american and Russian literary and social 
Romanticism reflected these concepts in art and literature. Kames claimed, 
“there is great uniformity in the gradual progress of men from the savage state 
to the highest civilization: beginning with hunting and fishing, advancing to 
flocks and herds, and then to agriculture and commerce.”80 science, evident 
in the embryonic fields of geology, history, sociology, ethnography, and anthro-
pology, unwittingly perhaps, reinforced perceptions and attitudes during the 
nineteenth century. These disciplines legitimized american and Russian inter-
nal colonial policies and programs. The sioux and the Kazakhs, the plains and 
the steppe, were exciting and exquisite repositories and laboratories to examine 
unspoiled nature and primitive man.
americans and Russians dispatched numerous expeditions to discover and 
study the lands and peoples they conquered, which paralleled similar efforts 
conducted by the British, french, and Germans in asia, the Middle east, africa, 
and south america.81 initially in the united states, the military led the majority 
of these expeditions, of which the lewis and clark voyage was but one; but fur 
trappers also gathered significant information that proved useful to the govern-
ment. By the 1820s, travelers to the plains published accounts of their adven-
tures that also yielded ostensibly important data on the land and peoples, which 
further reinforced so-called scientific assessments about civilization’s influence 
on primitive man and the natural landscapes. in Russia, most expeditions in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were under the auspices of the military or 
the academy of sciences and, later, the imperial Geographic society. scientific 
expeditions and military leaders, such as chokan valikhanov, vasili Radlov, and 
Peter semenov, expanded the fields of geography, geology, botany, ethnography, 
and sociology in the Russian empire.82
The united states and Russia dispatched dozens of scientific expeditions 
into the plains and steppe in order to ascertain the regional natural and human 
resources, access routes, agricultural suitability, climate, etc. it was also evident 
that most government-sponsored expeditions were precursors to expansion and 
conquest. President Jefferson instructed Lewis and Clark not only to map the 
newly acquired Louisiana Territory, but that the expedition was a “triumph of 
the american enlightenment . . . [that] would combine scientific, commercial, 
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and agricultural concerns with geographical discovery and nation-building.”83 
he insisted that the explorers identify the various tribes along their route, nego-
tiate with them, and inform them that there was a new “Great father” to advise 
and protect them. They were to learn all they could about the more powerful 
tribes, including the sioux, who inhabited the lands along their route to the 
Pacific ocean. other intrepid explorers followed lewis and clark on dozens of 
similar expeditions, including zebulon Pike, stephen long, ferdinand hayden, 
and even George custer, on his infamous exploration of the Black hills in 
1873. Beginning in the 1730s and throughout the nineteenth century, Russia 
dispatched numerous diplomatic and scientific missions to the steppe. in the 
process, these missions gathered detailed information about the Kazakhs and 
the land, its resources and commercial opportunities. herein is one of the major 
differences between how the united states mapped its interior and learned 
about its inhabitants compared with Russia’s methods.
Throughout the eighteenth century, americans used natives as guides and 
translators, something Russia did as well (chiefly Tatars). in the nineteenth 
century, however, Russia employed Kazakhs to explore and map the steppes 
and to penetrate deeper into central asia. The difference rests on the length 
of contact and incorporation. Russia claimed sovereignty over the Kazakh 
steppe beginning in 1732, and, following the defeat of Kenesary Kasymov 
in 1847, Russian domination over the steppe and the Kazakhs was generally 
unchallenged. The united states, on the other hand, was a relative newcomer 
to the northern plains, purchasing the region in 1803 from france in the 
louisiana Purchase. it took the united states another four decades to exert 
a serious presence there. Well before the american government actively sup-
ported formal education for sioux, the Russian government opened schools 
in the steppe designed to assimilate Kazakhs into the empire. The Russians 
wanted to use Russified Kazakhs to explore and negotiate with steppe and 
central asian inhabitants.
in 1847 the Russian government’s Omsk kadetskii korpus (omsk corps of 
cadets) opened and graduated many Kazakhs for duty in the army as translators, 
guides, and scribes. one of its first students was chokan valikhanov (1835–
1865), regarded by many scholars as the “first modern scholar and intellectual 
of his people.”84 he became a close friend of novelist dostoevsky (after his exile 
to the steppe due to his “revolutionary” activities), who later encouraged the 
young Kazakh to be “the first of your people to interpret for Russia the steppe, 
its significance, and your people in their relation to Russia.”85
valikhanov’s own scientific career started soon after his appointment to the 
steppe military staff. in 1858 he undertook the difficult mission to Kashgar, 
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which was his most significant adventure as well as the one that earned him 
widespread acclaim. This was a part of the Great Game with Great Britain 
for influence and control of central asia.86 The Russian Geographical society 
published accounts of his expedition that were subsequently reproduced in 
German and english works.87 as the editors of the english translation noted in 
the introduction, “although an officer in the Russian service and a man of good 
education, he is the son of a Kirghiz sultan and a native of the steppes. he is 
consequently well acquainted with the language and customs of the people of 
central asia, and could go amongst them without exciting the least suspicion of 
being connected with Russia.”88 after valikhanov’s triumphant return, the gov-
ernment assigned him to the War Ministry and, later, to the asiatic department 
of the Ministry of foreign affairs in saint Petersburg. While living in the capital 
he enjoyed the life of a young army officer, but tuberculosis compelled him to 
return to the Kazakh steppe in a futile attempt to recover his health.89
valikhanov represented the fully assimilated Kazakh—educated, civilized, 
and espousing views that conformed to Russia’s agenda; he thoroughly criti-
cized islamic fanaticism and urged Kazakhs to embrace Russian civilization. he 
was a remarkable figure—a statue of him still stands in front of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan’s academy of sciences building—transcending opposite cul-
tures (nomad versus sedentary, Turk versus slav, Muslim versus christian). The 
american government did not create comparable educational opportunities for 
the sioux or most natives, although it later used education to accelerate assimila-
tion. clearly, there were indians who emerged in the nineteenth century—most 
notably, ely Parker (seneca), but he was the exception. americans certainly did 
not create an opportunity for a sioux that resembled valikhanov’s extraordinary 
expedition. But clearly, valikhanov was the exception, and his accomplishments 
did little, if anything, to influence positively the conventional perceptions and 
attitudes about Kazakhs. By the 1890s, there were certainly some sioux who 
exemplified the american ideals of assimilation, such as charles a. eastman 
(Ohíye S’a, “Wins often”) and Gertrude Bonin (Zitkala-Sa, “Red Bird”), but 
they too remained exceptions, as long as the vast majority of sioux remained 
confined on the reservations.90 opportunities for indians, including sioux, and 
for Kazakhs existed in the united states and in tsarist Russia, but they were 
generally rare and did little to alter base typologies. Predictable stereotypes and 
clichés were firmly entrenched; although individuals emerged to complicate 
the typologies and perceptions, their individual successes—exceptional though 
they might be—could not shake apart the more universally accepted imagery 
and attitudes that the sioux and Kazakhs were backward, inferior peoples in 
desperate need of american or Russian civilizing benefits.
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eastman or valikhanov, however, represented an idealized version of a civi-
lized sioux or Kazakh, and americans and Russians promoted both men as exam-
ples of a sioux or Kazakh successfully elevated from barbarism to civilization 
because they embraced american or Russian culture. nevertheless, while the 
nineteenth-century literature is replete with negative characterizations of the 
sioux and the Kazakhs, there were some positive examples as well. for example, 
sioux men were “grand-looking men, the warriors, well-made, powerful, and 
lithe, grave and courteous, dignified, solemn, and majestic.”91 They might be 
“extremely symmetrical of form, well knit, agile, and easy in their movements.”92 
Figure 4.1. charles a. eastman, 1913 (courtesy of national anthropological 
archives, smithsonian institution). 
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The Kazakh was “Mongol-Turkic,” his “face was flat and wide . . . [with] narrow 
black eyes, small mouth,” and rarely any “facial hair.”93 his body might be “thick, 
compact, stout,” of “varying height,” and “strong, when he sits on a horse, so pow-
erfully, it would be difficult to dislodge him.”94 individuals could be positively 
described, such as Meyendorf ’s meeting with Kazakh sultan harun Ghazl, “the 
most distinguished head of the Kirghizzes”: he had “a healthy complexion, large, 
good-looking eyes, and a pleasant as well as earnest expression; we could easily 
perceive that he was an exceedingly intelligent person.”95 These physical charac-
teristics are relatively neutral commentaries—quite generalized—but physical 
appearance was not an attribute of sioux or Kazakh decline. for these and other 
observers, the cultural, social, economic, and political conditions established 
the decline narrative that influenced subsequent American and Russian policies. 
as smith noted in the american case, but which was wholly applicable to the 
Russian one as well, these observers were not “ethnologists or anthropologists 
in the twentieth-century mold; they did not transcend their own values and 
worldviews and assumptions about savagery and civilization to meet tribes on 
their own terms.”96
Writers, government officials, and settlers often depicted the sioux and 
Kazakhs as childlike, lazy, and prone to rapaciousness. The governor of orenburg, 
Figure 4.2. carlisle indian industrial school students (courtesy of denver Public 
library). 
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d. v. volkov, wrote catherine ii that Kazakhs were not innate barbarians but 
rather were immature and lacked proper morals and manners; they were like 
infants.97 The negative perceptions reinforced simplistic stereotypes, such as 
sioux being profligate, “unable or unwilling to save enough food for winter, con-
suming enormous amounts of food at feasts one week then starving the next.”98 
a Kazakh “can go for two days without eating . . . but on the first opportunity 
Figure 4.3. sioux men (courtesy of denver Public library). 
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that offers itself he will eat enough for three persons.”99 While sioux and Kazakh 
men were lazy gluttons, the women did all the work. Women did “most of the 
cultivating” and were enslaved by their husbands; “women do all of the work.”100 
The treatment of women reflected the uncivilized state of the sioux and the 
Kazakhs because “[c]ivilized people pampered women; savage people enslaved 
them.”101 americans and Russians identified these various cultural markers to 
dehumanize the sioux and the Kazakhs, to treat them as less than individuals 
with personalities and sensibilities that might require more than simple stereo-
typing. dehumanizing the sioux and Kazakhs absolved the colonizers of guilt 
and responsibility as they implemented policies that dislocated them from their 
land, eroding further sioux and Kazakh social and political institutions.
a certain sioux and Kazakh behavior that often flummoxed americans and 
Russians was the value the sioux attached to raiding and horse stealing and the 
value Kazakhs committed to the practice called barymta (that which is due me), 
believed by the Russians as little more than theft and comparable to american 
reactions to the sioux.102 in the minds of both americans and Russians, these 
practices epitomized sioux and Kazakh backwardness, even more than their 
ostensible mistreatment of women. The simplest reason contrived by americans 
and Russians for these two seemingly pointless practices was that the sioux and 
Kazakhs were congenital and incorrigible thieves. it was a far more complex cul-
tural and social explanation, but the americans and the Russians generally failed 
to look beyond preconceived notions and, instead, relied on well-established 
typologies.
scholars identified the role that raiding and horse stealing had for sioux men, 
but it was never just simple thievery. anthony R. McGinnis concluded that the 
“prestige that came from the risk taken in stealing the horses” equaled the “glory” 
associated with the “risk of counting coup in battle.”103 americans often com-
plained about the practice, considered it one of many reasons for unrelenting 
conflict on the plains, viewed it as motivation for persistent depredations com-
mitted against pioneers crossing the plains, and demanded it stop in the numer-
ous treaties they negotiated with the sioux. The practice also disturbed american 
sensibilities, conflicted with american perceptions of law and respect for prop-
erty, and was a source for sustained misunderstanding between americans and 
sioux. according to agent n. s. Porter on the fort Peck indian Reservation, 
stealing horses caused him “more trouble than any other one thing . . . Where 
a horse belonging to a white man is found in the possession of the indians i 
have no difficulty in getting him; but horses stolen from other indians they 
do not like to give up, as they claim it is one of their customs to steal from one 
another, and the more horses an indian steals the great indian he is considered 
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among his tribe.”104 The Kazakhs also frustrated the Russians with a practice 
that from the colonizers’ perspective was simple larceny, but to the Kazakhs 
it had far more complex social and cultural meaning. The Russians could only 
see value in the property taken during a barymta, but they were unable to see 
value in the act or its important cultural or social symbolism. in the Kazakh case, 
Russian officials understood barymta permitted a claimant to press a grievance; 
as aleksei i. levshin noted, the claimant should not take more than the con-
tested value during a raid.105 historian virginia Martin described barymta as 
a means to avenge “insult and upholding personal and clan honor.”106 even if 
an american or Russian understood the practice, it still represented a defect in 
native character, native society, and the cultural attachment to something con-
sidered fundamentally uncivilized.
What happened on the frontier of expansion affected and influenced attitudes 
and policies in the metropole, which more often than not seemed to be play-
ing catch up with boundaries—both the arbitrarily erected physical and politi-
cal boundaries and the less tangible but equally powerful cultural and social 
boundaries that distinguished sioux from american and Kazakh from Russian. 
The american and Russian governments instituted policies designed to control 
their indigenous populations, but each also had to manage the expansion and 
resettlement of millions of pioneers and peasants in the newly conquered territo-
ries. in order to facilitate that transfer of land and its resources, the united states 
and tsarist Russia developed policies that were based on specific need, such as 
removal and reservations—or, in the Russian case, districts—and were often 
based on fragile and faulty perceptions of the sioux and Kazakhs as backward, 
uncivilized peoples. essentially, americans and Russians dehumanized the sioux 
and Kazakh symbolically and physically; americans and Russians orientalized 
the sioux and Kazakhs as subjects to study and a people to assimilate or eliminate. 
Americans and Russians also Orientalized the places conquered and resolved 
to remove the land from Sioux and Kazakh control. This process of conquest 
and internal colonization subsequently deprived sovereignty in the name of civ-
ilization. for americans and Russians, the orient as an imagined place easily 
applied to the lands and peoples they encountered. Russia had a real orient on 
its frontier, but there was also the imagined one that was backward, decadent, 
and required Russian civilization. The United States had the West—Orientalized 
in the imagination—but it too required the American civilizing influence.
The americans had a wonderful means to express this sense of entitlement, 
expansion, and empire: Manifest destiny—a term coined in the 1840s to explain 
and, more importantly, justify westward expansion. The Russians, on the other 
hand, never devised a useful singular term, but they certainly debated their 
ThRouGh The colonial looKinG-Gl ass162
role in asia and just as eagerly embraced rhetorical justifications about Russia’s 
expansion, empire, and destiny. Consequently, in the United States after the 
civil War, railroads; municipalities; and local, state, and the federal government 
all promoted expansion and settlement, rapidly accelerating the process and 
increasing the potential for conflict between pioneer and sioux. Promotional 
materials and state instutitions are also rich resources to detect perceptions and 
attitudes. The Russian government, however, officially resisted peasant resettle-
ment until the 1880s, when the government started to enact numerous laws 
designed to assist peasants who wanted to migrate east. This difference also 
reflected the pattern of expansion and settlement, but it also complicates the 
historian’s effort to decipher perceptions and attitudes among Russians regard-
ing the Kazakhs or imperial expansion and colonization.
The united states ardently encouraged pioneers to go west, but the Russian 
government did not. The Russian government, essentially, tried to plug a hole 
in the dike with a finger. Russian peasants went east anyway, defying authorities, 
and settled on land claimed and used by Kazakhs. conflict ensued, but by the 
1880s—as in the united states and the conflict between pioneers and the sioux—
violence against Russian peasants or Kazakh nomads diminished significantly. 
Moreover, in both cases, the violence was never as ubiquitous as reported. There 
are numerous examples of friendship and cooperation between pioneers and 
sioux and between peasants and Kazakhs. however, when violence did occur, it 
was vicious and widely reported, especially in the american case. americans and 
Russians usually attributed the violence to sioux and Kazakh martial characters, 
their purportedly ingrained warlike traits. american and Russian retaliation was 
usually disproportionate to the first act of violence, regardless of who committed 
it, and used to justify further conquest and colonization. What this meant was 
that both the united states and Russia struggled to fulfill their obligations to 
the sioux and the Kazakhs, but try they did. ultimately, confining the sioux and 
the Kazakhs to limited spaces was the solution reached by both colonizing states 
while giving liberally to the pioneers and peasants that very land the sioux and 
Kazakhs claimed as their own and necessary for their survival.
The american government encouraged westward settlement but struggled 
throughout the century to uphold its treaty obligations to keep pioneers off land 
accorded to native americans. The Russian government, however, discouraged 
peasant migration, but land shortages in the european regions of the empire 
pushed many peasants eastward; landed nobility in the Russian empire did 
not want to lose its unfree labor (serfs) to the east. The Russian government 
hesitated to allow authorized peasant resettlement in the Kazakh steppe, even 
after the 1861 peasant emancipation, but finally conceded to what seemed the 
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inevitable fact of peasant migration with legislation designed to assist it. The 
american government chose a somewhat different course. Both situations led 
ultimately to the loss of political and individual sovereignty for the sioux and 
the Kazakhs—the subject of the next chapter, which examines the policies that 
shaped internal colonization.
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Throughout the nineteenth century, american and Russian politicians, intellec-
tuals, and others typically concluded that american and Russian continental 
expansion was territorial consolidation, unification, or some sort of destiny. That 
expansion also included indigenous populations that possessed, in the colonizers’ 
view, inferior social, cultural, economic, and political norms: they were allegedly 
uncivilized and claimed more land than necessary for their needs and survival. 
in addition, the united states and Russia each perceived themselves within 
exceptionalist representations and discourses, often expressed differently from 
concomitant european overseas expansion and imperialism.1 yet, american and 
Russian internal colonization was “as dependent on colonial relations of domi-
nance as were any of europe’s external incursions.”2
Both the americans and the Russians perceived internal colonization as a 
process that differed from european imperialism and colonization in asia and 
africa, which they both claimed to reject but clearly paralleled and mimicked. 
interestingly, the american government rarely used the term colonization to 
describe its expansion or policies. in the regions that experienced internal colo-
nization, the term was referenced occasionally to force indians onto reservations, 
but americans never called them colonies. for example, in 1853, the Friend, a 
Quaker publication, debated the concept, noting that “[i]t has been suggested 
that it would be good policy to colonize these people along the rich bottoms 
with which those wild regions are interspersed, giving them lands to be held 
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in individual right as long as actually occupied. The suggestion is worthy of 
consideration.”3 in 1865 army captain James l. fisk urged the commissioner of 
indian affairs and the american government “towards colonizing all the tribes 
of indians who now roam over the territorial domain between Minnesota and 
iowa and the Rocky mountains.”4 he claimed, “the policy of colonizing them 
on a common and restricted reservation of sufficient dimensions and resources 
for their subsistence will . . . prove a direct and immediate relief and benefit to 
both the government and the indians.”5 americans used the term to describe 
the territorial restrictions to be imposed on the indians—the allotment of land 
for their specific and designated use—but colonization was not a reference to 
designate where americans could settle.
The Russians often used the term colonization, but it was not until the 
1880s that the government described parts of siberia and Turkestan as colo-
nies; beforehand, Russians interpreted expansion as integration and unifica-
tion, similar to american perceptions of Manifest destiny. nonetheless, dur-
ing the nineteenth-century expansion, the Russians looked to other european 
empires to model their own internal colonial policies—particularly the British 
in india and the french in algeria.6 some Russian officials and intellectuals 
also looked to the united states and its administration of internally colonized 
regions and people. Many Russians studied the importance of the american 
transcontinental railroad when constructing the Trans-siberian Railway in 
the 1890s, and they also debated the utility of the american 1862 homestead 
act as a model for their peasant resettlement policies in siberia, the Kazakh 
steppe, and Turkestan. interestingly, Russia was not the only european empire 
to study american expansion and colonization. after 1870 Germans also stud-
ied the American example, as they equated it to nineteenth-century European 
expansion and colonization in asia and africa. according to historian Jens-
uwe Guettel, many Germans “increasingly identified american expansion 
and racial policies as models that colonizers could replicate elsewhere in the 
world” and which linked the “american frontier to other areas colonized by 
europeans.”7
internal colonization, and its attending ambition to nurture civilization, there-
fore, meant subverting—perhaps even destroying—sioux and Kazakh social, 
cultural, political, and economic structures. The multiple american and Russian 
policies and programs were not, however, temporal mirrors of each other but did 
reflect comparable colonial ideologies and philosophies. Equally important, the 
policies, programs, ideologies, and philosophies reflected the sense of territorial 
unification and incorporation of uninhabited and unused land. The americans 
and Russians asserted that the nomadic sioux and Kazakhs claimed more land 
inTeRnal colonizaTion 173
than was reasonable for a backward, uncivilized people. internal colonization 
was, therefore, comparable to settler colonialism in other contexts and included 
a set of policies, programs, and strategies designed to incorporate the land and 
socially and culturally integrate the people into the colonizing state structures 
and institutions.8
adMinisTeRinG The l ands
in the nineteenth century, americans and Russians shared a civilizing philoso-
phy and imperial ideology with other european imperial powers. unlike their 
european counterparts, however, neither the united states nor Russia estab-
lished ministries or departments to deal with internal colonization. in other 
words, neither created a colonial office comparable to the British, the dutch, 
or the french to deal with colonized people. for example, the British created 
a colonial office inside its War department in 1801; it later became its own 
department.9 The dutch established a colonial ministry in 1806. The french 
created something similar in the 1890s, known as the Ministry of overseas 
france, but it did not administer algeria. The french considered algeria a prov-
ince, not a colony and directed it under the auspices of the Ministry of the 
interior.10 other nineteenth-century european empires organized the alchemy 
of internal colonization differently than the united states and Russia. although 
the united states and Russia both created components of centralized, organiza-
tional administrations that implemented various policies and programs, they did 
not create a colonial ministry.
in 1824 the united states established the Bureau of indian affairs (Bia), 
initially under the department of War but later transferred in 1849 to the 
department of the interior, which was also the central department to manage 
the increasingly expanded federal lands and resources in the american West.11 
The Bia was as close to a colonial office as the united states ever had during 
the nineteenth century, certainly until the spanish-american War brought the 
Philippines and hawaii into the american fold. The Russians pursued a slightly 
different path to govern their colonized lands and peoples. The Ministry of state 
domains (established in 1837) managed the land. a governor-general within the 
department of War, however, administered the people. according to Willard 
sunderland, in a recent analysis, the “various peoples of the [Russian] empire 
tended to be administered according to their location, religion, occupation, or 
some combination of these criteria, and they often fell at once under several 
administrative structures. But no central organ existed to administer colonial 
people defined as a group.”12
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it appears that the main reason the americans and the Russians never estab-
lished colonial ministries was because the land and peoples were internal to the 
international boundaries. The united states and Russia incorporated and inte-
grated contiguous territory. another reason, perhaps, was that the united states 
and Russia each expected the internally colonized people eventually to amal-
gamate under the same governing structures that existed for the state’s other 
citizens or subjects. essentially, at some point in the future, natives might enjoy 
whatever rights and privileges accorded to americans or Russians. settler colo-
nization, the American and Russian form of internal colonization, required the 
state to intervene militarily, politically, and economically and typically empha-
sized recreating the colonizing society’s social, political, and economic charac-
teristics in the new territory.
The united states and Russia did create geographic societies, similar to their 
european counterparts, initially chartered to investigate the new lands and peo-
ples being discovered in asia, africa, and the americas—the Russian imperial 
Geographic society (RGo) in 1845 and the american Geographical society 
in 1851. Throughout the nineteenth century, europeans dispatched scholars 
around the world, but the RGo focused its considerable energies chiefly on 
Russia’s territories in the caucasus, central asia, and siberia. american scholars 
set off around the world as well, but they also recognized that their unexplored 
continent preserved its own incredible geography and indigenous populations. 
in a sense, the united states and Russia possessed internal, undiscovered lands 
and peoples that equaled whatever the Europeans might discover in recently 
colonized places.
at the core of american expansion into the plains and Russian expansion into 
the steppe, and all the internal colonization policies implemented by the united 
states and Russia, land was the indispensable stimulus: its control, its redistri-
bution, and its use. as Patrick Wolfe correctly noted, “Whatever settlers may 
say—and they generally have a lot to say—the primary motive for elimination is 
not race (or religion, ethnicity, grade of civilization, etc.) but access to territory. 
Territoriality is settler colonialism’s specific, irreducible element.”13 Throughout 
the nineteenth century, the united states and Russia pushed rapidly across a 
defensive frontier boundary, behind which they possessed an immediate base of 
power that could and did operate at long distances from the dominant metro-
pole, authority, populations, and resources. They established military posts in 
order to protect trade in the borderlands and later created settlements that 
permanently situated americans and Russians in the plains and the steppe. 
crossing the artificially imposed boundaries, american pioneers and Russia 
peasants engaged in settler internal colonization. By the 1820s, the americans 
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were still barely a presence west of the Mississippi River; Russia, on the other 
hand, was more fully prepared to extend its reach further into the steppe regions 
south into Turkestan.
in both the american and Russian cases, resituating the frontier bound-
ary around and over the colonized people physically integrated the land and 
indigenous people into the territorial contours of the colonizing state. it was, 
as anthropologist deborah Bird Rose argued, a situation in which to be in the 
way of settler colonization, all the indigenous population had to do was stay 
home.14 Put another way, what constituted places where the sioux and Kazakhs 
could live on the frontier was possible only as long as the frontier remained 
stagnant, immobile: “indian homelands were only possible on the frontier; and 
as the frontier moved, so did the homelands.”15 early twentieth-century traveler 
George frederick Wright observed the comparable ideologies at work in the 
plains and the steppe. he wrote, the “result is the same . . . the pioneers [Russian 
peasants] who are far beyond the reach of the central government became a law 
unto themselves . . . their dealing with the native races of siberia can be easily 
enough equaled in that of the frontiersmen of the United States, who have by 
similar means gradually wrested the continent of america from the improvi-
dent hands of the Red indian.”16 The nomadic sioux and Kazakhs used the land 
extensively rather than intensively. Therefore, sioux and Kazakh claims to the 
land meant it was also their most important commodity. in Russian minds, the 
Kazakhs failed to exploit the land to its agrarian potential. expelling the Kazakhs 
from pastures opened the land for intensive agricultural exploitation by Russian 
peasants rather than extensive livestock production by potentially marauding 
nomads.
in 1822 Mikhail speransky, the governor-general of siberia, proposed a series 
of reforms—essentially, administrative regulations—which demarcated specific 
territories for Kazakhs in the steppe.17 The new regulations also imposed stron-
ger civil administrative codes on the Kazakhs in order to integrate the nomads 
further into tighter union with the Russian empire. The goal was to advance 
Russian trade, culture, and control throughout the steppe.18 The new organi-
zational pattern also resembled the Russian peasant system, appealing to a 
Russian administrator’s native sensibilities. indeed, the Russians expropriated 
almost 7 million desiatin (1 desiatin equals roughly 2.7 acres) of land in the 
ural River region for exclusive use by Russian peasants.19 speransky’s reforms 
left Kazakh social and cultural norms generally unaffected; converting Kazakhs 
to christianity was not part of the alchemy of Russian internal colonization 
and certainly not a part of speransky’s objectives. What speransky’s reforms 
revealed, as well, was that the internal colonization of the Kazakhs was an ad hoc 
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reorganization designed to deal with only the steppe region. it was not part of a 
larger set of organizational restructuring that characterized a singular Russian 
colonial or settler policy or program to incorporate the Kazakhs into the empire.
By the time of speransky’s reforms in the Kazakh steppe, the americans were 
only beginning to formulate policies and programs to integrate the land and the 
people internally colonized. americans, however, generally confined relations 
with the sioux at that time to trade; land was not the issue in the West that it was 
in the east. The federal government assumed control of economic intercourse 
with all indian tribes, and in 1806 congress created the superintendent of 
indian Trade; all indian affairs were under his supervision. Trade between the 
united states and indians, including the sioux, was organized chiefly through 
treaty relations. nevertheless, treaties also served as a different mechanism to 
integrate indians than the Russian method, which they never predicated on trea-
ties and the notion of mutual sovereignty between signatories.
in both american and Russian cases, the colonizer determined to manage 
what land the indigenous population could use and, more importantly, how 
much land was necessary for survival. unlike the united states, which con-
trolled economic relations with indians—particularly the marketplace for land—
the Russians did not directly interfere with economic exchanges. one significant 
difference that influenced the character of the policies devised was the role that 
the sioux and the Kazakhs played in the colonizers’ general economy. Put simply, 
as the fur trade declined by the 1840s, the sioux hunting nomadism produced 
nothing valued by the americans; whereas the Kazakhs’ pastoral nomadism gen-
erated large numbers of sheep, hides, and wool that Russians sought at annual 
markets throughout the steppe.20 In addition, Kazakhs were required to pay an 
annual kibitka tax (kibitka is the Russian word for yurt)—usually only about one 
ruble, which increased to four rubles by the end of the century. The americans 
never extracted a comparable revenue stream from the sioux; instead, treaties 
obligated the american government to compensate tribes for the land cecession. 
The Russians did not compensate the Kazakhs. The united states used annui-
ties and allotted land to regulate sioux behavior, or at least behavior it consid-
ered consistent with civilization. The Russians never followed that path; instead, 
the Russians simply removed land on which the Kazakhs could migrate, thereby 
forcing Kazakhs to settle on the least favorable tracts of land to adopt farming.
The alcheMy of seT TleR colonizaTion and alloTMenT
Throughout the nineteenth century, the united states and Russia allotted land 
for a specific use. land was allotted for resettlement by either pioneers or 
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peasants and different tracts were set aside for the sioux and the Kazakhs. The 
american treaty system did not employ the concept of colonized land or peo-
ple. Treaties, instead, established the framework whereby indians ceded land 
to the americans. Russia merely annexed the land, which it did in 1824 when 
it announced formal annexation of the Kazakh steppe. The american treaty 
system and land cessation was complicated further by a new policy—removal—
which was, according to francis Paul Prucha, “the culmination of a movement 
that had been gradually gaining momentum in government circles for nearly 
three decades.”21 it did not affect the sioux directly, but it fashioned a legal 
relationship between all indians and the american government. in 1831 the 
us supreme court decision in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia acknowledged the 
“distinct political society” that ultimately placed all indians in a legal ambiguity 
called “domestic dependent nations.” as such, the sioux and all indians became 
“wards” under the guardianship of the united states. The american government 
claimed indian land “independent of their [indian] will, which must take effect 
in point of possession when their right of possession ceases.”22 Those indians 
relocated, or removed, from their territories east of the Mississippi subsequently, 
and forcibly, resettled on communally reserved lands in what americans gener-
ously called indian Territory, in present-day oklahoma.
Indian removal was the result of conquest, treaties, legislation, and legal 
action. in the 1830s, removal forced some eastern indian tribes onto reserva-
tions, but the sioux continued to migrate freely on the plains. although not 
called allotment, the affect meant setting aside specific land for a specific peo-
ple. More importantly, it established the idea of using reservations to set aside 
land only for indians to use. conversely, the Russians similarly segregated land, 
but that segregated land was for Russian peasants to use rather than for the 
Kazakhs, more in common with other european colonial environments in asia 
and africa. The Russian colonizer initially segregated itself apart from the native 
population on land the natives could not use. in the united states, the govern-
ment segregated native populations, quickly enclosed by colonial settlements, 
on land apart from the colonizer.
The Russians prohibited Kazakhs to migrate or pasture their livestock on or 
near steppe land reserved for Russian settlement; it was removal without trea-
ties or obligations. The Russian goal was to integrate, economically and admin-
istratively, the Kazakhs, to manage their movement and open land for further 
Russian internal colonization. as such, Kazakhs were restricted to specific 
districts (volost); special permission was required from a Russian official for 
Kazakhs to move from one district to another. The persistent Kazakh resistance 
to Russian internal colonization in the 1820s did not impede Russian expansion 
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and peasant resettlement in the steppe. in time, however, the Russians created 
land funds designated for agriculture and settlement but not held in reserve only 
for Russian peasants. The Russian government eventually permitted Kazakhs to 
accept allotted sections of land in order to abandon nomadism and take up 
agriculture.
To manage this allotment process in 1837 the Russian government created 
the siberian survey to direct and identify lands in the steppe most suitable for 
Russian colonization. it operated based on fifteen desiatin per adult male being 
the norm necessary for peasant settlement and agriculture.23 Beginning in 1843, 
the government permitted Russian peasants from regions in european Russia 
considered “exceptionally short of land” to migrate and resettle in siberia and 
the Kazakh steppe.24 as will be recalled, in 1847 the Kenesary Kasymov rebel-
lion ended, and by 1850 the Russian government halted cossack colonization 
in the steppe region because the original purpose—namely, the defensive mis-
sion—was outdated.
By the late 1840s, the discovery of gold in the far West triggered a mas-
sive migration that certainly aggravated the situation in the northern plains 
between the american government and the indigenous populations. according 
to Jeffrey ostler, in 1841 less than 100 emigrants crossed the plains, but in 1849 
that number exceeded more than 25,000.25 The sioux complained about the 
increased traffic, claiming that the thousands of migrants competed with them 
for resources, especially timber, water, and game. This competition seemingly 
elevated the possibility of conflict between american pioneers and the sioux 
for those limited resources. The widespread belief, however, that indians con-
stantly harassed and attacked emigrants was, as subsequent research revealed, 
the perception rather than the reality. Between 1840 and 1860, more whites 
killed indians than indians killed whites.26 certainly, confrontations occurred, 
but not to the extent that the american public believed. nonetheless, the united 
states took steps to administer indian affairs and protect emigrants traveling 
west. The removal policy no longer worked.
in 1849 congress created the department of the interior and moved the 
Bureau of indian affairs from the War department into this new executive-
branch department. The Bia appointed agents, paid annuities, distributed 
supplies, and administered relations with indians. in 1850 the commissioner 
of indian affairs, luke lea, proposed to establish reservations for the Plains 
tribes. The proposal included definite boundaries in order to protect tribes 
from trespassing whites on native lands, usually in violation of many previous 
treaties, and to restrict native lands and open territory to american settle-
ments. The american government envisioned individual reservations for the 
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many different tribes to assist them as they adopted civilized behavior and 
agriculture.
commissioner lea ardently supported the reservation idea; he argued that 
the sioux, chippewa, and other tribes, given their “remoteness and scattered 
condition, it is difficult to exercise any effective restraint over them.”27 in addi-
tion, he claimed that the constant intertribal warfare was “revolting to humanity” 
because it fostered “that insatiable passion for war, which, in combination with 
love of the chase, is the prominent characteristic feature of our wilder tribes, 
and presents a formidable obstacle in the way of their civilization and improve-
ment.”28 Therefore, he urged reservations for the sioux and other Plains tribes 
so that they may be “placed in positions where they can be controlled, and 
finally compelled by stern necessity to resort to agricultural labor or starve.”29 
for the first time, beginning in the late 1840s, the sioux became an essential 
factor to consider as american government policy changed.
Subsequent treaties with the Sioux reflected Lea’s attitude that a “portion of 
this country must soon pass sub judice; opening, by the extinction of the indian 
title, a new theatre for the great drama of western civilization.”30 american pio-
neers and Russian peasants were, as geographer Rodolphe de Koninck sug-
gested, the “territorial spearhead of the state” in a process he referred to as 
the “territorial compromise.”31 it was the “gathering of the pieces that comprise 
them [the state] and the colonization of their borderlands have relied at least 
partially on the peasantry, or on a process of peasantization.”32 in Russia, the 
Figure 5.1. Kazakhs on the move (courtesy of central state archives, Republic of 
Kazakhstan). 
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government built a fortified line that Kazakhs could not cross, but that did not 
stop Russian peasants, which compelled Russian government officials to extend 
their authority into contested territory in order to protect their interests. in 
the minds of many americans and Russians, military forts, posts, and settler 
communities were a “protest against barbarism,” but often along the border or 
frontier the government, in the guise of the military, seemed a step behind the 
settler pioneer or peasant.33
To ensure that americans traveling through the plains were safe, the american 
government determined to extend its military reach deeper into the north-
ern plains and built a series of forts and posts. in 1851 and again in 1858, the 
american government signed treaties at fort laramie comprising most Plains 
tribes, including a significant number of sioux bands. The 1851 treaty estab-
lished tribal territories throughout the plains. according to Robert M. utley, 
the government created these tribal territories to diminish intertribal warfare 
on the plains and reduce the chance of fateful encounters between warring 
tribes and emigrants. These tribal territories were not technically reservations 
but rather set the foundation for their future creation.34 some sioux bands 
relinquished title to more than 25 million acres in exchange for annuities and, 
ultimately, a reservation along the Minnesota River.35 The problem, from the 
american perspective, was that many sioux remained outside of american con-
trol; many sioux bands remained generally sovereign and not obligated to the 
treaty restrictions.
The american government determined to prevent attacks by the sioux against 
emigrants and, to the extent possible, avert violations of the treaties’ provisions 
by americans pioneers and emigrants. Those sioux that signed treaties with the 
american government typically agreed to submit violators to american justice. 
The treaties obligated many sioux to “agree and bind themselves to make resti-
tution or satisfaction for any wrongs committed . . . by any band or individual of 
their people, on the people of the united states, whilst lawfully residing in or 
passing through their respective territories.”36 The consequence, however, was 
that if a single sioux violated an article of the treaties, the american government 
reserved the right to withhold its obligations to the sioux.
The treaties were a mechanism of control, one that the american govern-
ment frequently and increasingly exercised during the next several decades. Any 
hostile act by an individual sioux meant the united states reserved the right to 
punish all sioux, which it did habitually. for example, article 8 of the 1851 fort 
laramie treaty stipulated that the “united states may withhold the whole of a 
portion of the annuities mentioned . . . from the nation so offending, until, in the 
opinion of the President of the united states, proper satisfaction shall have been 
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made.”37 The treaties did nothing to limit americans from crossing the plains or 
violating sioux rights. While the american government ostensibly designed trea-
ties to prevent violations by either an american or a sioux, the sioux could only 
appeal to the Bureau of indian affairs to hear their grievances. Resolution rarely 
favored the sioux, but it was a different situation for the Kazakhs.
The speransky reforms created courts systems in the steppe, purportedly 
designed and tasked to resolve disputes between farmer and nomad, native and 
Russian. in the event that a Kazakh alleged a Russian peasant committed a crime 
or violated the law, the regulations permitted Kazakhs to mediate the case in a 
Russian court. The reforms, however, did not compel Russians to attend native 
Kazakh courts, which used Kazakh customary law (adat), but a Russian could 
bring a case against a Kazakh in the Russian court.38 despite Russian attempts to 
create judicial institutions that legally integrated Kazakhs to resolve disputes, the 
system generally failed or benefited Russian peasants at the expense of Kazakh 
rights. one of Kenesary Kasymov’s constant complaints to Russian officials was 
that Russian peasants settled on Kazakh land, and the Russian government and 
its courts ignored the situation. Russian resettlements continued unabated to 
partition the Kazakh steppe. similarly, one sioux chief at the 1851 fort laramie 
negotiations echoed Kenesary’s concerns when he declared, “you have split my 
land and i don’t like it.”39 Resettlement by americans in the plains and Russians 
in the steppe altered the respective regions’ demographics, a process that accel-
erated in the 1850s.
Population shifts evident in the united states and Russia compelled the 
american and Russian governments to establish frameworks to accommodate 
that resettlement and reorganization. american pioneers and Russian peasants 
moved and settled on the plains and the steppe, a process that clearly resembled 
colonies in other contexts. The scholar Jürgen osterhammel referred to this par-
ticular type of “socio-political organization” and “system of domination” as bor-
der colonization, a case in which the boundary was pushed into a wilderness that 
was contiguous to the recognized boundaries of the expanding state.40 in the 
american case, internal colonization occurred at the same time as the military 
conquest. Similar growth happened in the plains territories, Colorado, Montana 
Territory, the dakotas, and Texas.
Russian settler colonization was different and did not initially transgress 
the Russian military conquest and its frontier. Nonetheless, once the Russians 
established a boundary that prohibited Kazakhs to cross, Russian peasant set-
tlers—legal and illegal—quickly followed to occupy the land in general proxim-
ity to those regulated areas. in 1854 the Russians founded the city of vernyi 
(present-day almaty) in semirechie, which gave the Russians the geographic 
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base necessary to expand deeper into Turkestan. Within a decade, the Russians 
occupied Tashkent; and by the 1870s, the khanates—Khiva, Bukhara, and 
Kokand—fell under Russian rule. The Russians did not initially attempt to open 
Turkestan to Russian peasant resettlement; in fact, the Russian government 
closed semirechie and Turkestan colonization for a couple of decades. instead, 
the Russians focused their attention on trying to manage the settlement process 
in the Kazakh steppe, which many observers believed was chaotic and out of 
control.
Russia’s problem was that the government tried to restrict peasant movement 
within the empire, which became more difficult following the 1861 serf emanci-
pation. in the united states, the government prohibited settlers from occupying 
land set aside for indian reservations, but the restrictions did not pose an obsta-
cle to migration before or after the homestead act. in Russia, the government 
restricted peasant migration by numerous edicts and regulations, but peasants 
still managed to find their way to the Kazakh steppe. indeed, within a couple 
decades after the emancipation, Russian officials estimated that more than 70 
percent of Russian emigrants to siberia and the steppe settled there illegally.41 
it was not difficult to understand the surge of pioneer and peasant resettlement 
in the plains and steppe: accessible land. in the united states, 160 free acres 
was too attractive for pioneers to ignore. after the serf emancipation, the average 
peasant holding in european Russia was only 3.5 desiatin, but a Russian peas-
ant could occupy at least 15 desiatin (roughly 40 acres) in the Kazakh steppe, 
according to resettlement rules enacted decades earlier.42 a later soviet source 
claimed that more than 75 percent of peasants indicated that land shortages in 
european Russia was the reason to migrate east to find available allotments.43
according to economic historian Maurice dobb, the empire’s wheat yield in 
european Russia was between eight to ten bushels per acre, which ranked below 
serbia and italy, and only about half as much as austria-hungary.44 The average 
cultivated area was little more than 1 desiatin, which failed to increase signifi-
cantly following the 1861 emancipation. Moreover, as the Russian population 
grew significantly between 1861 and 1897 (the year of the first Russian all-
empire census), arable land became scarcer.45 european Russia’s population 
density, excluding Poland, was almost twice that of the united states, whereas 
the total amount of cultivated land was no more than 25 percent.46 siberia and 
the Kazakh steppe captivated the Russian government’s attention as an obvious 
answer to the agrarian problem in european Russia, but the government failed 
to devise mechanisms to control migration and resettlement.
in the 1850s and 1860s, the united states and tsarist Russia tried to develop 
mechanisms to demarcate the land for pioneers and peasants as well as for the 
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sioux and the Kazakhs. The american and Russian governments reserved land 
for their emigrants to claim and farm, but they also designated land ostensibly 
reserved only for the nomadic sioux and Kazakhs to use. Pioneers and peasants 
often ignored the artificially applied boundaries. The 1860s was a watershed 
decade, in many respects, for american and Russian internal colonization of the 
plains and the steppe.
The eaRly sTaGes of alloTMenT
in 1862 the us congress passed the homestead act, considered by some schol-
ars one of the most important legislative acts in american history, although 
it was not the only land policy at work in the plains or the american West.47 
The homestead idea, deeply grounded in the Jeffersonian ideal of the yeoman 
farmer, seemingly reignited during the free-soil and antislavery debates tear-
ing the country apart in the 1840s and 1850s.48 The act, according to historian 
Richard slotkin, was also “part of a large social improvement program designed 
finally to purge american society of those nagging disorders that plagued it. The 
perennial ‘Indian question’ would now be justly resolved by dividing Indian 
lands into homestead-type allotments and having the indian integrated with 
civilized society in the sanctified status of yeoman farmer.”49 The homestead 
Act opened land in the West for individuals to file permits to acquire a 160-acre 
allotment; farmers were required to occupy the land for five years and improve 
the land. The Russians, who considered it a possible example to follow to pro-
mote more organized resettlement in siberia and the Kazakh steppe, studied its 
success extensively.50
although the Russian government never enacted a comparable homestead law, 
Russian statutes and regulations designed to manage the resettlement process 
included similar elements, such as financial incentives to improve the land on 
allotments and inducements to construct permanent dwellings or other build-
ings. one Russian agronomist, writing many years after the homestead act’s 
passage, noted that it helped the united states to “create prosperous [tsvetiush-
chiia] provinces on their own uninhabited lands in a very short time,” and he 
seemed to lament the fact that Russia failed to follow the american example.51
in 1865 the united states and Russia established commissions to investigate 
their respective policies and administration of native affairs. The us congress 
created the doolittle commission, chaired by sen. James R. doolittle, to investi-
gate failures of american policies and recommend reforms to resolve the indian 
problem, especially in the plains. in the united states, the discovery of gold 
in Montana, the 1862 sioux rebellion in Minnesota, and the homestead act 
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created a combustible mix of circumstances that accelerated the process of con-
fining the sioux to reservations.
also in 1865, the Russian government formed the steppe commission, which 
it instructed to investigate conditions in the steppe and propose new regula-
tions for its administration. The commission spent two years traveling around 
the Kazakh steppe, in semirechie, and in Turkestan. The doolittle commission 
also spent two years investigating and issued a report in 1867; its work received 
added impetus due to the increased violence along the Bozeman Trail and the 
1866 fetterman Massacre.
although the doolittle commission’s report highlighted the failures of 
american policy, it produced little legislatively to stem the violence. it was, as one 
scholar noted, an aptly named commission.52 as Prucha observed, the report’s 
most significant contribution was that it stimulated eastern christian reformers 
to demand changes to american government policy toward natives.53 in Russia, 
the steppe commission did not investigate policy failures; rather, it considered 
what policies to enact in order to yield a more efficient colonial administration. 
Its report did not highlight mistreatment of the Kazakhs or insist upon equitable 
land distribution. it did not deviate from its instructions to demand any substan-
tial reforms; it proposed only organizational and administrative restructuring.
The Russian steppe commission produced a significant administrative regu-
lation, which the Russian government enacted in 1868, known as the Pro visional 
statute on the administration of the Turgai, akmolinsk, uralsk, and semi-
palatinsk oblasts.54 intended to be a temporary (until 1871) reorganization, it 
remained in effect until 1917. The provisional statute essentially created two 
guberniia, one for the steppe and the other for Turkestan.55 The statute sub-
divided the steppe into four oblasti, highlighted in its title. it further reduced 
native leadership, and, additionally, the Russian government unified the civil and 
military authority in the region under the command of a governor-general.56 The 
commission concluded, as well, that the Kazakhs were unprepared to adopt an 
agrarian life because the steppe was unsuited to extensive agriculture—except 
for settlers with agricultural experience, such as Russian peasants.57 american 
diplomat eugene schuyler visited the steppe and Turkestan shortly after the 
regulation went into effect. He concluded, “the gulf between the conquerors 
and the conquered has been widened and deepened through defects inherent 
in methods of government subsequently developed, as well as through the faults 
of the administrators.”58
The 1868 statute recommended nothing in the way of assistance for Kazakhs 
dislocated by increased Russian peasant resettlement in the steppe; the govern-
ment also became the final arbiter to resolve land disputes not just between 
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Russian peasants and Kazakhs but among Kazakhs themselves. This established, 
more firmly, the allotment of specific territory for agriculture and livestock, 
between sedentary Russian peasants and nomadic Kazakhs. according to histo-
rian Peter Holquist, “Russia was unique among colonial powers in establishing 
‘norms for meeting the land needs of natives’ ” but nonetheless confirmed “a 
clear preference for sedentary over nomadic life.”59 although not called reserva-
tions by the Russians, the effect was the same. Kazakhs could only use desig-
nated territories within a specifically assigned district in a particular province.
Russia implemented policies that historian Matthew G. hannah observed, in 
the american case, emphasized “[s]patial fixation and restriction [that] were 
of central importance to the plan for civilization.”60 The Russian government 
severely curtailed Kazakh migration and prohibited movement from one dis-
trict to another without official permission. The american government exhib-
ited similar restrictive bureaucratic hurdles after it consigned sioux to specific 
reservations. for example, in september 1886, no flesh, a sioux assigned to 
the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota Territory, requested permission 
to go with a small party to visit friends who lived on the Rosebud agency. The 
acting agent, capt. James Bell, wrote to Bia commissioner John d.c. atkins to 
request permission to let No Flesh go. Atkins replied, “I have to say that while 
it is against the policy of the Government to permit indians to leave their res-
ervation for the purpose of visiting indians upon other reservations, i cannot 
see that any harm could result . . . provided that such visits are made at the 
proper time and will not interfere with the work of the visiting indians or the 
friends whom they may visit.”61 atkins reminded Bell that it was the “object of 
the Government to encourage all indians to become self-supporting by means 
of agriculture or other employment and the practice of visiting to and fro should 
be discouraged.”62
atkins concluded the message to Bell by explaining that these sorts of deci-
sions should remain at the agent’s discretion. What atkins’s missive reveals was 
the truly intrusive nature of american internal colonization. The Russians, how-
ever, imposed restrictions chiefly to prevent conflict between different migrating 
Kazakh auls that might fight to use specific pastures or between Kazakhs and 
Russians. Thus, the Russian regulations restricted Kazakhs to a specific uezd, the 
Russian government entertained Kazakh requests to pasture livestock in a dif-
ferent district. it was highly unlikely that a Russian official ever even considered 
it necessary to ask if a Kazakh could travel to visit friends or relatives who hap-
pened to live in a different uezd. The Russians restricted the Kazakh steppe land 
to specific uses; the americans restrictions were more socially, culturally, and 
personally pervasive.
inTeRnal colonizaTion186
The homestead act and the Russian provisional statute further threw open 
the doors to american pioneers and Russian peasants to resettle in the plains 
and the steppe. While different in conception, they were similar in consequence. 
american pioneers benefited far more from the new circumstances than did 
Russian peasants, generally because the Russian government continued to mon-
itor closely all peasant migration and resettlement in the steppe. The Russian 
government also maintained rigid restrictions on rural populations in european 
Russia. nonetheless, illegal emigration to the steppe continued, and local 
Russian officials often just ignored the problem. The Russian officials in saint 
Petersburg were aware that Russian peasants settled illegally in the steppe, but 
officials in the capital and the steppe tended to ignore the problem because the 
peasants served the state’s interests by fortifying Russia’s demographic position 
along the frontier. for example, in Turgai oblast, from 1875 to 1882, the area 
under settlement by Russian peasants grew from 17,000 to 44,000 desiatin.63 
The peasants were the spearhead of Russian internal colonization.
Before the provisional statute, Kazakhs had relatively free movement in the 
steppe south of the Russian line. after 1868 the Russian government more 
closely regulated Kazakh migrations. it was comparable to what happened to 
the sioux following the 1851 Treaty of fort laramie. at that time, the american 
government and some sioux bands agreed to tribal boundaries and reinforced 
and reorganized in 1868 after the american government established new territo-
rial limitations to demarcate the Great sioux Reservation. By the 1870s, however, 
the Black hills, initially located on the reservation and reserved for the sioux, 
became a source of tension after the custer expedition reported discovering 
large quantities of gold there. The American government proved unable—even 
unwilling—to prevent american pioneers from pouring into the Black hills, in 
violation of the 1868 treaty. This pattern happened repeatedly; the americans 
and Russians imposed territorial margins and defined the boundaries between 
colonizers and colonized but watched, unmoved but not uninterested, as pio-
neers and peasants defied the government’s authority to breach the margins. 
internal colonization in the steppe and the plains accelerated after 1868 in both 
the united states and the Russian empire.
alloTMenT
By the end of the 1860s, both the united states and Russia reevaluated inter-
nal colonization, its administration, and, to a lesser extent, the mechanisms to 
manage resettlement of pioneers and peasants and the native populations on 
colonized land. The united states already embarked upon a policy of using 
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treaties to secure the sioux on reservations; Russia started allotting land gener-
ally designated for Russian peasants (i.e., sedentary) and Kazakhs (i.e., nomads). 
There were other events that pushed the united states toward its own reforms in 
indian affairs. The 1868 fort laramie treaty ended Red cloud’s War and helped 
initiate President ulysses s. Grant’s so-called Peace Policy to reform american 
indian administration and policy. another issue that bothered many americans 
was the treaty system, which many considered fundamentally inconsistent with 
the goal of assimilation and the unique position granted Indians by annuities 
and treaty responsibilities imposed on the american government.
in 1868 Grant’s reform agenda—the Peace Policy—included a program that 
was probably inconceivable to Russian administrators in the Kazakh steppe. 
The Grant administration subscribed to the idea that the Bia was rife with 
corruption, graft, and irregularities that completely mishandled relations with 
indians since its inception in 1824; that it was largely responsible for antagoniz-
ing the various tribes, which led to conflict; and that it stole land and goods from 
indians with impunity. Russia’s colonial structures were not immune to similar 
allegations; many Russian officials also noted significant corruption that accom-
panied Russian administration and resettlement in the Kazakh steppe—what 
one critical observer described as “nothing but a long and nasty anecdote” that 
was replete in “thefts and embezzlement” of state funds, “impenetrable stupid-
ity,” and “brutality and wastefulness” in the government’s policies.64
The solution to these problems in the united states, and one long advocated 
by many reform-minded americans, was to appoint christian leaders as agents, 
teachers, and matrons on the reservations and to positions of authority through-
out the Bia. Russian officials never considered using Russian orthodox leaders 
to serve as administrators in the steppe. nevertheless, the united states fol-
lowed that course exactly, and in early 1869, congress established an indepen-
dent institution—the Board of indian commissioners (Bic)—charged with 
oversight responsibilities of the Bia and government treatment of indians. it 
issued annual reports every year well into the twentieth century.
Within three years of its inception, Bic members proclaimed success but 
noted there was still work to do. according to the third annual report in 1872,
of the warlike tribes of the sioux of dakota, Montana, and Wyoming, hunt-
ing peacefully for buffalo without occasioning any serious alarm among the 
thousands of white settlers whose cabins skirt the borders on both sides of 
these plains, shows clearly . . . the efforts of the friends of peace in estab-
lishing confidence between the white people and the indians. We contrast 
this picture with that presented by the same tribe, when, five years ago, in 
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consequence of our Government’s bad faith in violating its treaties with them, 
they were engaged in a war made memorable by the so-called fort Kearney 
massacre . . . and in the course of which many settlers on the frontier lost 
their lives, and so many hundreds of others were compelled to abandon their 
cabins and flee to the larger towns for safety.65
Grant never completely suspended his belief that Bia ought to transfer from the 
interior department to the War department. nonetheless, he agreed with Gen. 
William T. sherman that all indians must settle on their respective reservations 
and, more importantly, it should be a “double process of peace within their res-
ervation and war without.”66
By the mid-1870s, Grant’s Peace Policy reforms also included replacing all 
indian agents with Quakers, Protestants, catholics, and, in some cases, army 
officers on the many reservations. The goal was to eliminate the corruption that 
american reformers insisted was one of the major reasons for continued conflict 
with the sioux and other indians. in 1871 the united states unilaterally abandon 
treaty making with all indian tribes, which meant that relations with the sioux 
became a domestic relationship rather than one under the guise of “foreign rela-
tions.”67 The decision stipulated, “hereafter no indian nation or tribe within the 
territory of the united states shall be acknowledged or recognized as an inde-
pendent nation, tribe, or power with whom the united states may contract by 
treaty.”68 no longer were relations dictated by diplomacy; instead, the relationship 
was based on social policy, and american social policies demanded assimilation. 
despite these steps, the “political anomaly” that treaty making created for reform-
ers was not resolved as long as the sioux lived communally on reservations.69
it was a transitional phase of american indian federal policy that had no com-
parison in Russian policy, particularly reforming to manage the Russian empire’s 
minority nationalities. Reform groups in the united states spearheaded the 
reforms; oversaw government appropriations, education, and the distribution of 
annuities; and rigidly adhered to a christian, civilizing, and coercive character 
and agenda. Many reform-minded organizations, led by men such as herbert 
Welsh and organizations such as the Women’s national indian association and 
the indian Rights association, eventually coalesced in 1883 with the first meet-
ing of the lake Mohonk conference of the friends of the indian. These reform-
ers generally lacked official status but connected informally to the Board of 
indian commissioners.70 all of these individuals and groups, inspired by their 
christian faith, seemed driven by a simple ideology: they knew how to help 
the indian better than the indian knew himself. in order to save the indian, he 
must stop being an indian. in the case of the sioux, they must adopt american 
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civilization, embrace christianity, and learn to read and write english and labor. 
Well-known nineteenth-century american educator Richard h. Pratt succinctly 
described this ideology as “kill the indian in him, and save the man.”71 it was the 
clearest articulation of the american policies and justifications behind internal 
colonization, which meant americans wanted the sioux to abandon completely 
sioux culture, language, and spiritual attachments to become americans. The 
Russian government did not subject Kazakhs to similar coercive pressures; the 
orthodox church did not involve itself intrusively in the spiritual affairs of the 
Kazakhs until the early twentieth century. christian reform movements did not 
influence Russian policies in the steppe. The Russians did not want to make 
the Kazakhs become Russians; they merely wanted the Kazakhs to be less like 
Kazakhs. essentially, the Kazakhs could keep their language, traditions, and 
even religion; but the Russians just wanted them to stop being nomads. once 
settled, Russians expected Kazakhs to learn civilization and, in time, adopt the 
culture, language, and religion of the empire.
in both cases, however, governments determined that the best way to achieve 
their objective was land allotment. it was, essentially, land redistribution. Both 
governments allotted natives specific parcels of land to settle and farm and 
redistributed the surplus— significantly more than the native allotment—to 
american pioneers and Russian peasants. The american and Russian govern-
ments implemented allotment differently; however, both regarded allotment as 
the surest way to settle the Sioux and the Kazakhs. The intended consequence 
made land available to those who might best exploit its bounty, but, more impor-
tantly, it eroded the communal bonds that ostensibly kept the sioux and the 
Kazakhs uncivilized.72 The american government considered a variety of solu-
tions, but the means chosen was the 1887 General allotment act, or dawes 
act, which “mandated a fundamental change in indian-White relations.”73 
commissioner atkins clearly articulated the act’s intent: “it is the earnest desire 
of the Government that the indians give up their nomadic habits; settle upon 
land in severalty; go to work and earn a living; educate their children and become 
intelligent, respected and worthy citizens.”74 Many well-intentioned supporters 
of the act believed it appropriately encouraged indians to be more amenable to 
white settlement and to adopt agriculture permanently. Writing many years after 
the act’s passage, commissioner of indian affairs francis e. leupp wrote that 
most Americans regarded the reservations as “a system whose evils it requires 
the larger part of the energy of recent indian administration to remedy,” but 
also that each was somehow “a princely domain.”75 it assumed, one advocate 
claimed, to elevate the barbarian because civilization “follows the improved arts 
of agriculture as vegetation follows the genial sunshine and the shower, and 
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that those races who are in ignorance of agriculture are also ignorant of almost 
everything else.”76
The agrarian life produced, presumably, industrious, productive farmers who 
settled on large tracts and were rapidly assimilated into civilized society. atkins 
endorsed the reforms because the “benign policy on the part of the Government 
toward the indian race, dictated by a love of humanity, one in which both politi-
cal parties have fortunately and exceptionally agreed, is a proud national dis-
tinction.” nevertheless, he cautioned critics and supporters of allotment to be 
patient. he noted, “character, habits, and antecedents can not be changed by an 
enactment. The distance between barbarism and civilization is too long to be 
passed over speedily.”77 Most historians concluded, however, that the dawes act, 
in effect until 1934, was a dismal failure.
according to the act, the head of each family was eligible to receive a 160-acre 
tract of land; single individuals over the age of eighteen received an additional 
80 acres and children under eighteen received 40 acres. on reservations with 
land suitable only for livestock, the allotment doubled. allotment was compul-
sory; the government assigned land to individuals who refused allotment within 
four years. allotments were technically twenty-five-year trusts, during which 
time the individual could not sell nor lease the land. The government granted 
title after twenty-five years, but all reservation land not allotted was available for 
sale, with the proceeds held in trust by the government. initially, the sioux had 
the right to approve all sales of surplus land, but in 1903 the courts determined 
that approval was unnecessary. Therefore, the sioux ultimately had no say in the 
disposition of their land; neither tribe nor individual could reject allotment—
the government simply imposed the legislation.
in 1889 commissioner of indian affairs T. J. Morgan identified eight “simple, 
well-defined, and strongly-cherished convictions” to guide his administration, 
including that the “reservation system belongs to a ‘vanishing state of things’ and 
must soon cease to exist.” all indians, he argued, must be absorbed “into our 
national life, not as indians, but as american citizens.” Morgan wanted indians 
to adjust accordingly to destroy tribal relations, “peacefully if they will, forcibly 
if they must.”78 he understood the difficulties, however, writing in 1890 that the 
“natural conservatism of the indians, which leads them to cling with tenacity to 
their superstitions and inherited practices, adds to the difficulty of inducing 
them to abandon their own and accept the white man’s ways.”79 allotment pro-
ceeded slowly, but another principal blow to the Great sioux Reservation was 
President Benjamin harrison’s 1890 proclamation that broke the reservation 
into several smaller reserves, granted rights-of-way to railroads, and made land 
available to homesteaders.80
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Throughout the 1890s, reservation agents reported “progress” toward allot-
ment’s completion, but they also noted that opposition remained. in 1894 the 
Pine Ridge Reservation agent reported that roughly 90 percent of the sioux there 
opposed the plan.81 in 1897 sen. Richard f. Pettigrew, chairman of the senate 
committee of indian affairs, interviewed a delegation of four oglala sioux from 
Pine Ridge as they visited Washington. he asked them directly if any selected 
their allotments; all four said no. The reason was not solely an objection to the 
law but rather, they claimed, because the land was incapable of supporting large-
scale agriculture; it was, however, suitable to raising livestock. Red cloud, one 
of the delegates and well-known to american officials for his role in the conflict 
along the Bozeman Trail in the 1860s, explained to Pettigrew that his people 
knew the land well, but that it was unsuitable for agriculture. “We can not,” he 
said, “raise anything on it . . . we do not want it.”82 Pettigrew asked about cattle, 
and Red cloud turned the discussion to american desires for the sioux to be self-
supporting people, telling the senator that “if we try to depend on tilling the land 
we have no returns for it; there is no way of making ourselves self-supporting 
when the Government lets us alone.”83 The delegates submitted a petition to 
the committee, which rejected allotment and claimed “that by following stock 
raising we will in time become civilized, enlightened, thrifty, self-governing, and 
independent citizens.”84
it was, essentially, a plea to allow the sioux to use the land as they saw fit, not 
allot the land in parcels too small to support livestock because they could only 
be self-supporting through livestock, not agriculture. allotment, according to 
Red cloud and the other delegates, kept the sioux on Pine Ridge wards of the 
government, contrary to the law’s elementary purpose. it could be too that Red 
cloud simply failed to convince Pettigrew that the land was unproductive; dry 
farming in the plains had a large number of adherents, and there was unques-
tionably a belief that the “rain followed the plow.”85
even if that was the case, it is also doubtful that the sioux had the knowl-
edge, seed, or implements to farm successfully in the northern plains without 
adequate water resources.86 in a sense, the sioux delegation’s comments echoed 
zebulon Pike, who considered the plains suitable for livestock but not agricul-
ture.87 in fact, the sioux complaints matched what various reservation agents 
were telling different commissioners of indian affairs for decades; but after 1887 
the government was determined to settle the sioux onto individual allotments 
and make them farmers.88
The Kazakhs noted similar difficulties with forced sedentarization on the 
steppe.89 Russian geographers often debated the feasibility of intensive agricul-
ture in the Kazakh steppe; many argued that it was suitable only for livestock, 
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which required extensive allotments to be profitable and effective. Of course, the 
Russian government was compelled to accelerate migration to the Kazakh steppe, 
especially following the disastrous 1891–1892 famine in european Russia.90
The idea of virgin untilled land, even land that specialists understood was 
arid and not suitable to intensive agriculture, led to mass corruption and fur-
ther impoverished Kazakhs and robbed them of land. alikhan Bokeikhanov, a 
Russian-trained Kazakh agronomist, joined an expedition to the steppe—the 
so-called shcherbina expedition—and observed that Kazakhs in many districts 
averaged only about 6 desiatin of land, not the 15 desiatin promised follow-
ing the 1896 Russian statute to allot land in the steppe.91 Moreover, Kazakhs 
who agreed to settle and become farmers received more land than those who 
persisted with livestock nomadism.92 Gen. aleksei Kuropatkin, governor-gen-
eral of Turkestan, after touring recently colonized lands in semirechie, noted, 
“Particularly inadmissible to me is the giving . . . of 180,000 desiatin of pasture 
land to various individuals including 10,000 desiatin to Porotikov, police chief of 
the city of vernyi . . . Turning the Kirgiz to a sedentary life we parceled out to 
them only plough lands while the pasture lands—180,000 desiatin—we gave to 
speculators, not to the Kirgiz.”93
in the Russian case, allotment policies implemented in the Kazakh steppe 
were not enacted to break apart reservations or necessarily designed to erode 
Kazakh society, but the consequences impoverished Kazakhs and, even if 
Figure 5.2. Pine Ridge Reservation, august 2008 (photo by author). 
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unwittingly, forced them to abandon their nomadic life and settle on land utterly 
insufficient to raising livestock.94 Kazakhs were compelled to take menial jobs, 
usually as laborers or hired field-workers, simply to survive. Kazakh sociopoliti-
cal structures collapsed as a result.
Beginning in the 1880s, the Russian government enacted several new laws 
that drastically altered the steppe’s demographics and worsened economic con-
ditions for the Kazakhs. The movement of samovol’tsy (voluntary, or unauthor-
ized) peasants dominated the second half of the nineteenth century. The gov-
ernment failed to control this movement, which increased conflict and tensions 
for land, as the samovol’tsy generally occupied land allotted for Kazakhs. initially, 
the government rhetorically discouraged samovol’tsy from occupying Kazakh 
lands but did very little to prevent it.95 The samovol’tsy were no different from 
Americans who defied American laws that prohibited squatters from settling on 
indian reservations. similar to the Russian situation, as Patricia nelson limerick 
noted in the American case, “Squatters defied the boundaries of Indian Territory 
and then were aggrieved to find themselves harassed and attacked by indians.”96 
Russian courts generally decided in favor of Russian peasants when land dis-
putes were presented, forcing Kazakhs to migrate or settle elsewhere.
The number of peasants seeking new lives in the steppe overwhelmed Russian 
officials. These officials also recognized the potential for conflicts in the steppe 
between impoverished Kazakhs and Russian peasants. They decided the best 
remedy was, similar to the american case, to prohibit Russians from settling on 
allotted Kazakh lands. in 1883 the Russian government once again announced 
a ban against resettlement in the steppe oblasts.97 even with the prohibitions, 
the government was unable to regulate the movement of Russian peasants 
into the steppe; the prohibitions proved ineffective.98 The Russian government 
decided to reevaluate how much land Kazakhs needed and how much land to 
make available to Russian peasants. The illegal migrants were, according to one 
local Russian official, “unable to be patient” and tended to settle in places that 
lacked “supervision” (nabliudenie), occupying the land “without proper permis-
sion.”99 one official complained that at the rate the Russian peasants were flood-
ing into the steppe, they were on the verge of “completely covering the steppe 
with Russian settlements.”100 indeed, according to historian Geroid T. Robinson, 
“among the peasants west of the urals,” the land to the east was “regarded as a 
kind of utopia.”101
in 1888 Russian officials observed significant increases the number of indi-
gent Kazakhs. one report noted, “in order not to die from starvation, they [poor 
Kazakhs] take work as seasonal laborers at local markets and factories, and 
live as farm hirelings doing agricultural work for other Kazakhs. contact with 
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Russians has taught them how to cultivate fields and small gardens. The num-
ber of these beggars already numbers in the thousands.”102 in 1889 the Russian 
government established the Resettlement act, which permitted peasants to 
migrate legally and settle on lands that the Russian interior Ministry deemed 
excessive—namely, on lands that the government believed were unnecessary 
for Kazakh nomads. often these were communal lands, shared by Kazakhs 
from the same clan or horde. Moreover, given that Russian laws that restricted 
Kazakhs to specific districts disrupted Kazakh migration patterns, the land 
assigned to Kazakhs was often not suitable for livestock.
This combination of rules severely weakened the Kazakh nomadic economy 
and sociopolitical structures. To encourage Russian peasants to settle on steppe 
lands and to make tangible improvement to them (permanent buildings and 
year-round occupation), Russian peasants were granted tax exemptions and 
provided some assistance to construct new residences. The 1889 act, according 
to a Kazakh scholar, threw the door to the steppe wide open once again; but 
even under the new act, local officials were not able to manage effectively the 
resettlement process. Russian peasants tended to settle where they wanted, not 
on land the government assigned to them.103
in addition, beginning with the 1889 statute, the Russian government des-
ignated certain lands excess, or superfluous (izlishnii), for nomadic use and 
placed such land under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of agriculture and state 
Property. Consequently, peasant holdings often exceeded the 15 desiatin nor-
mally allotted by the government for settlement. This was a Russian version of 
the homestead act, but it was still a rather chaotic environment. in 1896 the 
Russian interior Ministry established a special Resettlement administration 
(Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie), which assumed certain duties formerly handled 
by the ministry’s “land section” (Zemskii otdel). This new administrative struc-
ture managed and promoted the practice of “scouting” (khodachestvo) to survey 
the best land for Russian peasants to occupy.104 one french visitor commented 
that the “scouts” were little more than thieves sanctioned by the state to seize 
land from the natives.105 in the zest to identify “surplus lands,” in a somewhat 
comical turn, an overzealous official—a certain Mazurenko—inadvertently 
incorporated some chinese territory in the tracts he categorized as surplus 
and fit for settlement.106 in order to organize peasant resettlement with better 
empirical evidence, the Russian government dispatched several scientific expe-
ditions to the steppe to determine what lands were best suited for resettlement. 
in one case, a Russian government expedition surveyed roughly 36 million desi-
atin in the steppe reserved for Kazakhs, but it concluded that it was more than 
double the amount necessary for them to survive.107
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Russia’s Resettlement administration established regulations to manage allot-
ments but often ignored its own rules, which forced many Kazakhs to reset-
tle on hilltops, mountainsides, and deserts in order to survive.108 one Kazakh 
described his allotment as “worthless” because Russians allotted the best land 
to peasants or wealthy Kazakhs. he lacked provisions and fodder for his livestock, 
which was “falling into extreme impoverishment.”109 another Kazakh claimed 
that he was not granted his full 15 desiatin allotment of “suitable land” (udobnoi 
zemli) guaranteed by law, which caused his family to live in absolute poverty.110 
The government provided inadequate training and support to Kazakhs forced to 
take up the sedentary, agrarian life.111 a similar situation existed in the united 
states. stories of corruption and unscrupulous americans taking advantage of 
indians—not just the sioux—were almost axiomatic. helen hunt Jackson’s 1881 
classic, A Century of Dishonor, was not the first to highlight this fact, but it cer-
tainly seemed to galvanize reformers to demand drastic changes to the american 
treatment of indians.112 one of the principal means devised to reform indian 
affairs was allotment—the very thing many sioux opposed. it did not matter.
in the united states, sen. charles dawes of Massachusetts, the architect 
of allotment, seemed to echo similar concerns when he spoke for the sioux a 
couple of years after the act’s passage. he observed that indians had “no homes, 
no horses, no hoes, no seeds, and had they had ploughs, they would not know 
how to use them.”113 The united states and Russia desired to expand agriculture 
because each believed that the agrarian, sedentary life was markedly superior to 
nomadism. Both governments allotted land to force the sioux and the Kazakhs 
to accept small allotments to farm, even though both governments also recog-
nized that the sioux and the Kazakhs were not experienced farmers. Perhaps the 
most unusual explanation for the Kazakh land shortage—not one that seems to 
be used in the united states—came from well-known Russian orientalist vasilii 
Grigoriev, who attributed the Kazakh problems in the steppe not to Russian 
colonization or because Russian peasants occupied the best land. Grigoriev 
claimed that before Russian expansion into the steppe, Kazakhs were in a con-
stant state of internecine warfare. As a consequence, this barbaric warfare kept 
the Kazakh population small relative to the available land. Russian colonization 
brought order, peace, and stability to the steppe; the Kazakh population thereby 
increased, and they “began to live in peace and multiply their numbers. This 
development resulted in land shortages.”114
The expanding american and Russian colonizers allotted the land in spe-
cific ways, using specific categories; but both governments also had to deal 
with pioneers and peasants who transgressed against the allotted boundaries. 
There were, in both cases, severe consequences for the Sioux and the Kazakhs 
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following the intensified allotment efforts evident in the american dawes act 
and the Russian 1889 and 1896 statutes. historian Richard White summarized 
the dawes act this way: “The policy of allotment in severalty was as draconian 
a case of social reform forced on an outside group—most indians were not yet 
citizens—and with as disastrous consequences as anything in American his-
tory. it was done in the name of capitalist progress, democracy, christianity. ”115 
according to emily Greenwald, it was an effort to “atomize indians, to break 
down their economic and social bonds by dispersing them onto individually 
owned parcels of land.”116 By 1907 about 3,000 of the 6,700 Pine Ridge sioux eli-
gible for allotment had made their selections. The impetus for future allotments, 
according to George e. hyde, Red cloud’s biographer, was that the united 
states had effectively destroyed the sioux sociopolitical structures by compel-
ling them to take land.117 The dawes act made more than 9 million acres avail-
able through allotment to american settlers, essentially dismantling the sioux 
reservations. in fact, according to Wolfe, in total land redistribution, “in the half-
century from 1881, the total acreage held by indians in the united states fell 
by two thirds, from just over 155 million acres to just over 52 million.”118 Rather 
than assimilating the sioux, allotment and forced sedentarization created deep 
social, cultural, and economic crises on the various sioux reservations well 
into the twentieth century. in the Kazakh steppe, as david Moon described 
Russian efforts, “Hand-in-hand with Russian conquest, peasant settlement, loss 
of land, and sedentarization came attempts to undermine the local culture as 
the Russian state began to move away from its earlier policy of accommodation 
with local elites.”119
The united states and Russia imposed their culture on the sioux and the 
Kazakhs; they compelled social and political accommodation and demanded 
assimilation into the dominant society by insisting that the sioux and the 
Kazakhs accept allotments in order to become part of the agrarian ideal. The 
colonizer used schools and education to teach assimilation, the social and cul-
tural behaviors americans and Russians deemed essential for settled, civilized, 
and productive members of society. education was the tool to destroy the barri-
ers that kept the sioux and the Kazakhs primitive peoples; it was the instrument 
to create social, cultural, and political uniformity. it is to that process that this 
study now moves.
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The united states and Russia pursued different strategies during internal colo-
nization to force the sioux and the Kazakhs to abandon the nomadic life for a 
sedentary, agrarian one. central to the various policies and programs advanced 
by the two countries was the belief that the sioux and the Kazakhs could be 
civilized and, ultimately, assimilated and integrated into the broad american 
and Russian social, economic, political, and cultural milieu. The ideological dif-
ferences did not completely mask the consequences; however, the differences 
influenced policy and altered the trajectory of internal colonization in the plains 
and the steppe. in particular, differences in technological advances (chiefly rail-
roads and communication), missionary activities, the use of treaties (examined 
in previous chapters), and governance existed between internal colonization in 
the united states when compared to Russia.
The RailRoad diffeRence
historian J. Russell smith observed, “Gunpowder and the railway reduced the 
grassland man to impotence.”1 as both the united states and Russia expanded 
railroad capacity throughout their empires, the tracks paved the way for deeper 
and more concentrated penetration into the colonized territories. The subject 
of railroad and empires has attracted significant popular and scholarly atten-
tion over the decades. Unquestionably, Russian imperial expansion began well 
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before the process started in the united states, but the development of railroads 
occurred much earlier and more rapidly in the united states than in Russia.2 
historian eric hobsbawm called railroads a “revolutionary transformation” that 
“[t]ransformed the speed of movement . . . and introduced the notion of a gigan-
tic, nation-wide, complex and exact interlocking routine symbolized by the rail-
way timetable. it revealed the possibilities of technical progress as nothing else 
had done, because it was both more advanced than most other forms of techni-
cal activity and omnipresent.”3
In the United States, railroads were “quite consciously . . . agents of state,” 
and, as historian Richard White noted, “Just as Manifest destiny made the 
expansion of the united states synonymous with the expansion of republican 
freedom, christianity, and civilization itself, so the railroads made their expan-
sion an expansion of civilization.”4 Railroads became the symbol of progress and 
civilization, and “technology, railways, the telegraph and weapons were used to 
control and order colonial societies.”5 an 1874 New York Times editorial enthu-
siastically insisted that railroads “pierced the jealously-guarded country of the 
red man; and in its wake will follow the turbulent and aggressive current which 
he has never been able to withstand.”6
By 1850 the united states had roughly three times more rail miles than 
Prussia—a leading european railway builder—a figure that swelled during the 
next decade.7 in 1869, after decades of sectional political debate, the trans-
continental railroad connected the eastern united states to the West coast. 
according to James Belich, in “1875, the top five nations in terms of rail miles 
per capita were the united states (with 1,922 miles of rail per million peo-
ple), new zealand (1,350), canada (1,159), australia (998), and Britain (527). 
european Russian had 185 miles of rail per million people, Brazil 72, and 
india 34.”8 only by the 1890s did railroads play a comparable role in Russia’s 
imperial expansion, similar to that which occurred in the united states. The 
Russian government, including the imperial Geographical society, considered 
the Trans-siberian Railway that linked Moscow to the Pacific ocean an agent 
of the state to bring “christian love and enlightenment into dark asia.”9 The 
Russians equated construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway to the American 
union Pacific (1869) and the canadian Pacific Railway (1885). american and 
canadian railroads represented models to follow for Russia’s industrialization, 
territorial consolidation, and economic integration. some Russians hoped to 
emulate the american example.10 The american transcontinental lines moved 
people and commerce, but those railroads also transported the military and, 
more importantly, pioneers, tourists, and entrepreneurs to the plains. Railways 
in siberia and central asia eased transportation for peasants, foreign visitors, 
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government administrators, and soldiers to the Kazakh steppe, siberia, and the 
Russian far east.
Railroad travel in both the united states and Russia encouraged pioneers 
and peasants to resettle in recently opened lands—particularly in the united 
states, where “the western railroads loosed a flood of stationery, postcards, 
calendars, timetables, guidebooks, and advertisements” on the public to pro-
mote rail travel and commerce.11 in the united states, railroads were often joint 
ventures between government and private interests. Russian railroads, how-
ever, were almost exclusively state enterprises. nonetheless, by the 1890s, the 
Russian government recognized the necessity of promoting railroads among the 
peasant population in order to encourage migration and resettlement in the 
steppe and siberia. according to historian Willard sunderland, “as the scale of 
resettlement increased, state publishing houses (usually under the auspices of 
the Resettlement administration or the siberian Railway committee) started 
churning out a wide array of settler-oriented materials, including settlement 
manuals on different settlement regions (putevoditeli), itineraries (marshruty), 
maps, and a variety of informational pamphlets.”12 a 1900 promotional Guide 
to the Great Siberian Railway, published by the Russian Ministry of Ways of 
communication, claimed “emigration as a factor in Russian history had always 
tended to secure Russian dominion and Russian culture, and would serve as 
a stronghold of orthodoxy and Russian law” as the primary rationale to con-
struct the Trans-siberian Railway.13 in order to facilitate peasant resettlement, 
the Russian government reduced the cost of train travel so that a family of five 
could travel together for the price of a child’s third-class ticket.14
By 1904 the Trans-siberian Railway linked Moscow to the Pacific ocean, 
and within one year it connected the Kazakh steppe, Turkestan, and Tashkent 
(via the Tashkent-orenburg Railway) more fully into the Russian empire.15 
Railroads strengthened the american and Russian grasp on internally colo-
nized lands; as a leading american railroad figure suggested, the “[r]ailroad line 
through indian territory [is] a fortress as well as a highway.”16 however, rail-
roads defended the territorial gains made rather than introduced new ideas into 
the expansionist agenda. Railroads supplemented american internal coloniza-
tion, but they also followed missionaries, settlers, miners, and others in concert 
with internal colonization. Railroads in the united states did not mark the path 
to internal colonization; they merely smoothed the way. in Russia, railroads 
created a new and easier path for peasants and opened different opportunities. 
in a sense, railroads in the western united states followed the flood of travelers 
and settlers; in the Kazakh steppe, organized peasant resettlement accompa-
nied the railroads. in both cases, railroads accelerated internal colonization, but 
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they did not introduce it. This was most evident in the demographic changes in 
the plains and the steppe.
Population shifts in the united states and Russia compelled the american 
and Russian governments to establish frameworks to accommodate pioneers 
and peasants moving and settling on the plains and the steppe. american and 
Russian structures, resettlement, and reorganization clearly resembled colonies 
in other contexts. it was a particular type of sociopolitical organization and sys-
tem of domination, which scholar Jürgen osterhammel referred to as “border 
colonization.” osterhammel argued that border colonization occurred when the 
expanding state’s recognized boundaries extended into and exceeded a contigu-
ous wilderness area.17 in the american expansion, border colonization occurred 
at the same time, and in some cases before, the military conquest. For example, 
in the two decades before the 1862 sioux rebellion in Minnesota, the neigh-
boring territory of Wisconsin experienced a tenfold increase in americans set-
tling there, while in the 1850s, Minnesota expanded twenty-eightfold.18 similar 
growth happened in the plains territories, colorado, Montana Territory, the 
dakotas, and Texas.
Russian peasant resettlement in the Kazakh steppe was much slower, and 
peasants tended to settle close to the irtysh line or Russian fortifications. 
Peasant resettlement rarely exhibited border colonization. The Russian govern-
ment tried to retain a firm grip on peasant movements, particular prior to the 
1861 serf emancipation. Those peasants permitted to migrate tended to settle in 
northern steppe regions. in the southern steppe regions, peasants settled much 
more slowly. According to one Russian survey, peasants frequently settled as 
“villages” rather than on individual allotments, mimicking the pattern of life they 
left behind. after the serf emancipation, the Russian government attempted to 
manage peasant migration and demarcate specific lands available to resettle-
ment in the steppe. Between 1874 and 1892, the number of settlements in the 
syr darya province almost tripled.19 akmolinsk, opened longer to resettlement 
than any other Kazakh steppe province, also experienced significant growth in 
the 1890s. The objective, as one source claimed, was to “drive the Kirgiz peo-
ple out . . . to ensure the life and property of the Russian settlers and restrain 
the impertinent Kirgiz.”20 after completing the Trans-siberian Railway in 1904, 
the Russian government lost control of the situation. around semipalatinsk, 
between 1907 and 1910, the number of resettled peasant families grew from 
1,000 to 11,500.21 indeed, between 1896 and 1916, more than 2 million Russian 
peasants settled in the steppe.22 These demographic changes, driven by com-
parable pioneer and peasant demands for land, were still somewhat different, 
particularly the role the railroads played facilitating the movement.
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The MissionaRy diffeRence
one other difference between american and Russian internal colonization of 
the sioux and the Kazakhs was the role played by missionaries. The internal 
colonization and ideological differences between the united states and Russia, 
as Roger l. nichols observed, set the americans “on a course using the church, 
the plow, and the school as the central means of incorporating tribal people 
into the general society.”23 in 1819 the us congress appropriated ten thousand 
dollars for indian affairs, ostensibly to save the indian from extinction and to 
promote civilization among the various tribes in the east and throughout the 
Mississippi valley regions.24 civilizing and christianizing indians in the united 
states was long a practice among various christian sects but declined in the first 
decades of independence.
civilizing and christianizing in the american case was an imperial ideology 
nonetheless, an ideology that emphasized assimilation and generally ignored 
native customs and beliefs during internal colonization. in the 1820s, several 
groups in the united states, including the american Board of commissioners 
for foreign Missions, dispatched missionaries to work among the various tribes, 
particularly in the West. from this point forward, civilization and christianity 
were “inextricably mixed” in american internal colonization.25 The Russians fol-
lowed a slightly different imperial ideology, more similar to British imperialism 
in india, in which the government focused on legal codes and civil institutions 
to orchestrate its internal colonization.26 as such, one Russian observer claimed 
that “Russian governance gave central asia the two most valuable gifts of civi-
lization—security of life and security for property—two things that were not 
known there previously, and the absence of which made normal life there impos-
sible.”27 The difference between american and Russian approaches to coupling 
the civilizing agenda with missionary efforts is not difficult to understand: the 
Kazakhs were Muslims.
catherine the Great’s 1773 “edict of Toleration of all faiths,” which sus-
pended nearly all christian proselytizing among the empire’s Muslim popula-
tions, determined Russia’s policies throughout much of the nineteenth cen-
tury. as such, the edict’s proponents expected to integrate Muslim subjects 
using less compulsory measures—such as forced conversions to orthodoxy—
because “to forbid, or not to allow them to profess different Modes of religion, 
would greatly endanger the Peace and security of its citizens.”28 Thus, for 
almost a century, the Russian government and the orthodox church ignored 
active missionary work among the Kazakh population.29 in the Kazakh steppe, 
parish priests rather than missionaries operated the orthodox missions. 
Those priests were often more busy with the job of ministering to Russian 
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peasants in the towns and villages than bothering to convert Muslim Kazakhs 
to christianity.30
catherine’s edict did not completely discourage the Russian orthodox 
church from proselytizing among the Kazakhs, or even among pagan peoples 
in siberia; rather, the government did not actively promote it.31 in fact, the 
Russian government and the orthodox church tolerated other non-christian 
religions throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, including Judaism 
and Buddhism.32 nineteenth-century Russian historian nikolai Karamzin 
comparatively claimed that Russia chose not to disturb the “consciences of 
the vanquished” but determined to enlighten its non-Christians “in the Divine 
faith simply by setting them a better example, without recourse to the vio-
lence and villainy to which other devotees of christianity resorted in europe 
and america.”33 Russia maintained a civilizing mission throughout much of the 
nineteenth century that was administrative and integrative rather than reli-
gious. The Russians often used the term grazhdanstvennost’ to describe the 
integration, but it is not a simple translation. it denotes a form of civil order and 
civil society—perhaps citizenship, but not assimilation.34
The Russian government discouraged missionary work among the Kazakhs 
because it held a very different perspective toward islam.35 from the moment 
europeans transplanted themselves in north america, converting the natives to 
christianity was axiomatic. as Mark cocker noted, possibly that first meeting 
in 1492 fundamentally altered europeans’ intellectual conceptions of human 
history, as “half the world was obliged to embrace its other half in an instant 
revolution of the imagination.”36 steven conn argued that the very existence 
of Native Americans made Europeans ask some ‘basic” questions, such as “who 
and where” did these people come from? These questions vexed Americans as 
well and “lay at the heart of the way several intellectual genres” developed in the 
united states long into the nineteenth century.37
That is not to suggest that when europeans arrived in the americas that they 
were completely ignorant of other peoples—quite the contrary. Europeans 
knew about asians, africans, Muslims, and peoples living beyond (and within) 
europe’s borders, but that did not prevent europeans from asking fundamen-
tal questions about the world and where Indians fit within that worldview. 
americans ultimately identified indians as a different race, not an identity 
based solely upon a creed or geography. as such, american christian mis-
sionaries actively worked to convert them throughout much of the nineteenth 
century. Moreover, many christian missionaries in asia, africa, and elsewhere 
tended to respect the existence of islam, although they considered it a f lawed 
and ignorant creed; in the united states, missionaries regarded native religion 
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as unrealistic and paganism. as the frontier moved west, missionary objectives 
remained the same; only the tactics changed.
The Russians, on the other hand, never troubled to answer such elementary 
questions. The people the Russians encountered in the Kazakh Steppe and Asia 
were a known people; they were, of course, misunderstood, stereotyped, and 
classified but were not a people that challenged the Russians’ fundamental bib-
lical or classical understanding of the world and its history. The Russians typi-
cally grouped the new subjects as inozemtsy (of another land) and later catego-
rized the Kazakhs as inorodtsy (“alien” or “of another people”). Both of these 
terms suggest the extra-territoriality of the annexed people, their non-Russian 
ethnicity. But in the nineteenth century, Kazakhs were also referred to as inov-
erets (of a different faith), bestowed by the conventions of the day as a religious 
marker to identify non-Russians (i.e., non-orthodox). The terms had legal and 
informal connotations and usages; Kazakhs were “non-assimilable, radically 
different subjects of the tsarist realm,” and the term reflected the degree of 
civilized development.38 according to John W. slocum, assimilation was deemed 
improbable for inorodtsy; they were people identified by distinct social, cultural, 
and religious characteristics “whose purportedly ‘low level of civilization’ placed 
them in need of a special relationship of trusteeship to the Russian state.”39 
Kazakhs and others occupied a different social space in the empire because, as 
aleksander Gradovskii noted in 1875, “the inorodtsy population . . . was always 
ready to rise up against the authority of the Muscovite government.”40 Thus, 
Russian government policy was designed to “neutralize that threat” in order to 
integrate rather than assimilate the Kazakhs.41
There were many nineteenth-century critics of catherine’s policy—particu-
larly among Russian officials working in the steppe regions—but the edict per-
sisted roughly until the 1870s.42 Consequently, the Russian Orthodox Church 
did not concern itself with the Kazakhs’ civilization or their spiritual well-being; 
however, in the united states, christianity and the civilizing mission went hand-
in-hand throughout the nineteenth century. among the americans and other 
european imperial powers, according to Ryan dunch, christian missionaries 
“came to their fields convinced of the intellectual, moral, and spiritual superior-
ity of what they thought of, not as their ‘culture,’ but as ‘civilization.’ ”43
in 1824 the american society for Promoting the civilization and General 
improvement of the indian Tribes Within the united states published its first 
report, in which it insisted that the “work of civilizing the indians, is a com-
mon obligation of the whole nation, and it is the duty of all to engage in it.”44 
americans also believed the mere proximity to american civilization and good 
christian practices transformed indians. as historian Robert f. Berkhofer Jr. 
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noted, because for missionaries “the superiority of the american Way of life 
appeared self-evident to them, they thought that indians would see it in their 
immediate self-interest to adopt the habits and beliefs of the (good) White 
american after a brief demonstration.”45
Thus, american missionaries worked more overtly to introduce indians to 
christianity as part of the civilizing mission compared to their Russian counter-
parts in the Kazakh steppe or among Muslims in central asia. american mis-
sionaries believed that exposure to christianity compelled indians to abandon 
their heathen, pagan ways and become civilized agriculturists. Missionaries 
assumed success because such “work, doubtless, is that of raising half a mil-
lion of fellow beings, inhabitants of our country, and original proprietors of its 
soil, from a state of ignorance, heathenism and wretchedness, to the posses-
sion of innumerable blessings, which result from civilization and christianity.”46 
stephen R. Riggs, nineteenth-century missionary to the sioux, pronounced that 
“a civilization in which christianity has no place cannot be other than a refined 
barbarism, and consequently . . . the gospel of Christ should be regarded as 
the great civilizer of nations.”47 Riggs’s views found echoes in most imperial, 
missionary environments, including the Great Britain house of commons’s 
1837 select committee on aborigines, which asserted, “True civilization and 
christianity are inseparable: the former had never been found, but as a fruit 
of the latter.”48 The Russian government did not share that philosophy through 
much of the nineteenth century. interestingly, though, both the united states 
and Russia emphasized civilization and christianity through education, with 
fascinating ideological parallels.
inTeRnal colonizaTion, educaTion, and 
uninTended conseQuences
The chief mechanism to emasculate indigenous cultures and affect internal 
colonization was education. despite sharing seemingly comparable objectives, 
the subsequent consequences were not so very different. The United States 
designed indian education to civilize and christianize the native population; 
Russia designed education to make the natives instruments of the empire in 
order to teach the skills necessary to serve imperial needs as scribes, translators, 
and guides. learning Russian was part of that objective, structured to integrate 
Kazakhs rather than assimilate them. americans wanted the indians to learn 
skills too, but chiefly to learn english, how to farm, learn a trade, develop a 
vocational skill, or learn to labor. By the mid-nineteenth century, americans also 
inextricably coupled these ostensibly tangible goals to an overt but amorphous 
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desire to civilize. The Russians, on the other hand, only linked education and 
civilization together by the late nineteenth century. Moreover, the american pol-
icies assumed a standardized, somewhat inflexible, universal approach to edu-
cation. The Russians more quickly recognized that the cultural and linguistic 
differences among the empire’s many nationalities required a more malleable 
approach to education in the various regions.49
even before independence, in 1775 the american continental congress 
appropriated five hundred dollars to educate “indian youth at dartmouth 
college.”50 in 1818 the american government determined to expand its sup-
port for indian education. The us congress expressed some admiration for 
what other european imperial powers accomplished in their efforts to educate 
natives and justified supporting missionary efforts among its own indigenous 
populations, noting,
Great exertions have of late years been made by individuals and missionary 
societies in europe and america: schools have been established by those 
humane and benevolent societies in the indies, amongst the hindoos and 
hottentots, and notwithstanding that superstition, bigotry, and ignorance have 
shrowded [sic] those people in darkness for ages, thousands of them have 
already yielded to instruction.
The government has no such difficulties to encounter: no bibles nor books 
to translate into foreign or other languages: only establish some english 
schools: the experiment may be tried at a very small expense. The commit-
tee believe that increasing the number of trading posts, and establishing 
schools on, or near our frontiers for the education of indian children, would 
be attended with beneficial effects, both to the united states and the indian 
tribes, and the best possible means of securing the friendship of those 
nations in amity with us, and in time to bring the hostile tribes to see that 
their true interest lies in peace and not in war.51
While the american government provided some limited support for chil-
dren of eastern indians to attend schools, the efforts to bring civilization to 
the indians in these early years was sporadic and limited. nonetheless, these 
labors foreshadowed attempts later in the nineteenth century to civilize the 
sioux. Most schools in the 1820s and 1830s were small missionary institutions, 
often opened with the government’s blessing. in addition, most treaties signed 
between americans and indians included some provision for schools. coupled 
with the goal of educating indians was civilizing and christianizing them; the 
federal government generally provided financial support and encouragement 
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but was not yet giving material support, such as buildings or teachers. The 
Bureau of indian affairs was not yet in the education business on the reserva-
tions, but that changed after the civil War.
in Russia, education initially played a more instrumentalist role and was used 
to integrate some natives into the government’s administrative structures and 
institutions rather than assimilate indigenous peoples.52 in 1847 the Russians 
opened the Omsk kadetskii korpus (omsk corps of cadets), which graduated 
many Kazakhs, including chokan valikhanov, for duty in the army as translators, 
guides, and scribes. in addition, the Russians established many Russian-native 
schools (Russko-tuzemny shkoly), which taught Russian and Kazakh children; 
instruction was almost always in Russian, but these schools were not compul-
sory. in central asia, however, the Russian-native schools competed with mektep 
(native schools with Tatar teachers, not Russians) for students, although atten-
dance was generally small.53 some Kazakh children attended mektep, but the 
curriculum in the mektep was generally Koranic recitation and catechism, cal-
ligraphy, and islamic texts. By the 1850s, wealthy Kazakhs regularly enrolled 
their sons in Russian schools, with graduates often taking positions in the 
steppe bureaucracy as clerks and scribes. despite catherine the Great’s 1773 
edict banning orthodox proselytizing among Muslims, by the second half of the 
nineteenth century, the Russian educational agenda included efforts to convert 
Kazakhs to Russian orthodoxy.
in the 1860s, Russian education of Kazakhs followed the so-called il’minskii 
system, which emphasized the sciences, math, history, and geography but was 
taught in native vernaculars. named for nikolai il’minskii, a professor of Turkic 
languages at the Kazan Theological academy and Kazan university, the goal was 
to limit the spread of islam, particularly among Kazakhs (the Russians under-
stood that Kazakhs were Muslim but believed its tenets were weakly possessed 
precisely because Kazakhs were nomads).54 il’minskii believed native vernacu-
lar education better transmitted Russian civilization and orthodoxy; il’minski 
schools also taught Russian but as a subject, not the instructional language.
il’minskii emphasized that native language education facilitated the transmis-
sion of Russian imperial ideas and ideology. Teaching in the vernacular rein-
forced loyalty to the empire and, ultimately, lead natives, including Kazakhs, to 
adopt Russian culture and habits.55 it was a tool to integrate and possibly convert 
Kazakhs and other national minorities to orthodoxy.56 The Russian minister of 
education, d. a. Tolstoi, wrote to the tsar, “To enlighten the natives, to draw them 
closer to Russia and to the Russian spirit, constitutes in my opinion a goal of 
highest political importance.”57 This method differed little from american mis-
sionaries who opened schools among the sioux and on reservations.
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stephen Riggs preached and taught using the sioux vernacular; he compiled 
one of the first vocabularies, translated the Bible into dakota, and spent some 
forty years among the sioux as a missionary, educator, and ethnologist.58 Brothers 
samuel and Gideon Pond joined Riggs in efforts to civilize, christianize, and 
educate the sioux. like Riggs, they relied on the native language to conduct 
their work.59 after 1868 the government funded schools, regardless if they were 
on or off reservations or run by missionaries, but the office of the commis-
sioner of indian affairs reemphasized the prohibition against teaching in the 
vernacular.60
in Russia, similar debates raged. il’minskii’s critics claimed that the 1864 stat-
ute on primary schools mandated instruction only in the Russian language, and 
they insisted that it accelerated Russification, the Russian version of assimilation: 
“assimilation of language assimilates also the nationality.”61 in the end, however, 
il’minskii won the debate, and in 1870 education minister Tolstoi adopted mea-
sures for the education of natives, which required native teachers to be fluent in 
Russian or Russians who knew the native tongue.62 similar to the work of Riggs 
and the Pond brothers with the dakota, Kazakh dictionaries, grammar books, 
and educational material appeared in the Kazakh language, which in the 1860s 
did not have its own script. The Russians created one using a phonetic-based 
cyrillic; however, later Kazakh intellectuals debated the use of cyrillic or arabic, 
with most choosing the modified arabic script. But it is in education that the 
assimilation policies adopted by the americans and the Russians diverge. The 
Russian government permitted Kazakhs to organize, open, and teach in their 
own schools; teach in the vernacular; and educate young Kazakhs in primary 
topics such as history, geography, mathematics, and the sciences. Kazakhs cre-
ated the curriculum, recruited the students, and used education to try to protect 
and preserve Kazakh culture in the face of increased Russification.63
Thus, in the second half of the nineteenth century, in their own way, american 
and Russian compulsory education attempted to impose cultural conformity 
through education and christianity. it was one thing to force sedentarization 
and the agrarian life through allotment but quite another to accelerate assimi-
lation through education. in 1875 the commissioner of indian affairs, John Q. 
smith, conjoined education and civilization for all indians because “they should 
be recognized and treated for what they are, an ignorant and helpless people, 
who have a large moral claim upon the united states.”64 americans owed indians, 
smith insisted, “a debt which cannot be discharged by gifts of blankets and 
bacon, or any routine official care for their protection or relief.”65 These “trifles” 
meant nothing compared to the gift of “civilization—which every consideration 
of humanity requires that we should give them.”66
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american and Russian internal colonization clearly manifested over native 
language issues, but it was a more pernicious feature of american internal colo-
nization than the Russian case. in fact, the us government clearly regarded the 
persistence of native tongues as one of the more powerful obstacles to assimila-
tion. in 1877 commissioner of indian affairs ezra a. hayt advised the govern-
ment to establish a “rule making it compulsory upon all indian children between 
the ages of six and fourteen years to attend schools, and requiring English alone 
to be spoken and taught therein.”67
in the united states, education was the blunt tool of assimilation. Bia admin-
istrators, teachers, and missionaries all played a prominent role; they imposed 
american culture, social norms, and civic behavior and strongly privileged 
english-language education over native languages, culture, and social customs. 
schooling and education were not novel concepts for the sioux. Missionaries 
had operated among them for several years, but in 1879 the american govern-
ment funded the first off-reservation boarding school, started by Richard h. 
Pratt, in carlisle, Pennsylvania. only a handful had opened by the time of the 
dawes act, but the government, following the allotment principles established 
in the act, opened even more boarding schools, including hampton institute in 
virginia and haskell institute in Kansas. By 1898 there were twenty-five such 
schools, with a couple more completed by 1909. The annual report from the 
Figure 6.1. ibrahim altynsarin, center, and students (courtesy of central state 
archives, Republic of Kazakhstan, 2-27605). 
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commissioner of indian affairs that year claimed that the “indian service is 
primarily educational . . . The first division of the indian office is therefore 
naturally called the education division.”68 interestingly, these schools eventu-
ally employed a large number of native teachers—more than 20 percent of the 
total (549 from a force of 2,355).69
american education fundamentally rejected the concept of the native. The 
american government sought to destroy what made native languages, in particu-
lar, so inimical to american internal colonization ideology. in 1887 commissioner 
of indian affairs J. d. c. atkins reported that it was necessary to wean natives 
away from their mother tongues in order to instill english, claiming that if it was 
“good enough for a white man and a black man, [it] ought to be good enough for 
the red man.”70 To the critics of this policy who claimed “it was a cruel blow to 
the sacred rights of the indians,” the commissioner rhetorically asked,
is it cruelty to the indian to force him to give up his scalping-knife and 
tomahawk? is it cruelty to force him to abandon the vicious and barbarous 
sun dance, where he lacerates his flesh, and dances and tortures himself 
even unto death? is it cruelty to the indian to force him to have his daughters 
educated and married under the laws of the land, instead of selling them at a 
tender age for a stipulated price into concubinage to gratify the brutal lusts of 
ignorance and barbarism?71
as one Bia administrator explained it to Pine Ridge Reservation agent d. Galla-
gher, “The education of indians in the vernacular is not only no use to them, but is 
detrimental to their education and civilization.”72 Many reformers objected to this 
provision, particularly because it seemed to prohibit the use of bibles published 
in native languages. in 1888 the commissioner of indian affairs, John h. oberly, a 
former superintendent of indian schools and a committed indian school reformer, 
clarified the policy.73 he wrote in the annual report that “it may be well to state 
that it is not the intention of the indian Bureau to prohibit the reading of the Bi-
ble by any indian in any language, or by anybody to any indian in any language or 
in any indian vernacular, anywhere, at any time.”74 The Russian debate about the 
use of the vernacular was not as heated, divisive, or invasive. The Russian govern-
ment did not prevent Kazakhs from speaking the mother tongue; the government 
wanted, at a minimum, for Kazakhs to be bilingual, in order to serve the empire.75
As a consequence, Russian education policies in the steppe allowed Kazakhs 
to become active participants in education rather than simply recipients of the 
colonizers’ language and culture. education in the Muslim world had a deep 
and rich tradition, but by the 1880s, many Kazakhs educated in Russian schools 
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embraced a “new method” (jadid) to protect Kazakh culture by improving it. 
They wanted to control secular instruction, modeled on the Russian schools, 
but infuse it with cultural reform and literacy. from the Russian perspective—
initially, at least—if these reforms created better translators, scribes, guides, 
and subjects, government officials did not object because the curriculum did 
not appear to conflict with Russian efforts to educate Kazakhs. The Kazakhs 
managed to adopt elements of il’minskii’s system but resist, in particular, its 
christianizing agenda. in a comparable context, some sioux managed to per-
form what historian Thomas G. andrews called a “tight rope” between accom-
modation and assimilation. andrews examined the work of clarence Three 
stars, a sioux teacher at the Pine Ridge day school, who believed that english 
language and literacy was the best mechanism to “recast” assimilation as a “tool 
of oglala survival.”76 literacy became the instrument of survival.
The american and Russian schools, however, graduated a generation of intel-
lectuals who became spokesmen for the native culture—translators of sioux and 
Kazakh culture to the colonizing power rather than mere representations of it. 
They could adopt all facets of the dominant society in dress, language, work, and 
carriage but could also defend the native culture and language. americanization 
and Russification fostered a generation of sioux and Kazakh intellectuals—men 
and women who could navigate more successfully between the two cultures 
than previous generations. They were, as edward J. lazzerini noted among other 
native colonized peoples, “partial insiders who knew how to turn the dominant 
discourse against itself,” subsequently adopting a variety of methods to pro-
tect the indigenous culture.77 They aspired to use the dominant culture to their 
advantage via education and economic advancement, to defend their own cul-
ture against the further intrusion of another. sociologist Karl Mannheim wrote, 
“in every society there are those social groups whose special task it is to provide 
an interpretation of the world for that society.”78 But, equally important, Sioux 
and Kazakh intellectuals interpreted their respective culture for the colonizer 
more effectively; the colonizer was comfortable because the intellectuals also 
seemed to exemplify the positive civilizing policies implemented by allotment 
and education. These sioux and Kazakh intellectuals epitomized civilization.
This unintended consequence of American and Russian education policies 
gave the sioux and the Kazakhs an audience; literacy gave sioux and Kazakh 
intellectuals access to an unfiltered, albeit english or Russian, voice. it was the 
language of the colonizer, but the playing field shifted. literacy gave the sioux 
and the Kazakhs power, some authority over their own history and culture, and 
allowed them to reach beyond the world of “the indian problem” or the “nation-
alities question” to present a different perspective and even, to some extent, a 
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different agenda. attending schools designed to assimilate them changed the 
conversation, and sioux and Kazakh intellectuals became active participants 
in that dialogue. armed with the periodical press, they reflected the changes 
in their society by using methods that mimicked comparable situations in 
other colonized societies; they could reform their culture by “adjusting it to 
the requirements of progress while at the same time maintaining its distinctive 
identity.”79 sioux and Kazakh intellectuals were able to reimagine their commu-
nities because, according to Benedict anderson, “their vanguard role” derived 
from their multilingual literacy—or, rather, their literacy and multilingualism. 
anderson argued that multilingualism gave native intellectuals valuable access 
to “modern Western culture in the broadest sense, and, in particular, to the 
models of nationalism, nation-ness, and nation-state produced elsewhere in the 
course of the nineteenth century.”80
in the united states, sioux intellectuals such as charles eastman used the 
periodical press to defend and highlight the value of native languages, cultures, 
and traditions. in many indian boarding schools, administrators and teachers 
allowed students to publish material that seemed to strengthen assimilationist 
policies, but students also used the new forums to defend and define their native 
identities. among Kazakh intellectuals, such as akhmet Baitursynov, there was 
a genealogic line between colonial education and the intellectuals’ capac-
ity to turn the “dominant discourse against itself.” eastman and Baitursynov 
became active leaders in the early twentieth-century sociopolitical movements 
the society of american indians (sai) and alash orda (The horde of alash), 
which claimed to represent the interests of their people against the cultural, 
social, economic, and political internal colonization that enveloped the sioux 
and the Kazakhs over the course of the nineteenth century.81 They wrote for 
american and Russian audiences, but they also successfully crossed the social 
and cultural divide to criticize government policies without threatening the 
social or political order. They were prolific writers; each advocated learning the 
colonizer’s language and insisted that education was critical for the survival of 
their people; but they also demanded that the governments desist with allot-
ment and internal colonization.
sioux and Kazakh intellectuals spawned a renaissance of sioux and Kazakh 
literature in the early twentieth century, and they helped to influence renewed 
examinations of internal colonization and altered american and Russian policies. 
allotment, in both the american and Russian cases, was simply the process to 
organize and stabilize land resettlement. in the american case, it is typically 
associated with the 1887 dawes act; however, in a sense, the americans allot-
ted land well before that legislation but called it something different, such as 
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removal or reservations. By removing indians to reservations, americans were 
allotting land for one group of people to use and denying it to another. in the 
Russian case, allotment started the moment the tsar’s forces moved into the 
steppe and established the line of west–east forts manned by cossack garrisons 
and Russian peasants. The Russians excluded Kazakhs from using those allot-
ments to pasture their livestock and often denied them permission to migrate to 
the other side of the line. in other words, that policy effectively removed Kazakhs 
by forcing them to pasture their herds away from Russian military establish-
ments and peasant settlements. The policy deprived them access to land they 
had claimed and enjoyed for generations. it was not, as in the american case, a 
literal and physical removal from one territory to another; but the result was the 
same.
sioux and Kazakhs lived with what historian Beth ladow called the “strange 
duality” in which the sioux and other indians were physically segregated from 
the dominant american society yet were expected to assimilate culturally.82 The 
Kazakhs lived with that same strange duality, categorized as inorodtsy—sub-
jects without benefit—and expected to integrate and imitate Russian peasant 
sedentary agriculturalists. These two contradictory concepts, apparently socio-
political handmaidens to civilization, permeated and influenced american and 
Russian alchemies of internal colonization.
a neW cenTuRy, diffeRenT soluTions?
as the nineteenth century closed, the united states faced a crisis of identity, as 
did the Russian empire in the early twentieth century. in the united states, 
many politicians, journalists, and others questioned if America was an empire 
comparable to Britain and france. The defeat of the spanish in cuba and the 
Philippines triggered an impassioned debate about the meaning and course 
of American expansion into these recently acquired overseas lands. For some 
americans, however, this was not a new or necessary debate. instead, the terms 
of the debate resonated clearly with the country’s earlier expansion across the 
continent. Writing in 1900, former journalist, soldier, and senator from Kansas, 
William a. Peffer, asked rhetorically, “is our Philippine policy anti-american?” 
not in essence, he claimed, because except for those few periods when the 
american army was engaged against Mexico, the confederate states, or spain, 
“the army was used almost entirely for the indian service, and stationed in 
the indian country along the frontier.”83 as such, he insisted, expansion and 
“americanism . . . has consistently exhibited itself in the policy followed by this 
country . . . which are comparable to the Philippine situation at the present 
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day. if it amounts to imperialism, then, indeed, are we a nation of imperial-
ists without division.”84 america had overseas colonies; it had, or so it seemed, 
imperial ambitions. This argument was echoed decades later by Richard White, 
who noted, “Western expansion was about empire, as much as the american 
people and many historians would like to treat it as a purely domestic develop-
ment. . . . [and] the creation of an overseas empire in 1898 was not ‘unthinking 
or accidental.’ it had precedents in continental expansion, which was just as 
conscious.”85 contiguous expansion, for most americans, was destiny and natu-
ral, but it was also imperial and colonization. Russia and its contemporaries, on 
the other hand, clearly considered it a continental empire, but no such debate 
occurred in the halls of government, among military men, or among Russian 
peasants migrating to the steppe. Russia was an empire, but the regime divested 
itself of overseas colonies in 1867 when it determined that alaska was not worth 
the cost to maintain the overseas imperial grip. Russia’s identity crisis, however, 
was not the result of its continued imperial expansion but rather by its sudden 
termination.
Japan’s defeat of Russia in 1904–1905 exacerbated Russia’s internal economic 
and social fragility and sparked a revolution at home. it was a chastening defeat; 
an asian power turned the tide against european economic and military hege-
mony. if that was not humbling enough, widespread peasant and labor unrest 
quickly spread and sailors in the Black Sea fleet rebelled, forcing the government 
to abandon many of its culturally and socially repressive, crucifying policies and 
return its colonial affairs to what one scholar called its “traditional pattern of flex-
ible pragmatism.”86 The concessions wrested from Tsar nicholas ii resulted in 
unprecedented reforms. The tsar consented to parliamentary (duma) elections, 
permitted political parties to organize, eased censorship, and granted freedoms 
of movement, the press, and assembly. Russia generally abandoned its policies 
of forced assimilation in order to pacify nationalist and anticolonial movements 
inspired by Japan’s example. one policy that the Russian government failed to 
reform was peasant resettlement in the steppe and siberia. finally unencum-
bered by official restrictions, peasant migration rapidly accelerated after 1905 
and overwhelmed local officials. as with many other minority peoples in the 
Russian empire, Kazakh intellectuals organized to petition the government for 
relief from the increased economic deterioration caused by peasants occupying 
land previously reserved for Kazakh nomads. included in the petition was the 
demand that the government suspend all allotment and resettlement activities 
in the Kazakh steppe.
in 1906 six Kazakhs, including alikhan Bokeikhanov, were elected to serve 
in the first duma; considered far too liberal for the conservative tsar, nicholas 
assiMil aTion and idenTiT y222
II quickly dissolved it, and new elections were held. The tsar also managed to 
impose new legislation that greatly reduced national minority participation in 
all ensuing duma elections. nonetheless, Kazakhs, as was the case for many 
minorities in the empire, fully and actively participated for the first time in 
the empire’s political process. They were not alone. Kazakh intellectuals subse-
quently organized the Alash Orda, and in 1913 it started publishing a newspa-
per, Kazak. edited by akhmet Baitursynov, Kazak appeared regularly until 1918, 
when it succumbed to wartime shortages and the ravages of revolution and civil 
war. These men were not revolutionaries. in fact, during World War i, alash orda 
actively supported the Russian government’s efforts, but it vigorously debated 
what role Kazakhs ought to play and how the people could best contribute. That 
was all for naught, however, because in June 1916, the government announced 
plans to conscript Muslims to serve, which sparked widespread revolts through-
out central asia and the steppe regions.87 alash proclaimed Kazakh indepen-
dence from Russia in december 1917, but, caught between opposing Bolshevik 
Reds on the one side and Whites (anti-Bolsheviks) on the other, independence 
was short-lived. By 1923 the Bolshevik government reincorporated Kazakhs into 
the newly formed soviet union—a novel social, cultural, and political experi-
ment that played out for the Kazakhs under soviet rule, an examination of which 
is beyond the scope of this work.88
in the early twentieth century, despite debates about america’s overseas impe-
rial ambitions, allotment continued uninterrupted on the majority of indian 
reservations. in 1906 the federal government amended the dawes act with the 
Burke act. The purpose of the Burke act was to adjust the twenty-five-year 
trust period established for indians granted citizenship and enfranchised. The 
Figure 6.2. From left: akhmet Baitursynov, alikhan Bokeikhanov, and Mirzhakip 
dulatov (courtesy of central state archives, Republic of Kazakhstan, 2-95119). 
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government established Competency Commissions to evaluate so-called quali-
fied indians, thereby making indians unrestricted landowners with the right to 
lease or sell land without government interference.89 The act merely accelerated 
allotment and indian economic and social dislocation. By the 1910s, sioux intel-
lectuals such as charles eastman also participated in the modestly successful 
society of american indians. formed in 1911, and similar to alash orda, the 
sai advocated for increased work and education opportunities and debated the 
need for greater political, cultural, and economic sovereignty. in 1913 the sai 
started to publish the Quarterly Journal of the Society of American Indians, 
which represented the principal organ to disseminate its agenda. The sai held 
annual conferences and became the leading voice for reform in indian affairs.
When the united states entered the first World War, many sai leaders 
responded enthusiastically to the country’s military need in an essay. They 
instructed the journal’s readers that the united states “has upheld the principles 
of human liberty, political equality and universal justice and she has invited to 
her hospitable shores the millions of the world who needed a land of opportu-
nity and has schooled them in those principles.” The essay concluded with the 
challenge, “already we hear the tread of feet that once wore moccasins; already 
the red men are enlisting. Let this, then, be a personal question, ‘Have you done 
your share?’ ”90 The sai was rarely in accord with the american government or 
the War department, but on this occasion, the organization never wavered in its 
support. By the 1920s, the sai splintered into factions, rent by internal rivalries, 
but its support for indian enlistment, service, and domestic contributions (e.g., 
liberty loans and the Red cross) positively influenced politicians and others to 
enact necessary reforms, including full citizenship for indians in 1924.
Two years later, in 1926, secretary of the interior hubert Work sanctioned an 
independent study to determine the effectiveness of american government poli-
cies on behalf of indian since 1887 and the dawes act. The so-called Meriam 
Report signified the clearest statement of current economic, social, and cultural 
conditions for indians, noting that indians had not “adjusted to the economic 
and social system of the dominant white society.”91 as historian Margaret szasz 
noted, “in the four decades since the passage of the dawes act, indians had 
become more and more dependent on the indian Bureau. ironically, this was 
the very antithesis of the theoretical aim of federal indian Policy.”92
at the heart of the debates in the united states and the soviet union during 
the 1920s was the issue of self-determination. The concept of self- determination 
became current in the late eighteenth century, but us president Woodrow 
Wilson popularized the idea during the first World War. vladimir lenin also 
embraced the concept but for different reasons. like lenin, Wilson and his 
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supporters held a liberal worldview in which self-determination represented 
self-government, nationality, and the nation-state.93 neither Wilson nor lenin 
defined self-determination within their own country’s boundaries as indepen-
dence or decolonization. according to Rupert emerson, the “intermingling” of 
minorities with the “dominant majority people” determined that “no form of 
self-determination, short of mass migration, can be invoked to satisfy such 
demands as the minority community may make for recognition of its separate 
identity and its human rights.”94 lenin’s soviet union was the first to try self-
determination, as understood then, in a multinational state.
implementing the ill-defined self-determination program among the Kazakhs, 
however, was complex and burdened by lingering tensions between Russian set-
tlers and Kazakh nomads. The soviet union’s self-determination policies pro-
moted forms of nationhood (language, culture), created national territories, and 
established what historian Terry Martin called an “affirmative action empire.”95 
The soviet government formed commissions to investigate Russian and Kazakh 
grievances and the agricultural commissariat ultimately concluded that protec-
tion for Russian agriculture, not “backward” Kazakh nomadism, was paramount. 
at the 1927 communist Party congress, Kazakh leaders claimed that the 
“Kazakh people interpret autonomy above all else as the right to decide inde-
pendently questions of land.”96 Kazakh resistance to collectivization decimated 
livestock and resulted in a famine that claimed nearly 25 percent of the Kazakh 
population.97 The soviets began the “socialist offensive,” ostensibly a class war 
against the “kulaks” (in the Kazakh case, wealthy nomads who possessed large 
herds). By 1931 stalin proclaimed that the soviet union finally defeated “back-
wardness” and had become an industrialized, modern socialist society.98
in the united states, self-determination took a different path. similar to 
Kazakh intellectuals’ complaints about Russification, american reformers and 
the leaders of the sai demanded an end to the dawes act and the restoration of 
social, cultural, and economic sovereignty. The Meriam Report seemed to sanc-
tion the reform agenda. The assimilation policies, reformers claimed, did nothing 
to elevate indians but further impoverished them. Reformers such as John collier 
hoped to rebuild tribal structures severely fractured during allotment, restore 
tribal lands, reconstitute tribal self-governance, and preserve or resurrect indige-
nous culture and languages. in 1934 congress passed the indian Reorganization 
act (iRa). staunchly advocated by collier, President franklin Roosevelt’s newly 
appointed commissioner of indian affairs, many american reformers considered 
this bill to be a vast improvement in indian-american relations.
also known as the Wheeler-howard act, its sponsor, sen. Burton Wheeler of 
Montana, subsequently considered the bill a failure. He wrote in his autobiography, 
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“i must confess that there is one bill i was not proud of having enacted . . . it was 
not a good bill.”99 Roosevelt, however, supported the bill because it granted to 
“indian people” the opportunity to “take an active and responsible part in the 
solution to their own problems.”100 upon its passage, a jubilant collier wrote, 
“Whether that date [June 18, 1934—the date Roosevelt signed the law] shall be 
known hereafter as the independence day of indian history will be determined 
by the indians themselves.” But, he exclaimed, “The allotment law—the agony 
and ruin of the indians—has been repealed.”101 one supporter of the legislation, 
elizabeth Green, compared the iRa with the “changes” evident for the “racial 
minorities once under the dominion of the Russian Tsars” and a “complete 
reorientation of indian administrative policy” once thought “impossible.”102 she 
also claimed that the most “salient feature of the new legislation is its land policy. 
The immediate effect . . . was to halt permanently the policy . . . of individual 
allotment of the tribal lands, previously owned communally.”103
in the end, most scholars consider collier’s reform efforts a failure. There are 
several reasons for this, but collier himself cited the unwillingness of congress 
to appropriate sufficient resources to carry out the program, a consistent com-
plaint since the nineteenth century.104 in the end, the iRa did not implement 
self-determination or the full cultural revival collier sought. in fact, in 1937 
senator Wheeler even introduced legislation to repeal it, though it remained in 
place until the 1950s.105 it failed for one simple reason: the american govern-
ment, despite claims to the contrary, legislation, and well-intentioned proposals, 
was unable or unwilling to relinquish control of Indian affairs. By the late 1930s, 
the united states and soviet Russia diverged significantly in their approach to 
self-determination. Both governments applied a form of “local federalism,” as 
suggested by Polish scholar oskar halecki, in which this form of self-determina-
tion “can give satisfaction to the claims of smaller groups or of factions of nation-
alities, without disorganizing the state to which they belong, by inconsiderate 
changes of frontier.”106 In a sense, one more reform equaled one more failure. 
clearly, for both the sioux and the Kazakhs, self-determination represented a 
more rhetorical rather than practical exercise.
us and soviet government authorities continued to direct and intervene 
in sioux and Kazakh political, social, and economic processes. according to 
anthropologist Thomas Biolsi, the “supervisory power could be invoked by the 
oia [office of indian affairs] (and occasionally was) to insure that council 
actions conformed to such standards as the tribal constitutions, oia policy, and 
the democratic ideals of the oia reformers.107 The indian office “engineered” 
political consent and cooperation from the sioux (as well among other indian 
tribes) in order to manage “tribal council operations . . . of self-government 
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to the sioux under the iRa.”108 in Kazakhstan, the soviet federal system did 
not assume any devolution of centralized political power, but the policy prior 
to 1928 was to promote Kazakh national forms—specifically, language and cul-
ture. The policies that collier instituted in the united states, albeit embryonic, 
were nonetheless self-determination. They shared with soviet efforts the goal to 
dismantle forced assimilation or integration (americanization or Russification) 
with policies designed to foster respect for and defense of indigenous culture, 
language, traditions, and arts. in the 1920s and 1930s, government officials in 
the united states and the soviet union deployed similar rhetoric to reform and 
restructure mechanisms to assimilate the indigenous populations; both govern-
ments had sioux and Kazakh supporters in this effort. The governments allied 
with these reformers to attach greater emphasis to cultural self-determination of 
indigenous populations rather than political self-determination that superseded 
demands for political autonomy, even independence and absolute sovereignty.
despite this invigorated political and social activism, neither the sai nor alash 
orda fully affected the change they sought. The sai was, according to histo-
rian hazel W. hertzberg, “a town meeting of educated english-speaking indians 
rather than a representative confederation of tribes.”109 sir olaf caroe dismissed 
alash orda as an organization that was “never much more than a committee which 
held congresses and issued manifestos.”110 These rather unsympathetic assess-
ments ignored the cultural, social, literary, and political contributions made by 
the sai and alash. The sai was the first indian-led organization that demanded 
a “voice in federal indian policy” and “respect for indians as citizens.” it estab-
lished the foundation for the “next wave of reform during the new deal.”111 alash 
orda was comparable to the sai. alash was an unprecedented voice for Kazakh 
grievances, a voice that unraveled during the Russian civil War. in the 1920s, 
soviet policies briefly resurrected that Kazakh voice, but the stalinist terror reck-
lessly and violently silenced it during the chaotic 1930s. The sai and alash man-
aged to give voice to those who had none to those willing to listen; the legacy was 
not just town meetings, conferences, or manifestos. The sai and alash managed 
to preserve and promote the culture, languages, and rich traditions previously 
deemed primitive and destined to perish with the “touch of civilization.”
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american and Russian internal colonization of the plains and the steppe were 
phases in a broader national history of expansion. The contiguous expansion 
occupied different rostra of nineteenth-century european imperialism and 
colonialism, but the processes of american and Russian expansion and internal 
colonization illustrate a common set of assumptions and expectations about the 
land and the indigenous peoples being incorporated also exhibited by contem-
porary european empires. The american expansionist ideology engendered 
by its european ancestors—chiefly Britain—amalgamated lockean liberalism 
rooted in a philosophy that emphasized private property, individualism, civil 
liberties, hard work, and contracts. it evolved to coalesce into a purposeful, 
almost messianic sense of divine mission to conquer the North American con-
tinent and to civilize and americanize the natives. initially, Russian expansion 
had no such mission; it was driven by trade and security. By the late nineteenth 
century, however, Russia’s mission evolved to unveil a comparable civilizing 
agenda designed to integrate non-Russians into an imperial, but not national, 
framework and identity.1
By the second half of the nineteenth century, the us government insisted that 
the sioux completely assimilate in language, dress, and work—a process euphe-
mistically described as americanism. during the same period, the Russian gov-
ernment simply desired loyal subjects faithful to the empire; it did not want to 
turn Kazakhs into Russians. it was desirable for Kazakhs to adopt the Russian 
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language, culture, and religion but not required. The Russians wanted the 
Kazakhs to integrate, not assimilate; however, Russia also wanted Kazakh land, 
increased trade, and enhanced security, which the Kazakh steppe supplied in 
abundance. These imperial colonizing traits manifested in numerous other colo-
nial contexts, such as the British in india and africa and the french in algeria.2 
in that sense, the united states and Russia mimicked their imperial contempo-
raries. as with other empires, the united states and Russia depicted the other—
the people on the frontier—as the savage or barbarian. The Roman empire, 
as historian Bernhard Maier observed, viewed the celts from the perspective 
of a “military adversary” that “goes hand in hand with unconcealed propagan-
dist intent, which places disproportionately strong emphasis on the wild and 
warlike aspect.”3 The american, Russian, British, and other nineteenth-century 
European empires used comparable prisms to observe, conquer, and colonize. 
americans and Russians did not concoct the prisms, typologies, and images to 
view their colonized peoples. instead, they merely inherited the caricatures and 
fashioned them to suit their nineteenth-century sensibilities.
americans and Russians characterized the sioux and the Kazakhs as locked 
in a time capsule of sorts, capable of civilized behavior but separated from the 
society and culture the colonizers expected them to imitate. The sioux settled 
on reservations, attended government-sanctioned schools to learn english and a 
trade, and were expected to adopt christianity. The Russian government forced 
most Kazakhs to settle; school was expected for only some to serve the empire; 
and conversion to christianity was anticipated by the Russians as only a tool to 
combat their increased fear of an aroused islam.4
What made the united states and tsarist Russia different from their european 
counterparts was obvious: the contiguous nature of the empires and internal 
colonization. The civilizing mission was internal rather than external, but it 
shared comparable objectives. By the start of the twentieth century, the united 
states and Russia erected the primary mechanisms to fulfill internal coloniza-
tion of the sioux and the Kazakhs. allotment and education posed the twin 
pillars to civilize them. By the 1890s, the sioux and the Kazakhs resisted, not 
with guns and rebellion, but in print and adaptation. sioux and Kazakh intel-
lectuals—educated to assimilate or integrate—adapted, adopted, and chal-
lenged american and Russian civilizing ideologies. This was contrary to many 
contemporary expectations, expressed by nineteenth-century sociologist John s. 
MacKenzie, who observed,
When a people is conquered and subjected to another, it ceases to be a soci-
ety, except in so far as it retains a spiritual life of its own apart from that of its 
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conquerors. Yet it does not become an integral part of the victorious people’s 
life, until it is able to appropriate to itself the spirit of that life. so long as the 
citizens of the conquered state are merely in the condition of atoms externally 
fitted into a system to which they do not naturally belong, they cannot be 
regarded as parts of the society at all. They are slaves: they are instruments of 
a civilization of which they do not partake. certainly no more melancholy fate 
can befall a nation than that it should be subjected to another whose life is 
not large enough to absorb its own.5
The British and french constructed civilizing ideologies to elevate and sustain 
external imperial identities, which the colonizer designed to civilize the colo-
nized people of the empire. for the British and the french, this process was 
empire building; but due to the contiguous expansion of the united states and 
Russia, the process was both an empire and, differently from other nineteenth-
century empires, simultaneously a state-building process. americans accepted 
state-building—they considered expansion across the continent to be an organic 
process—but many americans rejected the idea that continental expansion was 
also imperialism. Russia’s expansion was equally organic but unabashedly impe-
rial. The lands and peoples were subjects of the tsar, the societies that remained 
barbarous and backward. Consequently, Americans and Russians considered 
the sioux and the Kazakhs to be expendable exteriors to the dominant society 
and the state. Russia embraced the imperial concept, but the united states 
rhetorically rejected it.
These imperial civilizing justifications, adopted not just by overseas empires 
such as Britain and france but the united states and Russia as well, exacerbated 
tensions between colonized and colonizer. as scholars have noted, the imperial 
colonizing goal to elevate a people from savagery to civilization also incubated 
the justification for its own imperial destruction.6 for the united states and 
Russia, however, the imperial ideology was as much about civilizing the indig-
enous populations as it was civilizing wilderness. The state uniformly assimilated 
the land but not the people. The people did not disappear—civilization did not 
exterminate them—but they adapted and survived. nonetheless, the perception 
persisted well into the twentieth century that the indigenous peoples caught 
in american and Russian continental expansions seemingly evaporated in the 
onslaught of internal colonization. in a 1962 essay titled “colonialism,” historian 
a. P. Thornton argued that indigenous populations that resisted “expansion of 
empire overland have . . . been expunged both from the map and the histori-
cal conscience—and this is true of the Red indians of north america as to the 
Turkomans of central asia.”7
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Though Thornton’s observation was not a specific reference to the sioux or 
the Kazakhs, the point is relevant to this comparison because it conveys the 
perception rather than the reality: the intrinsic notion that the united states 
and tsarist Russia exterminated the colonized indigenous peoples, the languages 
and cultures lost. Moreover, Thornton echoed nineteenth-century expectations 
of the one inevitable outcome of continental expansion: that the “touch of civi-
lization” always overwhelmed indigenous peoples.8 instead, in the early twen-
tieth century, many well-educated sioux and Kazakhs adapted and organized 
social movements that used print—newspapers, magazines, and journals—to 
validate their languages and cultures. These intellectuals emerged as spokes-
men for their people at the very moment the united states and Russia con-
fronted two very different crises of identity that followed america’s victory in 
the spanish-american War and Russia’s defeat by the Japanese and the 1905 
Russian Revolution.
The coMPaRaTive PeRsPecTive
one of the most inherently comparative statements anyone can make about the 
united states or Russia is that they were, or are, exceptional. The united states 
and Russia expanded across continents; internally colonized indigenous peoples 
who lived there; incorporated those peoples into the political entity; allotted 
lands; and exercised political, social, and cultural control over those peoples with 
education, language, and religion to integrate, assimilate, or separate them from 
the dominant colonizing society. The united states and Russia exhibited all of 
the traits typically associated with nineteenth-century european imperialism 
in africa and asia; the only difference was contiguous expansion as opposed to 
overseas expansion. The processes might have differed; the consequences for the 
sioux and the Kazakhs did not.
The comparative perspective reveals much about empires—their construc-
tion, their methods of conquest and administration, their typologies and percep-
tions, and their uniqueness and similarities. The United States and Russia were 
not exceptional; they were not unique empires. That does not mean, however, 
that these two empires did not develop idiosyncratic processes or share com-
monalities with one other. The americans and the Russians used allotment and 
education to accomplish the same thing—compliant subjects of the empire—
but the way the colonizers’ allotted land and the manner in which the american 
and Russian governments educated sioux and Kazakh children was different.
The united states and Russia paralleled, though not precisely, each other in 
their continental expansion and internal colonization. They developed policies 
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and processes based on many common assumptions, expectations, ideologies, 
typologies, and consequences for those internally colonized. The United States 
and tsarist Russia were, as historians ann laura stoler and carole McGranahan 
noted, “quintessential” empires, “consummate producers of excepted popula-
tions, excepted spaces, and their own exception from international and domes-
tic laws.”9 and yet, in the united states, the debate about american exception-
alism continues. in Russia, the soviets rejected the idea of Russia’s imperial 
exceptionalism and replaced it with a new soviet ideology, founding mytholo-
gies, and typologies to create a new soviet exceptionalism. These exceptional-
ist arguments, whether american, Russian, or soviet, often, as historian Mary 
nolan argued, “promote their own silences and omissions” that mask “the com-
plex nature of american society and its similarities with the interconnections 
to other nations.”10 The collapse of the soviet union ended its exceptionalist 
claims, forcing reinterpretations of the past—both tsarist and soviet—in Russia, 
Kazakhstan, ukraine, and Georgia. frederick Jackson Turner’s frontier thesis 
still animates debates among american scholars.
comparative history ought to illuminate something about the subjects being 
compared that might not be clear and evident when examined in isolation 
because, as historians frederick cooper, George M. fredrickson, and James 
T. campbell argued, “comparison suggests the multiple possibilities, path-
ways, and dead ends that exist within a broader history. a global, interactive 
approach to history needs comparison, and comparison needs interactive and 
global analysis.”11 The united states and tsarist Russia in the nineteenth cen-
tury expanded their empires comparable to other european overseas imperial 
and colonial processes. Travelers to the american plains and the Kazakh steppe 
saw the similarities—not just the geographic similarities but the consequences 
of expansion and internal colonization. in the nineteenth century, as david M. 
Wrobel argued in Global West, American Frontier, travelers “often placed the 
West in a broader, comparative global context, viewing it as one developing fron-
tier among many and considering the united states as a colonizing power (like 
its european progenitors).”12
a common feature of empires was the ability of the colonizing society—in 
this case, americans and Russians—to express a self-perception that justified 
expansion and colonization. The united states clearly did so through Manifest 
destiny throughout the nineteenth century. Manifest destiny was a concept 
rooted in the belief that the united states was a christian nation that provi-
dence selected to expand across the continent, save the indian from extinction, 
spread the agrarian ideal, and exploit the bounty that was heretofore neglected 
and wasted by a race incapable of progressing without the guidance and firm 
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hand of a benevolent american people. The Russians’ self-perception stemmed 
from a belief that the racism evident in american or British empire building was 
a malignant sort; many Russians believed that they possessed a unique ability to 
absorb alien peoples into the empire. They believed the conflict and opposition 
they encountered in the Kazakh steppe, the caucasus, and Turkestan was not a 
response to Russian expansion, but that it derived from an islamic fanaticism—a 
social and cultural backwardness that repressed the peoples the empire colo-
nized. americans and Russians believed they had a christian duty to save the 
sioux and the Kazakhs from the very fabrics of their social, cultural, economic, 
and political structures that kept them living a nomadic and barbaric life.
The problem with both self-perceptions was that each served a single master: 
both demanded the land from the people already living and using that land. it 
was american and Russian self-delusion that failed to recognize that the sioux 
and the Kazakhs fought for the land, not just for the ostensibly barbaric culture, 
society, and economies. The sioux and the Kazakhs fought for the land that 
sustained the nomadic life, which existed in juxtaposition to the agrarian perfec-
tion americans and Russians believed was necessary to survive. americans and 
Russians believed the agrarian ideal was an essential process to elevate the sioux 
and the Kazakhs above the nomadic barbarism they seemingly inhabited. The 
conflict emerged because the sioux and the Kazakhs simply gave the land a dif-
ferent value—one that was economic, of course, but one intrinsically connected 
to their culture, society, and way of life. Moreover, sioux and Kazakh societies 
were not stagnant, which contrasted with american and Russian perceptions. 
sioux and Kazakh societies and cultures were always in transition, adapting new 
technologies and strategies to cope with the internal and external pressures that 
challenged their way of life.
students of Russian and soviet imperialism can be, by the same token, seduced 
by the uniqueness or exceptionalist view, based upon perceptions of tsarist 
autocracy or Soviet/Stalinist brutality. Moreover, when students of rich Russian 
history compare its imperial designs and extraordinary geographic expansion, 
the comparison is usually internal to the empire itself. for example, one might 
compare central asia and the caucasus, or finland and Poland; even within 
central asia itself the comparison might be between the steppe and Turkestan, 
or a sedentary-nomadic dichotomy. Rarely have students of Russian imperialism 
ventured outside, except, as adeeb Khalid noted, to compare Russia with the 
British Empire. Yet, even an astute scholar like Khalid fell into the “uniqueness” 
trap when he wrote, “Colonial conquest transformed colonized societies, but 
colonial empires seldom used state power to transform societies, cultures, or 
individuals in the way attempted by the soviet state.”13 But that is precisely what 
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the united states did to the sioux, and certainly what tsarist Russia wanted to 
do to the Kazakhs, in the nineteenth century.
This study chiefly focused upon american and Russian central government 
policies—particularly in the united states, where the sioux depended upon 
the federal government rather than individual states. That should not sug-
gest, however, that the states played no role, but that policy typically emanated 
in Washington and was implemented on reservations or other federal lands by 
federal employees working for federal institutions. in contrast, in the Russian 
empire, the central government in saint Petersburg developed policies to oper-
ate in the various provinces and governor-generalships in siberia, Turkestan, and 
the Kazakh steppe. Russian government officials—in particular, the governor-
generals—had far more latitude to execute policies as they saw fit. american gov-
ernors had no authority to adjust or implement policies on reservations in their 
states. so Russia, the autocratic and despotic regime, manifested less oversight 
in local affairs in nationality questions than did Washington, the decentralized 
and democratic icon, with the “indian Question.” This was, in part, due to con-
stitutional authority in the united states to deal with indians being vested in 
the federal government, not in the states; in Russia, no such structure existed. 
The tsar ruled, the tsar appointed, and the tsar governed; but the tsar relied on 
thousands of government officials to follow his decrees and that created a highly 
malleable environment for policy interpretation for those on the ground in the 
Kazakh steppe.
american and Russian colonization of the northern Great Plains and the 
Kazakh steppe situates comfortably within the framework of nineteenth- 
century global imperial-colonial expansion. american and Russian colonization 
of contiguous territories compares well with the mainstream of the analogous 
phenomenon in africa and asia. as with British, french, or Belgian imperial-
ism, the perceptions of uninhabited or underutilized land, backward peoples, 
or untapped resources justified the need to expand and colonize. The coloniz-
ers intended to bring agriculture and develop the resources that fueled and 
financed their industry. in addition, the imperial powers reconfigured the 
mission from one of economics to culture and society to elevate the seemingly 
backward peoples from their barbarism. imperialism and colonialism was also, 
ultimately, about people: those who colonized with a self-conceptualized civi-
lizing agenda and those who were the target of that expansion and subsequent 
colonization.
The process of incorporating the sioux and the Kazakhs into the expand-
ing country’s territorial and political structures was a comparable divide-and-
conquer method. The Americans and the Russians used treaties and oaths to get 
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bands or clans to cede land, swear loyalty, or surrender their political and eco-
nomic sovereignty. The united states and Russia recognized the political—per-
haps national—sovereignty of the sioux and the Kazakhs, but they never signed 
treaties or swore oaths with a single representative who legitimately spoke for, or 
had the right to speak for, the entire community. The sioux and the Kazakhs did 
not have national leaders and did not have governance mechanisms to represent 
all sioux or all Kazakhs; they did not have comparable political systems capa-
ble of behaving like a nation-state, nor did they necessarily want that structure. 
each treaty or oath taken by one or a few sioux or Kazakhs did not represent 
all sioux or all Kazakhs. The us and Russian governments understood this fact 
but typically faulted the backward sociopolitical structures of the sioux and the 
Kazakhs rather than acknowledge the tactic and policies of divide and conquer. 
The united states signed treaties with bands and the Russians accepted oaths 
from clan or even horde khans, but there was never an occasion when sioux 
chiefs or Kazakh khans could legitimately claim to represent the nation.
The benefit of this comparison is that examining the internal colonization of 
the sioux and the Kazakhs through the comparative prism demonstrates that 
the united states engaged in an expansionist agenda that differed little from 
the Russian experience. The internal colonization produced an overwhelming 
response and use of force to localized affairs, but it was clearly motivated by a 
desire to complete the colonization of land that was arguably controlled by a 
native people. internal colonization provoked resistance and conflict, and these 
conflicts represented military resistance by a people whose political sovereignty 
the colonizers already determined lacked national unity or a national integrity 
to be treated as equals. In that sense, the American expansion west was not a 
unique colonizing exercise somehow separated from other nineteenth-century 
european colonizations. and yet, american and Russian perceptions of their 
continental expansions still maintain a powerful influence on their respective 
national imaginations.
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